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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

MAKING BOUNDARIES AND LINKING GLOBALLY:
“MATERIAL POLITICS” OF PHYTOSANITARY
REGULATIOIN ON MEXICAN MANGOS
This dissertation illuminates how phytosanitary (PS) regulations enable mango
exportation from Mexico to the United States. PS regulations are technical and legal
measures to prevent plant pests from proliferating or being transported to other places
and are important regulatory mechanisms enabling the globalization of agriculture. My
case study investigates how PS regulations enable Mexican mango exportation as an
aspect of the globalization of agriculture, illustrating the consequences of PS regulations
to humans and non-humans. More specifically, three research questions are posed: (1)
How does the PS regulation network operate to draw distinctions between pest/non-pest,
thereby enabling the export of Mexican mangos to the United States? (2) What values are
associated with the PS regulation network, and what are the normative, moral, or ethical
implications of the regulations? And, (3) How are the PS regulations in transition in the
state of Sinaloa changing economic prospects for mango growers and packers to tap into
global mango markets?
Theoretically, the analysis draws on a concept called “material politics,” which
claims that politics is enacted through not only discursive measures, such as statutes, but
also physical embodiment by material beings. Thus, PS regulations are conceptualized as
a materially heterogeneous network that establishes boundaries between pest/non-pest,
thereby connecting distinct places, such as mango orchards and consumers. The material
politics concept also suggests the emergence of socio-material “ordering” effects by
regulations, such as values, morals, and norms, as well as unequal economic
opportunities.
Nine months of ethnographic fieldwork in Mexico, which employed in-depth
interviews, (participant) observations, and documentary research, yielded the following
findings: (1) PS regulations as a network of governance (re)configured the production of
the commodity, “disciplining” humans and non-humans to conform to the global
regulatory order; (2) in this network, non-governmental entities played critical roles,
fitting squarely with the recent neoliberal political-economic orientation in Mexico; and

(3) although the government’s pest eradication program could improve market chances
for growers, local political-economic circumstances, including small-scale growers’
dependence on packers for marketing, still left substantial challenges for such economic
prospects to materialize.

KEYWORDS: Phytosanitary regulation, Mango, Mexico, Material Politics, Globalization
of agriculture
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Through what process are mango fruits from Mexico made available to
consumers in the United States? That is the question prompting this research. Mangos,
one of the most consumed fruits in tropical areas, are now commonly found in
supermarkets in temperate industrialized countries, such as the United States. However,
the fact that mangos are available in this country might be an unlikely outcome since they
are vulnerable to Tephritidae fruit flies, highly problematic pests, which the United States
strictly controls. The U.S. government applies stringent phytosanitary (PS) regulations to
mangos in order to prevent the pests from entering the country. Through investigating the
PS regulations, or measures “designed to minimize the transport and spread of organisms
harmful to plants by means of human activities” (Ebbels 2003:3), this dissertations sheds
light on some behind the scenes mechanisms that enable mangos to become a globally
traded commodity.
Using the case study of Mexican mangos exported to the United States, the
following chapters will present the ways a variety of agents, including humans, devices,
insects, and statutes, are assembled as a network of regulations that makes the fruit pestfree and thereby eligible for export from Mexico to the United States. Drawing on
ethnographic research conducted in Mexico, this study also illuminates how the PS
regulation network engenders values, moral expectations, and norms, and alters the
prospects of economic opportunities for mango growers and packers to access markets
beyond their own borders.
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For my case study, I chose Sinaloa in northwestern Mexico as the principal field
of research for two reasons: first, it is a major mango-producing state, and second, it is in
transition in terms of PS conditions. To prevent Tephritidae fruit flies,1 which are
parasitic on many fruit crops, from being introduced to its territory, the U.S. government
requires that Mexican mangos prove to be free from the pests. This has been made
possible by the application of disinfection treatments, including fumigation with ethylene
dibromide (EDB),2 heat treatment, and irradiation. Hot-water treatment (HWT), the most
common disinfection treatment for Mexican mangos, involves dipping mangos in hot
water for a certain period of time to kill immature fruit flies. This practice became
mandatory in 1986 and since then has been successfully applied in the export of Mexican
mangos to the United States. Meanwhile, an alternative tactic that allows producers to
export mangos to the United States is production in pest-free areas (PFA). A PFA is an
established geographic area in which target pest species have been eradicated and pestfree status is maintained through diverse technical means. In Sinaloa, five municipalities
were recognized as PFA in 2005 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Mangos grown in the PFA can be exported to the United States without additional
treatments such as HWT. Several other municipalities in the central region of the state are
awaiting official recognition by the United States as PFA, while active operations to
eradicate the pest are in effect in the rest of the state, which remains non-PFA. This
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More specifically, these species are Mexican fruit fly (Anastrepha ludens), West Indian
fruit fly (A. obliqua), Zapote fruit fly (A. serpentina), Guava fruit fly (A. striata), and
Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata).
2

As detailed in Chapter 6, the use of EDB has already been abolished for health concerns
in the United States.
2

arrangement of the PS regulations in transition makes this state an ideal site in which to
observe dynamic changes of the regulatory landscape.
Theoretically, my exploration of the PS regulation network is guided by the
concept of “material politics” (Law and Mol 2008) so as to illuminate globalization as a
process that makes boundaries between “pest/non-pest.” Moreover, the PS regulation
network links distant places through mundane practices, involving non-human “material”
beings, and simultaneously creates and contrasts multiple orderings as effects of the
material practices. In contrast with the term order, which suggests a static and fixed
status, the term ordering implies that consequences are ever incomplete, temporal effects
(Law 1994) that are captured as processes. Therefore, the PS regulation network can be
understood as establishing boundaries between “pest/non-pest” objects, places, and
people, while simultaneously linking (i.e., establishing relationship between) them (e.g., a
mango grove in Mexico and a supermarket in the United States). This process engages a
variety of measures, including legal statutes and physical devices, involves human and
non-human beings, and simultaneously creates socio-material orderings, including, as
alluded to earlier, values, moral/ethical/normative senses, and disciplines, dominations,
and inequalities. For instance, processes to distinguish whether fruits are free from pests
are paired with other estimations, such as “a good grower producing pest-free fruits”; the
“good” status implies a normative and disciplining expectation (e.g., “other growers
should do the same”) as well as a qualification to market the products to distant places.
Thus, the material politics concept is a starting point to critically scrutinize the PS
regulation network. However, ensuring that mango fruits are “pest free” is not a simple
task. A variety of measures, including legal texts, scientific knowledge, pest detection
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devices, disinfection equipment, and people, must be allied, organized, and monitored to
effect proper operation of the regulations. To better understand this complex process of
assembling a heterogeneous regulation network, my study draws on insights from various
strands of literature, including Science and Technology Studies (STS), Actor-Network
Theory (ANT), Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, Michel Foucault’s theories of
governmentality, and the sociology of agriculture and food, in order to elucidate the
performance and consequences of the PS regulation network as one of several regulations
that enables today’s globalization of agriculture and food production and consumption.
Insights from STS and ANT in particular propose that both humans and non-humans be
treated symmetrically in analysis of the “social” as a materially heterogeneous network
(Law 1994; 2009). System-theoretical perspective is useful in accurately grasping
specific operations of functionally differentiated social systems, such as science, law,
economics, and politics, which are assembled as a network and altogether serve to enact
the PS regulations. That global society has distinctive domains, or differentiated systems,
is also relevant to understanding the recent rise of governance and governmentality under
a neoliberal political climate, which drives the globalization of agriculture and food
production and consumption. Foucault’s concept of governmentality indicates that in
neoliberal political-economic reforms the nation-state government gradually loses—or so
it appears—its central role in regulating society. In its place arises scientific governance
and diverse entities involved in governance as significant players, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the use of a variety of technical measures
and expertise underpinned by varying social domains, such as science and law, in order to
“conduct conducts” of individuals (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996a; Dean 2010; Higgins
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and Larner 2010; Higgins and Lawrence 2005a; Irwin 2007; Rose and Miller [1992]
2010). My research of the PS regulation network for the export of Mexican mangos is
situated in conjunction with these various theoretical strands.
In the rest of this chapter I will provide a brief overview of the background of the
present study. This will include an outline of the PS regulatory program for the mango
export program in the state of Sinaloa and formulation of the research questions for the
dissertation. Then, an outline of the dissertation will follow with brief descriptions of
each chapter.
1.1

Background of the Research and Research Questions
The mango is an important global agro-commodity generating revenues for

people of developing countries (Jacobi, MacRae, and Hetherington 2001). However, its
international trade is relatively limited due to its susceptibility to destructive fruit flies
and perishability, resulting in the necessity of post-harvest PS treatments for disinfection
that can simultaneously preserve the fruit’s quality (Jacobi, MacRae, and Hetherington
2001). Mexico is a major mango-producing country, ranked fourth in world total
production, and exported about 0.2 million tons of mangos in 2005, ranking second in the
world’s total export in that year (FAOSTATS http://faostat.fao.org/). The US is the most
important customer of this export from Mexico: nearly ninety percent of the mango
export from Mexico is destined for the United States.
In the fresh mango exportation from Mexico to the United States, PS regulations
to ensure that fruits are pest-free are crucial. Mexican packers/exporters shipping mangos
to the United States must abide by the Work Plan agreed upon by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) and the
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Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación
(SAGARPA) of Mexico. The Work Plan details technical specifications of the
disinfection of the fruit, as well as the responsibilities of APHIS, SAGARPA, growers,
packers/exporters, and their organization, Empacadoras de Mango de Exportación
(EMEX). As the only organization officially recognized by the USDA as representing the
exporters, EMEX is responsible for coordinating key activities of the program. Since its
foundation in 1991, EMEX has been vital to the promotion of almost all aspects of the
Mexican mango industry, including research on mangos, quarantine negotiations, postharvest handling, packing standards, marketing, and promotion of the commodity (WongUrrea et al. 1996).
Hot-water treatment (HWT) is the practice used for disinfection in most of the
areas where mangos are produced in Mexico. This practice draws distinctions between
pest-free fruits and non-pest-free fruits and links them (i.e. pest-free fruits can be
exported) to the United States. The process engages diverse means and material beings
such as a water tub, hot water, thermometer, and so forth. In addition to the HWT process
per se, the Work Plan, along with national PS statutes, stipulates numerous conditions,
including registration of orchards, certification of disinfection facilities, monitoring of
packing, and on-site inspection by APHIS and SAGARPA officials. While the practice of
HWT engages diverse human and non-human beings, it engenders certain orderings
about and among them, such as “clean packing areas for treated fruits” and “non-clean
unload areas for untreated fruits” within a packing/disinfection facility. The HWT
currently practiced was initially developed in the 1980s. Prior to that, as detailed in
Chapter 6, mangos were disinfected with vapor heat, fumigation by EDB, or another
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technique combining vapor heat and cold water (Sharp et al. 1989; Sharp 1994; Sharp
and Hallman 1994).
Meanwhile, pest-free area (PFA) certification is an alternative means to authorize
Mexican mango exportation to the United States. A PFA is described as “an area in
which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which,
where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained” (IPPC 1995:37). To
eradicate a target pest species from a certain geographical area, and to establish and
maintain it as pest-free, various measures are applied, including pest monitoring by traps,
pest population suppression by sterile fly release and pesticide application, and other
quarantine measures such as roadside inspection (Riherd, Nguyen, and Brazzel 1994).
The fruit flies of concern in Mexico, consistent with the fact that Mexican fruit flies are
the best known species of fruit fly, are persistent and elusive as they can reproduce in
different plants, can fly, or can “hitchhike” on human transportation, sneaking into
another area. Hence, to eradicate them from a geographic area takes tireless and repeated
mundane practices. The area in which a pest species is eradicated must be officially (i.e.,
by a national government) certified and declared to be pest-free by exporting and
importing countries to make products eligible for export.
In the case of mangos, the benefit of PFA certification is significant because fruits
grown in a PFA can be exported without HWT, which is costly and can damage fruits’
quality. In 2005, the Mexican governmental eradication campaign led to the official
recognition by the United States that five municipalities in northern Sinaloa were free of
fruit flies (SAGARPA 2006). Critical to my study, this PFA’s “frontline” is about to
shift: several other municipalities are awaiting official recognition as PFAs. This
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changing arrangement of PS regulations provided me with a chance to closely analyze the
dynamism of different modes of ordering effects between HWT and PFA. It could be
posited that the shifting technical arrangement from HWT to PFA in Sinaloa would allow
me to delineate multiple, asymmetrical, contingent emerging orderings, which may entail
moral and normative values, and differential economic opportunities. For example,
currently several roadside inspection points operate in Sinaloa to prevent smuggling of
potentially contaminated items into the clean PFA. Transportation of humans and nonhumans are controlled here; passing the points with banned products potentially
contaminated with fruit flies can now be deemed illegal. In the area where fruit fly
control programs operate, some mango growers who are serious about complying with
practices required for pest control blame those who are not for being unserious. A field
technician who checks fruit fly traps carefully and never misses the detection of
problematic insects would be deemed competent, while others who have missed would be
called, unfortunately, incompetent. In the area that is becoming a PFA, some mango
growers see opportunities to ship their fruits without the costly HWT, but others find
costs for the eradication program constraining. And the differences can result in varying
opportunities to gain access to the global economy of agriculture.
In addition to the technical transition of the PS regulations in Sinaloa, my study
addresses how scientific knowledge about fruit flies and measures to control them are
constructed. Scientific research on fruit flies is where distinctions between “pest/non-pest”
are produced. It is one of the tasks of this study to elucidate how scientists examine
whether a certain class of insects is a significant pest for particular crops, or whether
technical measures such as HWT can really make fruits pest-free. For example,
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determining “host status” (i.e., whether a plant product can be infested by a certain class
of insect) is not a straightforward task. Host status is a complex function where diverse
variables intertwine, including the plant’s and the insect’s ecological and physiological
characteristics and the politico-economic concerns of countries interested in the trade of
plant products (Aluja and Mangan 2008). In the case of a fruit fly, whether its larva
hatches, grows, and feeds on a specific fruit is one of the primary determinants of host
status. However, some fruit flies’ feeding habits are fairly contingent on diverse factors,
such as the availability of plants and the characteristics of fruits. Even if a fruit fly
species is known not to lay eggs on fruits of a particular plant in the wild field, it may do
so in an artificial condition (i.e., confined in a cage with only a concerned plant species or
cultivar). As for the development of the HWT, a trial-and-error process is necessary to
determine the appropriate water temperature and time of dipping fruits while ensuring
both disinfection and quality (e.g., palatability and shelf life) of fruits. A variety of
factors determine the parameters of the HWT, such as the size of fruits, their heat
tolerance in terms of quality preservation, and the heat resistance of larva at different
developmental stages.
Not only “natural” scientific-technical aspects, but also “politics” comes into play
in regulating fruits for exportation. Fruit growers in the United States might be concerned
about potential fruit fly invasions as a result of allowing the importation of new fruit
products, including mangos. For exporting countries, such responses might appear to
reflect protectionism on the part of U.S. farmers. Even if an importing country lifts a
plant-quarantine import ban, it does not mean that all producers in the approved exporting
countries can immediately export the product. An exporting country and an importing
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country make an agreement that requires specific conditions for export, which some
farmers may find difficult to meet.
The technical transition of PS regulations in Sinaloa as well as basic scientific
research on fruit flies both constitute processes that draw pest/non-pest distinctions,
engaging not only humans but also non-humans. To an observer examining scientific
research on fruit flies, the processes to construct knowledge, whether host status
determination or development of HWT, may look as if “negotiation” between humans
and non-humans, such as fruits, pests, humans, and devices, is taking place. With the
guidance of the idea of material politics, this study aims to elucidate how such
“negotiation” as socio-material ordering is taking place and being settled, and what
consequences the PS regulations bring about, including moral, normative senses, and
differing economic opportunities. More specifically, I ask the following questions:
[Question 1] How does the PS regulation network operate to draw distinctions
between pest/non-pest, thereby enabling the export of Mexican mangos to the United
States? Who and what devices, practices, or knowledge are applied in the development
and enactment of PS regulations?
[Question 2] What values are associated with the PS regulation network, and
what are the normative, moral, or ethical implications of the regulations?
[Question 3] How are the PS regulations in transition in Sinaloa changing
economic prospects for mango growers and packers to tap into global markets of
mangos?
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1.2

Outline of Dissertation
The next chapter will develop the theoretical foundation that guides this study. I

will provide an overview of the material politics concept by Law and Mol (2008) and
explain how it is applied to the analysis of PS regulations in Mexico. Then, my analysis
of the material politics of the PS regulation network will be situated in various strands of
relevant literature, including political economy of governance, systems theory, STS, and
the sociology of agriculture and food. Chapter Three will address methodologies
employed in this research using a case study approach, consisting of qualitative data
collection and analysis approaches. Chapter Four will introduce major “actors” in this
research, including legal and organizational frameworks of global PS regulations,
Tephritidae fruit flies, and mangos, and settings of the research site, Sinaloa, Mexico.
From Chapter Five through Ten, findings from the fieldwork in Mexico and
analyses of document data will be presented. Chapter Five will analyze a few cases on
processes through which a certain class of fruit flies were determined as a pest vis-à-vis
specific plant crops. Particular analytical attention will be paid to how uncertainties of
behaviors of the concerned fruit flies are handled, or temporarily halted and concealed, so
that knowledge about the pest-host relationship is built and sustained.
Chapter Six and Seven will examine major PS measures that enable the export of
Mexican mangos to the United States. Chapter Six, first, will trace a historical trajectory
of the development of post-harvest treatments, such as HWT, since the 1950s. A detailed
document analysis will elucidate how PS regulatory technologies developed, evolved,
and/or were abolished, engaging a constellation of human and non-human agents,
including devices and statutes, building and (re)shaping social-material relationships.

11

Following the analysis of post-harvest treatments is Chapter Seven, which presents how
the PFA in the state of Sinaloa was (being) established, by a national pest
eradication/control campaign, which employs a variety of “discursive” (flexible and
mobile) means and more rigid “material” means, along with non-human agents such as
sterilized insects and natural enemies of the pest. Processes to establish and maintain the
PFA, as the core component of the national campaign, are complex and extensive,
expanding the campaign’s reach of control from mango-producing areas to even nonfarming areas including urban residential zones, due to the high mobility of the fruit fly
pests. In short, the PS regulations for the PFA spatially expand, going beyond mango
groves and packing houses. These two chapters also elucidate how some of the physical
settings, for instance, double-screen doors installed in a packing house to control
movements of humans and non-humans, and simultaneously demarcating pest/non-pest
zones, were incorporated in PS regulations as a materially heterogeneous network,
epitomizing what the material politics concept is meant to capture through its analysis.
Chapter Eight will focus on some of the major organizational actors in charge of
PS regulations. Findings from my fieldwork will reveal important roles of quasigovernmental organizations, in particular, Comité Estatal de Sanidad Vegetal de Sinaloa
(CESAVESIN), or the State Committee of Plant Health of Sinaloa, in regulatory
activities to control the pest in Sinaloa. The unique, hybrid characteristics of this
Committee as a semi-private-semi-governmental organization enable it to engage in strict
regulatory activities with legally delegated authorities, and at the same time to effectively
mobilize mango growers to carry out control practices. Besides this Committee, the
increasing presence of other non-governmental third-party bodies playing vital roles in
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the enactment of PS regulations, such as the inspection of fruits in packing houses, will
be examined as well. My argument will center on the aptness and flexibility of these
quasi-governmental agencies in enacting the regulations very effectively within the
neoliberal political climate resulting from Mexico’s recent political-economic reforms.
Chapter Nine will address the values and moral, ethical, or normative implications
that constitute corollaries of the PS regulation network, and serve to discipline those
who/that are involved in it. Also addressed in this chapter are potential and explicit
conflicts engendered through confrontations of varying interests of actors engaged in the
regulation. Chapter Ten, the final chapter presenting findings, will examine whether and
how the PS regulation network will benefit some actors, such as farmers, especially
small-scale, less-resourceful, peasant growers. This question also pertains to how national
PS regulations as a public campaign incurring substantial costs is justified with its
expected benefits. That is, the eradication program of the PS campaign is expected to
eliminate the costly HWT, thereby supposedly liberating growers from a dependent
relationship with packers possessing the disinfection treatment equipment. However, in
reality, whether the economic prospect that growers would soon benefit from “liberation”
from the pest hinges on complex politico-economic circumstances surrounding peasant
growers, including increasing fees to participate in the pest-control program. Rather, my
argument will be that assessments of the prospected benefits of PS regulations require
consideration of the complex conditions in which peasant growers strive to sustain their
livelihoods.
Chapter Eleven, the concluding chapter, will provide summaries of the findings
chapters, followed by discussions of the significance of as well as limits of this research.
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Based on this, I will suggest future directions for subsequent inquiries to advance
understanding of global regulatory governance in agriculture and food provision.
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Chapter 2
Material Politics: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
This chapter addresses the theoretical foundation for the present research. First, I
will spell out the concept of material politics (Law and Mol 2008) and how it will guide
this study. Inspired by the practice of boiling pig swills in the United Kingdom as a
“political technique,” the concept draws attention to politics enacted by both “material”
and “discursive” means, as well as the multiplicity of socio-material orderings as
outcomes of a political technique. Second, I will discuss how the material politics
concept can be related to relevant literature, including works on STS, systems theory, and
the sociology of agriculture and food. A key idea that bridges these strands of literature is
governance in (neo)liberal political climates reflecting functional differentiation of
modern society, which, I will argue, provides diverse resources of legitimacy for
regulations to be assembled as materially heterogeneous, spatially and institutionally
extending, networks of control over human and non-human beings.
2.1

Material Politics
First and foremost, I will begin with the leitmotif of this study, that is, material

politics, which “may be understood as a material ordering of the world in a way that
contrasts this with other and equally possible alternative modes of ordering” (Law and
Mol 2008:133). As mentioned in the first chapter, ordering here means to defy the notion
of an order as a static status and to highlight that it is an ever incomplete and temporal
outcome (Law 1994). Law and Mol presented the concept of material politics through the
case of boiling treatment of pig swills (i.e., food waste), which drew distinctions,
establish boundaries, and connect different locales in the United Kingdom. The practice
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of boiling, which Law and Mol consider a “political technique,” was a legally required
mundane practice to disinfect human food waste and convert it into clean feed to prevent
swine disease. The practice involved non-human beings (e.g., boiling water, swine, and
waste from restaurants) all of which worked together to make links (i.e., establishing
relationships between) different places and times of metabolism, while engendering
multiple orderings of the world. Through boiling, multiple ordering effects such as those
between “food waste versus clean feed,” “disease-free, high-productive, rich United
Kingdom (where this treatment was practiced) versus contaminated, low-productive, poor
countries (where the treatment is not applied),” were engendered. However, this practice
was abolished in 2001 when Foot and Mouth Disease, a devastating cattle disease,
occurred, perhaps due to improper boiling treatment of swills. The abolishment of the
boiling practice in 2001 raised feed demand in the United Kingdom, which boosted soy
production in Argentina. At this time, the United Kingdom became dependent on
Argentinian feed supplies; and following this new ordering were workers who lost jobs in
rural Argentina, since soy production required less labor. Also, the metabolic linking
through recycling food waste between humans and hogs was severed in the United
Kingdom. The boiling practice as a political technique “ordered metabolic relations in a
complex way, globally dividing the rich from the poor, linking up distant places and
peoples” (Law and Mol 2008:141).
Thus, the idea of material politics concerns “an analysis of a geologic (a geologic
that is also an anthropologic and a technologic) of connecting and disconnecting; of
linking and differentiating while foregrounding the material specificities of our
geographically dispersed site” (Law and Mol 2008:134). Put differently, material politics
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allows us to grasp globalization as a process that draws boundaries and links distant
places through mundane practices involving both humans and non-humans and to
contrast contingent orderings of the world as effects of such material practices.
A very important feature of the material politics concept is its attention to
“materiality.” According to Law and Mol, there are two different sorts of politics: one
that is associated with “material” artifacts such as sleeping policeman (i.e., bump
installed on street to slow car speed down); the other associated with debates, discussions,
or explicit contestations, epitomized by political life in the ancient Greek polis. The
former is derived from insights of STS/ANT (Latour 1987; 2005; Law 1994; 2009; Law
and Hassard 1999), whereas the latter is from Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy
(Arendt 1958). For Law and Mol, one kind of these “politics” is not sufficient to grasp
material politics. The former is too strongly linked to a single order, that is, merely
whether a sleeping policeman slows a car down or not. The latter seems too strongly tied
with “the life of the mind” and is indifferent to the “stubborn obduracy of the material”
(Law and Mol 2008:134). Law and Mol (2008) articulate the material politics concept as
“one that simultaneously foregrounds the relevance of materialities, whilst making it
possible to explore differences and alternative modes of being” (135).
Also, the material politics concept takes seriously the relevance of non-human
beings in creating orderings of the world in relational, multi-contextual realities. In other
words, an ordering effect is not a single causal consequence, but is understood as one of
many possible alternative consequences in different contexts. Accordingly, it can be
argued that it is the task of an observer (a researcher) to elucidate and problematize as
“politics” contingent ordering effects that are consequences of the mundane working of
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non-human “actors.” An “actor” here is defined as an entity, whether human or nonhuman (e.g., a pest, nature, or god) and “collective” or not (e.g., an organization,
government, or individual), to which an event is attributed as its “act.” In the meantime, I
will call any unity to which an event may or may not be attributed as its act an “entity.”
Further noteworthy is their concept of ordering, which is comprehended in its
multiplicity or contingency. Material politics may be construed “as a material ordering of
the world in a way that contrasts with alternative and equally possible modes of ordering”
(Law and Mol 2008:133). This statement encapsulates their attention to the pluralcontextual realities of modern society. Also, an ordering is conceptualized as an everincomplete process. The idea of material politics aims to delineate globalization as
ordering rather than a fixed static order, because what is observed is not something everstable but an ever-incomplete process. Moreover, this pertains to their attention to the
mundaneness of practices that engender orderings. The boiling practice as such was not
necessarily something interesting, exciting, nor hotly contested (at least until it was
questioned). Yet, it is the very mundaneness of the practice that kept enacting boundaries
and simultaneously enabling linking, hence socio-material orderings.
Finally, I highlight what I call the “reflexive constructivism” of the material
politics concept, that is, the recognition that the “question is not whether something is
political all by itself but whether it can be called as part of the process of analysing it”
(Law and Mol 2008:133). Observing and describing something cannot be separated from
how an observer sees it (Luhmann 1998). Such a stance refuses a simple ontology that
presumes objects to be observed “exist out there” independently from how an observer
sees it.
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Thus, it is my task to observe, thematize, and problematize the network of PS
regulations for Mexican mangos as material politics. Following the discussions of Law
and Mol, I posit that the network of PS regulations, as material politics engaging human
and non-human beings, work to put things, practices, and people engaged in the
regulations into certain orderings. These PS regulations are conceptualized as
establishing boundaries around pest-free things or places, while simultaneously linking
them to different locales. For instance, mangos are processed with mundane practices,
such as hot-water treatment, to be made pest-free; then, they become eligible to be
shipped to distant places. The PS regulation network, involving both human and nonhuman beings, put them into certain orderings. That is, besides pest versus pest-free (nonpest), other orderings may emerge including values or norms (e.g., desirable vs.
undesirable production practices) or other distinctions (e.g., a mango packer entitled for
export vs. a mango grower unauthorized for export), contingent on context. These
orderings also occasion asymmetrical consequences for people, products, or places in
terms of likeliness to gain access to and benefit from the globalization of agriculture. For
instance, some growers and packers who produce pest-free mangos with desirable
practices become suppliers who are most likely to benefit from exporting the commodity,
whereas others who do not or cannot produce pest-free products are not eligible to do so.
I note, further, that my study reflexively constructs PS regulations as politics; that is, it
thematizes and illuminates how mundane practices associated with the regulations create
socio-material orderings that entail asymmetrical power, or dominance/submission
relationships, among those involved in it. Sociologists concerned about the impact of
regulatory mechanisms of agri-food globalization have been revealing such unequal
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consequences for rural people (Bain, Deaton, and Busch 2005; Echánove 2005; Stanford
2002). Developing from the work of material politics, this study will elucidate how
performances of PS regulations draw boundaries and are enacted, and what consequences
these regulations have brought to involved parties.
2.2

Situating PS Regulations in Governance
Alongside the theoretical foundation discussed above, in what follows I will

situate my study of PS regulations in conjunction with relevant literature in the social
sciences. To do this, I will briefly examine the concept of governance based on Michel
Foucault’s argument, which reflects the shift of dominance from the nation-state to
diffusive and diverse mechanisms. In the governance scheme of regulating society,
especially under a neoliberal political climate, a constellation of technical or legal
measures are employed. These measures produce self-discipline through moralizing and
normalizing individual human subjects, or inducing them to become productive actors
conforming to global regulations (Burchell 1996; Jaeger 2007; Rose 1996). Bringing the
governance concept to my analysis connects the changing regulatory scheme under
neoliberal governance to the previous discussion of material politics, underpinned with
ANT and systems theory. The “governance shift” in global regulations, I argue based on
insights from systems theory, reflects the increasing complexity of modern society where
functionally differentiated systems, such as, and especially, science and law, provide
legitimacy to expert knowledge employed by diverse regulatory bodies, including NGOs.
Further, based on ANT, a regulatory network can be comprehended as an assemblage of
heterogeneous regulatory entities, whether humans or non-human, whether verbal
commands or physical settings, extending beyond space and institutions to regulate a
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variety of entities “at a distance” (Irwin 2007). Also, the systems theory understands
differentiation or segmentation of a regulatory network into heterogeneous entities in
response to increasing complexity and uncertainties regarding the objects it is to deal
with (Esmark 2009). Thus, it is my argument that ANT and systems theory, both
combined with literature in political economy, allow a more profound understanding of
the transformation of regulatory governance in the globalization of agriculture and food
production and consumption, than when a single strand of these literatures is employed.
2.2.1 Governance shift
The concept of governance has been drawing increasing attention within the
social sciences since the 1970s; however, its first use can be dated back to the fourteenth
century and generally referred to “the action or manner of governing, guiding or steering
conducts” (Jessop 1995:309). While the concept entails considerable ambiguity, there
seems to be a broad consensus that it indicates a shift from a nation-state-centered
regulatory scheme to regulation through the application of a variety of non-state entities
and actors (Higgins and Lawrence 2005b; Jessop 1995). As the governance shift entails
deterritorialization (i.e., uncoupling of regulation from the sovereign territory of a nation
state) and proliferation of international organizations such as WTO and multi- or transnational corporations (MNC and TNC, respectively), oftentimes discussions on
governance revolve around globalization (Peine and McMichael 2005). In a similar vein,
critics argue that privatization and decentralization of a central government’s agencies
result in the emergence of new types of entities, such as quasi-governmental
organizations, NGOs, and “third-party” certifying, auditing, or standard-making bodies,
all of which are active at both local and international levels (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch
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2005). I argue that these commentators capture the increasing complexity of entities and
actors involved in regulation and the broadening foci of objects to regulate, conditions
that demand extending regulatory networks to transcend spatial and institutional
boundaries.
Such shifts toward more diffusive regulatory networks are often ascribed to
Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality in liberalism and neoliberalism (Barry,
Osborne, and Rose 1996a; Dean 2010; Foucault 1991; Jaeger 2007). Foucault observed
that the emergence of the modern state since the eighteenth century ushered governments
to a new kind of practice, or art of conduct of conducts (Dean 2010; Foucault 1991).
Ideas, or mentalities, of conducting conducts by government, that is, governmentality
(Dean 2010; Rose and Miller [1992] 2012) in the eighteenth century was challenged by
liberalism, which attempted to minimize top-down control by the government’s authority
over individual acts, especially in the economic domain (i.e., market), such that
individual humans, deemed to be naturally endowed with freedom, would act freely yet
in a well-coordinated and responsible manner (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b; Rose
1996). Accordingly, the focus of governance was on technical means to induce selfdiscipline and conduct surveillance to monitor human acts, in tandem with the “concerns
of political economy and ‘liberalism’ (that is, societal and individual self-regulation)”
(Jaeger 2007:260). Therefore, Foucault’s rejection of nation-state government as the sole
regulator indicates growing interest in technologies of power to control the self, which
“serv[e] to produce specific forms of disciplinary normalization and to codify or coordinate through governmental or governance mechanisms” (Jessop 1995:311).
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Furthermore, in the post-World War II era when neoliberalism emerged, the
liberal concern with techniques for self-discipline came to alter the notion of human
freedom (Rose 1996). While the old liberalism considered human beings naturally
endowed with intrinsic freedom, now neo-liberalism deems freedom an artifact, hence
humans are subject to manipulation so that they can fully develop the capacity of free
choice, becoming entrepreneurial and effective in many aspects of human life beyond the
market/economic domain (Burchell 1996; Dean 2010; Gordon 1991). Accordingly,
neoliberalism does not simply prioritize securing freedom in the economic domain, but in
fact neoliberalism has multifaceted and complex applications beyond the economy
(Jessop 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002). The plurality or multifacetedness of neoliberalism
therefore indicates that “it is necessary to analyse particular forms of political rationality
and the ways in which they connect themselves to regimes of government” (Dean
2010:73).
2.2.2 Functional differentiation, assemblage, and the governance shift
My argument here is that the multifaceted neoliberal governmentality extending
beyond the economy (market) indicates that there are different systems with distinctive
functions in society, that is, the functional differentiation of society (Albert 2007; Esmark
2009; Jaeger 2007; Jessop 1995; 1998; Kerwer 2004). The concept of functional
differentiation, or functionalism, originating from the division of labor in society by
Durkheim and adopted by Parsonsian structural functionalism, calls to mind the analogy
of a living organism, which consists of mechanisms to perform “basic functions,” or
fulfill the needs of, and thereby sustain, an organism’s body (Collins and Makowsky
2005). Recent systems theories, including Niklas Luhmann’s work, departed from this
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model by abandoning the idea of a function as a necessity in order to sustain society, and
formulated it as a scheme with which to find alternative solutions that fulfill a certain
condition or solve a certain problem (Jessop 1995; Nagaoka 2006). Modern society is
characterized as a variety of differentiated, globally extending, functional systems,
including science, politics, law, mass-media, education, religion, art, and so forth, each of
which has its distinctive operation (Esmark 2009; Nagaoka 2006). For instance, science
as a functional system is posited to fulfill the problem of making distinctions between
truth/not-truth; such distinctions are alternative and thus contingent solutions (therefore,
science can be seen as a field of contesting claims concerning true or not true). Different
systems with “particular forms of political rationality,” such as science and law, provide
diverse discursive and technical measures, which are mobilized, assembled, and
“connected themselves to regimes of government” (Dean 2010:73) and constitute
spatially and institutionally diffusive regulatory networks.
The pluri-reality created by functional differentiation in modern society indicates
that “govenmentalization” of the nation state vis-à-vis emerging liberalism required the
coordination of a variety of expertise and technologies in order to extend control over
individuals across a territory, while refraining from hampering individual freedom in
economic activities. Rose and Millar ([1992] 2010) argue, “The inauguration of liberal
societies in Europe accords a vital role to a key characteristic of modern government:
action at a distance . . . Liberal government identifies a domain outside ‘politics’, and
seeks to manage it without destroying its existence and its autonomy. This is made
possible through the activities and calculations of a proliferation of independent agents
including philanthropists, doctors, hygienists, managers, planners, parents and social
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workers” (278). Thus, political technologies drawing on rational calculations of human
behaviors or thinking, including architecture, accounting, education, medicine, or
insurance (Beeson and Firth 1998), would proliferate so as to extend a network of
measures disciplining individuals at a distance. With the emergence of neoliberalism,
such networks of rational and calculated disciplinary measures expand beyond the
economic domain, resulting in marketization of many, if not all, aspects of social life.
Accordingly, by analyzing “the complex of mundane programmes, calculations,
techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to
embody and give effect to governmental ambitions . . . we can begin to understand the
multiple and delicate networks that connect the lives of individuals, groups and
organizations to the aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal democracies of the
present” (Rose and Miller [1992] 2010:273-4). Law and Mol’s material politics concept
is precisely meant to capture this complex of assembled diverse measures, which is built
as a materially heterogeneous network. Therefore, a key to understanding the governance
shift in increasingly complex modern society lies in careful examination of how a variety
of technical measures underpinned with differentiated expertise are assembled as a
network so that governance extends its reach of subtle self-disciplining mechanisms over
individuals spatially and institutionally.
Yet, the assemblage of heterogeneous entities by no means happens “smoothly.”
According to the systems theoretical perspective, different systems can be connected, or
in Luhmann’s term, “structurally coupled,” with varying degrees of compatibilities,
developing only particular paths of connections (Luhmann 2009b). For instance, while
science, with its supposed objectivity, is increasingly incorporated into legal or
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administrative decision-making as a basis for unbiased judgment (Irwin 2007; Jasanoff
1995), other systems, such as religion or art, do not seem to be expected to play such
roles. Assembling of a network would likely engender problematic corollaries as well;
even if science is incorporated in administrative decision-making, scientific-technical
rationality is incompatible with the latter, which oftentimes has to consider public
reactions to a decision (Jasanoff 1987; 1995; Komatsu 2003). Thus, political reactions to
scientific judgment may appear as irrational and distort its objectivity (Aluja and Mangan
2008).
Also, drawing on evolutionary theories, Luhmannian systems theory postulates
the possibility (not necessity) of further differentiation within a system, that is,
subsystems, which increase internal complexities (Nagaoka 2006). Such internal
differentiation may (though not necessarily) occur as “segmentation (the differentiation
of similar units), stratification (the differentiation of hierarchical strata), and centerperiphery differentiation” (Jaeger 2007:261). The evolutionary changes can be
comprehended, as Jessop (1995) argues, as self-organizing (i.e., self-constructing, selfreproducing, and self-steering) mechanisms of complex systems vis-à-vis difficulty in
directly steering complex systems in a top-down manner by the nation-state government,
reflecting the above discussed shifting regulatory governance. The evolutionary changes
resulting in increasing subcomponents within a particular network, such as PS regulations,
can be comprehended as adaptations to handle increasingly complex problems. For
instance, PS regulations may add new standards or procedures, increasing internal
complexity within it, to cope with increasing diversification of traded products, exotic
pest species, or new technologies.
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With this differentiation perspective, I make the case that PS regulations intersect
with different systems and are supplied with foundations of these systems’ legitimacy,
such as “objective” scientific knowledge, legal authorization to enforce rules, and
calculation of economic benefits, including those for consumers, and so forth. Following
ANT’s terminologies (Callon 1986), this process by which “feeds” from different
systems are assembled through problematization, interessment, enrollment, and
mobilization, involving non-human beings (e.g., physical constructs), thereby develops
particular paths between different systems. Moreover, with the evolutionary perspective
of systems theory, further inner differentiations within PS regulations, such as the
creation of separate technical protocols and the establishment of meticulous procedures,
can be expected to occur. The diffusive regulatory scheme might have prompted
alteration, or even dismantling, of the roles of the centralized nation-state government
authority in enacting regulations, and is more compatible with emerging liberalism and
neoliberalism. In what follows, I will delve into how the regulatory governance shift is
embodied as scientific governance, or techno-scientification in political decision making,
and how the said shift has been reflected in the global restructuring of agri-food sectors
captured in literature of sociology of agriculture and food production and consumption.
2.2.3 Scientific governance
As science and technology have proliferated in any aspect of modern life, whether
in information technology or food production, making decisions based on scientific
knowledge has become one of the chief concerns in politics governing modern society
(Fujigaki 2002). This observation becomes both persuasive and ironic when we
remember that it is modern technical development that, while benefitting our lives,
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yielded the sense of “risk society,” or fears of massive, nonetheless apparently
uncontrollable, technology-induced disasters, including nuclear accident or global climate
change (Beck 1992). Furthermore, the permeation of science and technology into every
aspect of modern society also prompted a shift of focus in STS from “science and
technology policy” to “scientific governance,” which indicates that the central national
government is no longer the single authority to regulate science and technologies, and
daily lives that they affect, but rather, activities of other entities, such as industry,
scientific organization, consumers, lobbyists, and the market, are also to be incorporated
in of science and technologies, and their consequences (Irwin 2007). This observation
reflects a shift of theoretical foci parallel with what I delineated above as the governance
shift in political economy during the transition from liberalism to neoliberalism.
STS scholars’ attention to the shift “from government to governance” implies that
science-based political decision-making is no longer an exclusive domain of government
officials and scientific experts. This recognition not only calls for a comprehensive
understanding of scientific governance within a context in which diverse actors are
involved and situated, but also raises critical questions as to who is involved in sciencebased decision making and whose interests are considered, as STS has continuously
interrogated (Callon 1995). Whether from the practical concern about how better
scientific knowledge can be incorporated into public decision making, or from the critical
interest in assessing science’s credentials as objective knowledge, the interrelation
between science and politics has become an important realm for STS scholars to proceed
with their inquiries (Irwin 2007). Yet, within STS there is an admission that STS has
tended to shy away from analysis of “‘mainstream’ social scientific and political
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discussions of such topics as globalization, socioeconomic inequality, and political
economy” (Irwin 2007:599). With the growing interest within STS in how STS
contributes to better understanding and promoting “public” engagement in scientific
governance (Sismondo 2007), it is vital for STS scholars to address concerns invoked by
globalization, such as the marginalization of rural areas in developing countries.
In STS literature on scientific governance, there are several themes that I consider
relevant to my study, including boundary work (Gieryn 1999; Jasanoff 1987), coproduction (Jasanoff 2004b) and networks and assemblages (Irwin 2007; Latour 1987;
Latour 1993; Law 2009), and standard or grade making (Higgins and Larner 2010;
Lampland and Star 2009; Tanaka and Busch 2003). For instance, boundary work, or
practices demarcating science from other domains including politics, plays a critical role
in constituting PS regulations as science-based regulations. In order to prevent the use of
unnecessary measures that can distort free trade, the WTO Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, according to which PS measures are
established and enacted, demands that protection measures be taken based on scientific
evidence. Science-based analysis of phytosanitary risks, or Pest Risk Analysis,
supposedly provides “objective” bases for political decision-making over whether a
certain pest species is harmful or whether a particular PS treatment (e.g. disinfection of
plants) is justified.
In reality, however, there are cases in which sufficient scientific evidence may not
be available to determine adequate protection measures against unknown or unfamiliar
pathogens. In the trade dispute case over the PS regulations surrounding apple fire blight
disease between the United States and Japan (Kennedy 2000; Knight 2005), despite the
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“scientific evidence” presented by both countries, the case was never satisfactorily
settled; interpretation and representation of the evidence were the debated issue. In the
case of disputes over PS regulations between the United States and Mexico, sciencebased decision making might not have been neutral, but rather considered to reflect the
interests of pressure groups (Ramos, Perera, and Sliter 1999; Stanford 2002). The
determination of science-based regulations should not be taken as a clear-cut solution
process simply because it draws upon “objective” knowledge. It is vital for my study to
consider how scientific knowledge is incorporated or not incorporated in political
(including, more specifically, legal and administrative) decision making over whether a
certain class of insect is considered to be a harmful pest, or whether specific measures are
needed to mitigate risks of a pest.
An important contribution of STS for the understanding of material politics is the
insight from ANT, in particular, works on the roles of science and technology in
assembling heterogeneous networks across what we know as natural and social domains,
involving diverse components including people, materials, equipment, and institutions,
which serve to control acts of actors at distance (Callon 1986; Latour 1987; 1993).
Furthermore, in recognizing the significant roles of non-human material beings, STS
scholars use the term “co-production” to see orderings in both the natural and social
worlds as products of mutually constitutive creation and consolidation processes.
Jasanoff (2004b) argues that “the reality of human experience emerges as the joint
achievements of scientific, technical, and social enterprises . . . each underwriting the
other’s existence” (17). It can be argued, therefore, that the way we experience the
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natural, or material, world depends on the way we know it, and vice versa; we experience
the natural (material) world as a “hybrid” of its materiality and means of interpreting it.
This perspective has two relevant implications for my study. First, an
epistemological and methodological implication is that, in an analysis of material politics,
the “question is not whether something is political all by itself but whether it can be
called as part of the process of analysing it” (Law and Mol 2008:133). I reiterate that this
research constitutes the very process of co-production of sociological knowledge as to the
material reality of PS regulations. Second, as Jasanoff (2004b)asserts, “co-production
offers new ways of thinking about power, highlighting the often invisible role of
knowledge, expertise, technical practices and material objects in in shaping, sustaining,
subverting or transforming relations of authority” (4). In parallel, PS regulations as
material politics are enacted through a socio-material hybrid network equipped to
produce physical effects on the behaviors or movements of humans and non-humans
“touched” by the authority of the regulation.
Finally, recent STS scholars have demonstrated increasing interest in diverse,
rationally calculated, scientized, globally formalized, and universalized governance
mechanisms, such as standards, protocols, certifications, and auditing (Higgins and
Larner 2010). Indeed, modern life is rife with standardizing mechanisms that classify and
categorize things (Bowker and Star 1999). Recent STS works, especially those inspired
by ANT, also direct attention to the relevance of rigid materiality in the making and
enacting of standards as materially embodied through a socio-technical hybrid network.
A materially heterogeneous regulatory network is developed with rational-calculative,
expert, and technical practices, “conducting individual’s conducts” at a distance, without
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the conspicuous presence of a centralized authority. This image of the regulatory network
engaging in diverse technical measures resonates squarely with Foucauldian
governmentality in (neo)liberal political climates in modern society (Higgins and Larner
2010).
Studies of standards also investigate how standards classifying things and people
can justify the inclusion of certain categories and the exclusion of others, how they
engender values, norms, or moral/ethical senses, and how they relate to potential
asymmetrical political and/or economic consequences among those classified. For
instance, according to certain standardized classification practices, some categories such
as diseases and race/ethnicity groups are classified in a particular way, and hence can be
subject to exclusion from society (Bowker and Star 1999). In a similar vein, scholars in
the sociology of agriculture influenced by STS have revealed that commodity standards
as a means of classification, legitimated by science and technology, can not only
standardize products to facilitate market circulation of products, but also classify people
engaged in production into categories such as “good farmer” or “bad distributor” (Busch
2000; Tanaka and Busch 2003). While products that meet standards and individuals
producing them are allowed to market their products, those that fail to meet the standards
are likely to be excluded and thereby lose opportunities to gain from the market. In this
sense, despite their supposed neutrality, standardizing mechanisms actually produces
effects related to value formation, morality, and norms, and often results in asymmetrical
economic opportunities.
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2.2.4 From regulation regime to governance in globalization of agriculture
and food production and consumption
In the literature of sociology of agriculture and food production and consumption,
too, changes in regulatory schemes have been observed in parallel with what I called
governance shift. For modern nation states, in general, securing production and
distribution of food sources for their people by arranging institutions and organizations
has been one of the most important roles to fulfill (Lowe, Marsden, and Whatmore
1994a). Employing terminologies of French regulation theory (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz
1987), political economists noted a particular mode of regulating agricultural production,
that is, a “Fordist food regime,” dominant in the 1930s through the 1940s, which enabled
the provision of cheap foods through mass-scale production to feed mass-workforces to
sustain a mass-production-oriented capitalist mode of accumulation in the post-World
War I era (Lawrence and Vanclay 1994; Lowe, Marsden, and Whatmore 1994a). A food
regime is a totality of rules or institutions that resonates with a distinctive mode of
capitalist accumulation; it create commodity “complexes” consisting of chains
connecting producers and consumers, states, and corporations, through which stable
mass-food provision for a nation is made possible (Friedmann 1994). In a similar vein,
Commodity Systems Analysis (Friedland 1984; Friedland, Barton, and Thomas 1981), an
epoch making analytical frame in the sociology of agriculture, devotes a great deal of
attention to the role of the state, in conjunction with labor coordination by capital and
technological arrangement, in industrializing agro-food production. Thus, the mass-food
provision of the Fordist food regime and/or industrialized agricultural production were
tied to the development of the national economy, and coordinated labor and technology
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within a nation (Friedland 1991). Hence, interventions by the nation-state in, for instance,
providing technical assistance for food sectors, were vital (Busch, Bonanno, and Lacy
1989); and standards established by the nation-state would also facilitate mass-scale,
industrialized production and distribution of cheap foods (Lowe, Marsden, and Whatmore
1994a).
However, the instability of the U.S. economy in the 1970s (e.g., the abolishment
of the gold standard) resulted in the free-flow of capital, detaching it from the national
economy, leading to the demise of the Fordist food regime to be replaced by a postFordist regime, which sought flexible production of diverse products (Lawrence and
Vanclay 1994). Consumers with diverse and individualized interests in novel and/or
exotic products, along with retail sectors as mediators (or in fact creators) of such varying
interests, also became significant players in regulating food provision (Flynn, Marsden,
and Ward 1994). In addition, increasing public concerns about the environmental impact
of the industrial mode of production came to condition agricultural production and food
provision systems (Buttel 1992; Buttel, Larson, and Gillespie 1990). Thus, in the postFordist regime, a variety of factors influencing food provision systems came into sight, in
comparison with the previous mass-production regime coordinated mainly by the nationstate government.
Meanwhile, unfettered capital departed from the national boundary, resulting in
expansion of food-supply chains on a global scale, marking an era of increasing
globalization of agriculture and food production and consumption. Private sectors,
especially MNC and TNC, built disperse global networks of production and became
decisively influential over an entire global commodity supply chain; regulations over
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trade also came to be discussed, negotiated, and established in international arenas such
as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), WTO, and other regional economic
partnerships (e.g., NAFTA, EC [EU]) (Heffernan and Constance 1994; McMichael
1994a). Along with the deregulation of trade restrictions and financial transactions across
national borders promoting free trade, global and/or international regulatory institutions
controlling agri-food trade served to benefit MNCs/TNCs from global agri-food market
chains, ushering in the rearrangement or restructuring of global-scale divisions of labor
(Heffernan and Constance 1994; McMichael 1994a). By exploiting the comparative
advantages of different locales across the world, flexible global arrangements by
MNCs/TNCs over labor, capital, and technologies came to constitute the essential
mechanism of contemporary agri-food systems, which fulfilled varying consumers’ needs
for diverse products, such as fresh, exotic, or new products grown in developing countries
for export to off-season markets in developed countries, often at the expense of the
traditional subsistence farming practices of the locale (Friedland 1994a; 1994b; Raynolds,
et al. 1993).
Thus, the role of the nation-state government in global-scale restructuring of agrifood systems was changing, or waning, in the shift to a post-Fordist food provision
regime (e.g., Bonanno et al. 1994; Goodman and Watts 1997; Lowe, Marsden, and
Whatmore 1994b; McMichael 1994b). The previous mode of regulations sustaining
mass-production/consumption was strongly associated with the interest, and the central
role as regulator, of the nation-state government. In the meantime, the “new” global agrifood systems enabling diversification and flexibility led to altering, or withdrawal, of the
role of the nation-state government; and in turn, they gave rise to MNC/TNC’s growing
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influence in regulating agro-food provision, and international regulatory institutions, such
as GATT/WTO, which would facilitate free, autonomous, self-regulating market
mechanisms in resonance with the nineteenth century’s liberalism (McMichael 1994a;
1994c).
From a PS regulatory standpoint, though rarely mentioned in the literature of the
sociology of agriculture and food production and consumption, the rapid increase in both
the volume and the variety of traded fresh fruits and vegetables in the post-Fordist food
provision system has posed many challenges. For instance, while standardized reefer (i.e.,
refrigerated) containers commonly used for trade of fresh produce enabled quick
handling of products in volume, they also facilitated living plants and associated plant
pests to survive in fresh and good condition, posing greater risks of their introduction into
new habitats (Ebbels 2003). Because different plant pests demonstrate varying
preferences in plants they attack, the diversification of traded plant products can demand
different treatments or inspection procedures corresponding to specific combinations of
pest and host plants, making statutes, manuals, or protocols of PS regulations longer and
more meticulous. Importantly, in addition, despite critics’ observation of its waning
influences, the nation-state government still seems to be a significant actor in the
enactment of PS regulations. In the rest of this chapter, and in my findings chapters, I will
delve into the degree of validity regarding the argument that the role of the nation state
government is waning.
Furthermore, in parallel with changes in the role of the nation-state government,
the decades following the 1990s have witnessed new types of actors, procedures, or
measures emerge and increase in significance in regulating primary sectors. In private
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economic sectors, for instance, while MNCs/TNCs maintain the capability to dominate
integrated food sector complexes, actors in retail sectors are also significantly increasing
in influence over production and distribution (Flynn, Marsden, and Ward 1994). Through
protocols or standards for its “private” brands, retailers such as supermarkets in
industrialized countries extend their reach of control over production of goods, including
fresh produces, in distant locales (Busch and Bain 2004; Freidberg 2004). As alluded to
in the earlier section (2.2.3 Scientific governance), certain types of regulatory
mechanisms, such as standards, certifications, or auditing, have come to proliferate in
agriculture, food provision, and other primary production sectors. A variety of products
and production/distribution processes are now subject to different regulatory mechanisms,
including organic production, quality certification (e.g., ISO 9000 series for quality
management), accounting practices, Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certification,
sustainable marine and forestry resource management, fair trade, and so forth (Bacon, et
al. 2008; Constance and Bonanno 1999; 2000; Eden and Bear 2010; Guthman 2004;
Mutersbaugh 2005). Accordingly, organizations that establish, enact, or maintain
standards, whether international, private, semi-governmental, and/or third-party, are now
deemed to be vital players in regulating food provision (Bain, Deaton, and Busch 2005;
Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 2005). As suggested earlier, more recent works employing the
language of ANT address fluid and dynamic processes through which consumers’
interests are mobilized in food provision systems (Goodman 2002; Goodman and DuPuis
2002; Lockie and Kitto 2000). Diverse consumers’ interests, whether in quality,
sustainability, and justice or ethics of production, would be mobilized, channeled, and
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enmeshed into these new regulatory mechanisms through dynamic and complex actors’
negotiations.
Thus, it is my argument that the emergence of new forms and actors for
regulations reflects the shift of the regulatory scheme toward governance in neoliberal
political climates where differentiated, multiple types of legitimate domination resources
exist; these resources can be mobilized and assembled into a materially heterogeneous
network of control. Recognizing the complex political backgrounds against which
varying interests intersect, interface, or intertwine, a couple of conclusions can be derived.
First, the application of scientific and technical knowledge, and related calculative,
technical, and rational means, or techno-scientification, in agri-food sectors underlies
these new forms of regulatory mechanisms, as well as regulatory governance in general
(Higgins and Larner 2010; Higgins and Lawrence 2005b; Tanaka and Juska 2010). For
instance, technical advancement in modifying chemical compositions in seeds led to
creating rapeseed strains that produce edible oil, which have become standard strains and
yielded standardized procedures (Tanaka and Busch 2003; Tanaka, Juska, and Busch
1999). Another conclusion, inspired with insights from STS, is that although standards or
protocols communicated with “lighter” media, such as texts or diagrams, can easily cross
geo-political boundaries, their enactment at the local level entails—and thus literally
materializes—physical procedures and consequences, as implicated by the idea of
material politics. For instance, to secure a crop of highly standardized products to meet
retailers’ criteria, production protocols demand fertilizers and/or pesticides to be applied
in fields; to ensure uniformity of products, standardized physical settings, devices, and

38

procedures must be installed or practiced in a packing house to ship products for export
(Freidberg 2004).
Second, it is necessary to scrutinize the validity of the regulation theorist’s
account that would ascribe all these diverse regulation mechanisms to modes of
accumulation of capital in the transition to post-Fordism. Furthermore, it might be hasty
to conclude that the nation-state government has waned in, or withdrawn completely
from, exerting its ability for regulating agri-food sectors. Certainly, the apparent and
comparative presence of the nation-state government in regulatory activities might have
shrunk, in comparison with other growing non-governmental actors engaged in
regulations. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily indicate the sheer loss of capacity of the
state government; but rather it suggests that ways or loci where a government operates, or
objects it deals with, vary geographically, culturally, contextually, or historically. For
instance, given a series of scandals in the 1990s to early 2000s that crushed consumers’
trust in food safety in Japan, where historically and culturally the state has been vital in
steering the entire nation, discourse in policy-making and the media revolved around the
responsibilities of the national government, along with the roles of scientists in public
policy-making, which, to restore trust in the food safety administration, eventually led to
the founding of a new agency responsible for food safety affairs in the national
government (Tanaka 2008). In addition, Marsden and his colleagues (Flynn, Marsden,
and Ward 1994; Marsden, Flynn, and Ward 1994) have found that British national
government agencies still played critical roles in restructuring food-related regulations
and increasing involvement of retail sectors in it. As will be detailed in Chapter 5 (and
suggested earlier in this section), moreover, PS regulations in general are stipulated and
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enacted under the responsibility of a national government as per the International Plant
Protection Convention (IPPC) and SPS Agreement. These examples indicate the still
robust presence and capacity of the nation-state government in certain contexts.
Therefore, given the complexity of regulatory governance, that is, the growing
involvement of new regulatory actors and mechanisms, an analysis of regulations in agrifood systems should pay careful and flexible attention to how distinctive resources for
legitimate and effective regulation (e.g., scientific and technical expertise, legal
underpinning, or cultural resources such as trust) are assembled and optimized as a
regulatory network in varying contexts and in relation to objects with which it is to
function, rather than ascribing it to a particular mode of capital accumulation or to the
decline of the nation-state government (Marsden 1994). It is in this analytical orientation
that my approach combining ANT (which is apt to analyze processes of assembling
heterogeneous resources) and systems theory (which is apt to analyze distinctive
operations of heterogeneous resources), compared to a single analytical approach, will
better work to examine PS regulations as material politics.
Third, as with some cases of application of standards (Bowker and Star 1999) as
previously mentioned (2.2.3 Scientific governance), very importantly, diverse regulatory
mechanisms yield moral and value implications, and produce asymmetrical, unequal, or
paradoxical consequences among those who are involved in regulatory processes (Busch
2000; Tanaka and Busch 2003). Critics have pointed out that, in general, trade regulations
as governance mechanisms of the global market-economy tend to privilege wealthy
people in industrialized countries (Peine and McMichael 2005). This is more the case
when exporting developing countries are trying to meet a standard, because they tend to
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lack technical and/or financial resources to effectively manage practices to meet
standards (Bain, Deaton, and Busch 2005; Henson and Loader 2001). Despite the
purported benefits from free trade promoted by “harmonized” regulations, consequences
were often less than beneficial, especially in rural areas of developing countries
(McMichael 2004). As with many past sociological works concerning the globalization of
agriculture and food production and consumption and its relevance to development, my
research is intended to shed light on the paradoxical and even potentially negative
consequences of regulatory mechanisms as part of global governance in agriculture and
food production and consumption.
2.2.5 Past social-science texts on PS regulations
Before concluding this chapter, I will address briefly the significance of
investigating PS regulations in general. Under the trade rules stipulated by the WTO, PS
regulations are a crucial component of SPS measures, and constitute an essential
mechanism to facilitate transactions of agricultural products across borders. Nonetheless,
although social scientists have been keen to investigate the globalization of agriculture
and food production and consumption, as well as organizational and institutional changes
enabling it, including global regulations and standards, (Bonanno et al. 1994; Goodman
and Watts 1997; Higgins and Lawrence 2005a; Lowe, Marsden, and Whatmore 1994b;
McMichael 1994b), relatively few works have dealt with PS regulations as the main
focus of study (e.g., Alvarez 2001; 2006; Knight 2005; Stanford 2002). To date, a few
texts in the social sciences, drawing mainly upon the political economy perspective rather
than STS, have examined PS regulations and their asymmetrical impacts on rural people
in Mexico. Stanford (2002) examines the quality of and PS regulations upon Mexican
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avocados to show the process and consequences of regulation, including technical
measures, contestation from the importing country, and the resulting impact on
underprivileged peasants. Echánove (2005) points out that the Mexican mango export
trade does not necessarily benefit mango-producing peasants’ livelihood because their
limited capital impedes their ability to meet PS and other quality standards. Further, with
an interest close to that of the present study, Alvarez (2001; 2006) has examined how PS
regulations, including HWT and the related certification requirements of groves and
packing houses, has contributed to enhancing control of production and distribution
practices of mangos in Mexico. He argues that PS regulations imposed on foreign places
such as rural Mexico indicate an encroachment of the nation-state border by the USDA.
The above review of critical insights of SPS measures in the enactment of
regulatory institutions in the globalization of agriculture raise questions such as whose
benefits are prioritized, who is making decisions to mobilize other people, and who is
supposed to follow the decisions. Particularly, drawing on the political economy
perspective, the works by Stanford, Echánove and Alvarez have successfully elucidated
consequences of PS regulations in light of unequal class relationships in rural Mexico
under the globalization of agriculture. My research intends to further the understanding of
the impact of PS regulations on rural people in Mexico by scrutinizing how the shifting
PS technical arrangement is changing social and material orderings.
2.3

Summary
In this chapter, I laid out the theoretical foundation to guide the research on the

material politics of PS regulations. The material politics concept by Law and Mol (2008),
drawing on insights from STS, ANT in particular, means to illuminate “material”
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processes through which rigid material beings along with more mobile “discursive”
means such as statutes, combined together, draw certain distinctions (e.g., in my case,
pest/non-pest), and by doing so, link distant places. Based on this theoretical framework,
PS regulations can be conceptualized as a materially heterogeneous network drawing the
distinction between pest/non-pest while simultaneously establishing relationships
between different places (e.g., pest-free mango production site to a consumer in the
United States), while also engendering values as well as moral and ethical and normative
implications, and resulting in unequally distributed economic opportunities for those who
are engaged in the production and export of Mexican mangos. Yet, the assembling of
materially heterogeneous agents does not happen “smoothly” because of varying degrees
of compatibility with each other resulting from differences in their operations, as
anticipated by systems theory.
Then, I provided a review of relevant literature, including works on governance
drawing on Foucault’s arguments on governmentality in conjunction with the emergence
of liberalism and neoliberalism, STS on scientific governance, and the sociology of
agriculture and food production and consumption on transitions between regulatory
schemes in agriculture and food provision. This review established how the discussed
theoretical foundation, and my inquiry into PS regulations, are situated within, and
relevant to, past and ongoing literature. The recognition of the shift toward governance in
liberal and neoliberal regulatory schemes where central roles of the nation-state
government in regulating agri-food systems are seemingly shrinking or changing is
particularly pertinent, because it indicates the relevance of my approach examining the
assemblage of heterogeneous—whether human or non-human, governmental or non-
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governmental—agents whose legitimacy is rooted in functionally differentiated systems
of modern society, such as science, law, and economics, with particular modes of
operations. Therefore, the pertinence of my theoretical foundation combining ANT and
systems theory lies in its aptness to capture the assemblage of differentiated
functionalities to enable PS regulations entailing physical consequences through its
enactment. To materialize this theoretical foundation, the next chapter will address
methodologies to observe and analyze PS regulations as material politics.
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Chapter 3
Methodologies
This chapter deals with how I materialize the PS regulation as material politics. I
have reiterated that material politics is materialized through reflexive constructivism,
meaning that politics is not severed from how I observe and write it. To keep myself as
an observer conscious about this, for data collection and analysis I used qualitative,
ethnographic research methods, since they require a researcher/observer to reflect on
relevance of his/her position in observation. Material politics entails of course very
material processes building, arranging or modifying physical beings as well. Details of
operations of the PS regulation would matter. Hence, especially to address the first
research question, one of better methods for me to materialize the material politics is to
be on site where the PS regulation operates, to witness how those processes involving
human and non-human beings draw boundaries between pest/non-pest. Yet, obviously,
operations of the regulations in the past are not available for direct observation, and the
current PS regulation as such is complex of technical, legal and administrative elements,
without which I would not be able to understand significance of on-site operations of the
regulation. Thus, I also collected document data, such as past governmental regulations,
articles of journals, and so forth, as well as conducted in-depth interviews. To examine
value, moral, normative implications of the PS regulation, to answer the second research
question, in-depth interviews besides the participant observation, were also employed.
Finally, to address the third research question asking about prospects of economic
opportunities, interviews and analysis of basic statistical data on production of mangos
were also collected and analyzed. All combined together, these approaches for collection
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and analysis were meant to trace the materially heterogeneous network of the PS
regulation as a case. In what follows, I will detail rationales for adopting the case study
approach and the qualitative research methods, followed by a discussion of their
limitations.
This chapter explains the methods I employed to collect and analyze data about
the PS regulation network as material politics. I have reiterated that material politics is
concretize through reflexive constructivism, meaning that the politics of an issue are not
severed from, but are rather constructed by, the observations and discourse produced by
researchers, including my own writing in this dissertation. To keep myself as an observer
conscious of this, for data collection and analysis I used qualitative, ethnographic
research methods, since they require a researcher/observer to reflect on the relevance of
his/her position in the observation. Moreover, because material politics entails, of course,
material processes building, arranging or modifying physical beings as well, specific
details of the operations of the PS regulation network did matter to my research. Hence,
especially to address the first research question— How does the PS regulation network
operate to draw distinctions between pest/non-pest, thereby enabling the export of
Mexican mangos to the United States?—one of the better methods used to answer this
question was to be physically present on sites where PS regulations operate, to witness
how those processes involving human and non-human beings draw boundaries between
pest/non-pest. Yet, obviously, operations of the regulations in the past were not available
for direct observation, and the current PS regulations as such constitute a complex of
technical, legal, and administrative elements, without which I would not be able to
understand the significance of on-site operations of the regulations. Thus, I also collected
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documentary data, such as past governmental regulations, journal articles, and so forth,
and conducted in-depth interviews. To examine the second research question— What
values are associated with the PS regulation network, and what are the normative, moral,
or ethical implications of the regulations?—I employed in-depth interviews along with
participant observation. Finally, to address the third research question— How are the PS
regulations in transition in Sinaloa changing economic prospects for mango growers and
packers to tap into global markets of mangos?—interviews and analysis of statistical data
on production of mangos were also collected and analyzed. Combined, these data
collection and analysis approaches were meant to trace the materially heterogeneous
network of PS regulations as a case for in-depth examination of them. In what follows, I
will detail my rationale for adopting the case study approach and the qualitative research
methods, followed by a discussion of the limitations of these approaches.
3.1

Case Study Approach
My research questions demanded sensitivity to details of processes and

consequences of PS regulations which could produce a multiplicity of contextually
varying meanings. Therefore this research employed a case study approach, underpinned
by qualitative methods, and is strong in “contextualized comparison” or “searching for
analytically equivalent phenomena…across contexts” (George and Bennett 2005:19),
fitting squarely with my interests in alternative and possible orderings in multiple
contexts. In general, the qualitative case-study approach can help a researcher not only
learn the intrinsic characteristics of a particular case in depth, but also better understand
theoretical questions, especially through verifying and modifying existing theories (Ragin
and Becker 1992; Stake 2008). As Ragin and Becker emphasize delete the names in this
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citation following (Ragin and Becker 1992), a researcher conducing a case study has to
ask, “What is it a case of?” to present a certain level of generalizability. As far as my
study is a case of PS regulations as material politics, my study had to present plausible
findings and conclusions that could persuade a reader that something similar could be
observed in PS regulations in other sites. Thus, my case study, examining the network of
PS regulations governing the export of mangos, more specifically, the regulatory
transition in Sinaloa, aimed to present “evidence to support, contest, refine, or elaborate a
theory, model or concept” (Schwandt 1997:3) with rich and detailed accounts of material
politics performed by the regulations, while attempting to illuminate the globalization of
agriculture as a larger background phenomenon.
As a method of inquiry, a case study focuses on a single “case.” A case as a
fundamental unit of social research varies across different types of inquiries, depending
on their purposes or the nature of their analytic frames, and it is crucial for a researcher to
be aware that qualitative case-study research itself entails continuous and reflexive
processes of demarcating a “case” (Ragin 1994; Stake 2008; Yin 1998). Accordingly, I
posited that the “case” for this research refers to PS regulations as a materially
heterogeneous network involving humans and non-humans that distinguishes between
“pest/non-pest” (particularly, fruit fly pests) in Sinaloa and its corollaries; these
regulations become embodied as politics. My data were collected within this network.
This means that I tracked the historical development of PS regulations, including
scientific knowledge and technologies applied in it, such as HWT and PFA, along with
other control measures, as well as networks of actors currently engaged in PS practices
for mangos exported from Mexico. Also, corollaries of the enacted PS regulations, such
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as associated values, normative and moral expectations, and varying economic
opportunities were significant to the study because they signify the political implications
of the regulations.
3.2

Working Hypotheses
In qualitative research where the number of studied “cases” is small, the goal of

inquiry is not likely to center on true/false binary hypothesis testing, but rather to produce
data for analytic induction: based on the theoretical framework, certain working
hypotheses are indicated for modification or calibration according to varying, diverse, or
even contradictory phenomena, such that refinement of the hypotheses with richer and
thicker empirical evidence would lead to advancing the basic theoretical framework
(Flick 2007; Goetz and Lecompte 1981; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Ragin 1994; Richards
2005). The material politics concept has allowed me to posit that PS regulations
constitute a materially heterogeneous, evolving network, engaging human and nonhuman material actors with particular operations, and engendering varying orderings,
including associated values, moral or normative implications, and varying prospects of
economic benefits. With this theoretical framework, along with the knowledge about the
PS conditions in Sinaloa outlined in Chapter 1 (Introduction), accordingly, before and
during the fieldwork, I developed the following working hypotheses, which eventually
constituted the primary themes in the later analysis:
§

The network of PS regulations on Mexican mangos would be seen as an
assemblage of not only humans but also non-humans, including both rigid
material beings (e.g., devices) and lighter and flexible media (e.g., documents
of statutes), as significant actors.
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§

These heterogeneous actors to be assembled would demonstrate varying
degrees of compatibility with each other.

§

Within the evolving PS regulation network, subcomponents (e.g., more
detailed manuals) would emerge to cope with increasing complexity (i.e.,
uncertainty and/or variability due to new scientific findings or technical
development).

§

An event within the PS regulation network (e.g., pest occurrence) could be
variably and contingently attributed to different actors as responsible for it.
For instance, some might attribute a pest occurrence to the government,
whereas others might deem individual growers responsible for it.

§

Also, attribution of responsibility would engender associated values, norms, or
moral implications. For instance, a pest occurrence might be attributed to “a
lazy mango grower,” “the irresponsible government,” “ignorant travelers
smuggling fruits,” “ineffective monitoring device (e.g., trap),” or “obstinate
fruit flies,” and so forth.

§

Engendered values or moral implications serve as normative expectations to
discipline other actors to conform to the regulations. For instance, some might
argue that individual growers should responsibly apply required pest control
measures.

§

Varying patterns of attribution of responsibility would also be related to how
the regulation could be justified. For instance, consumers might be deemed
responsible for a demand for quality fruits without blemish by pests, thereby
used to justify PS regulations.
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§

Mango growers in non-PFA areas in Sinaloa might welcome the expansion of
PFA since they would be able to export fruits without relying on packers who
had HWT equipment, whereas packers might see the PFA as a threat to their
business.

3.3

Fieldwork in Mexico
Data with which to examine the working hypotheses were primarily collected

through fieldwork in Mexico, supplemented by documentary research using electronic
archives in the United States, such as LexisNexis and Hein Online. The primary data
collection activity, my fieldwork, took place in the state of Sinaloa, Mexico. One of the
determinant factors in the selection of the site is the political-economic backdrop of the
country. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, commonly known as
NAFTA, enacted in 1994, Mexico has been advancing neoliberal policies, including the
promotion of free trade. However, as revealed by debates over the promotion of free trade
in the 2006 Mexican presidential election, Mexico’s policy orientation has been highly
contested (Bruhn and Greene 2007). This is especially true for rural areas because
neoliberal policies include, for example, withdrawal of the federal programs to aid
peasants via support for staple foods (Carlsen 2003; Echánove 2005). Peasants lost
subsistence corn farming to cheaper U.S. corn imports and became migrant laborers as a
result (McMichael 2004). Thus, during the most recent decades, Mexico has drawn the
interest of social scientists who attempt to document the consequences of globalization
(e.g., Hellman 1999; Myhre 1994). For this research, too, it was one of my prime
concerns to examine the relevance of the neoliberal reforms to the development of PS
regulations and/or consequences to the mango sector.
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For the fieldwork, I chose the state of Sinaloa in north-western Mexico, facing the
Pacific Ocean and Gulf of California (Figure 3-1). Chapter 4 (4.4 Research Site: The state
of Sinaloa, Mexico) will provide more detailed geographic information. A few crucial
factors influenced the selection of this site: Sinaloa had been a highly productive
agricultural state with farming sectors eager to export products to the United States;
mangos had become one of the most promising crops produced in the state, especially for
export markets; and the state is in transition in terms of the status of the prevalence of
fruit fly pests. Together, these factors made this state the primary site for data collection.

Figure 3-1 Location of the primary research site, Sinaloa (red), and other sites
visited for the study
Elaboration by author based on a map image provided by Instituto Nacional de
Estadística y Geografía, Mexico (INEGI)
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Time spent on fieldwork totaled nine months between August to November of
2008 and February to June of 2009 in Sinaloa and in several locales in the country. I
stayed in the city of Culiacán, the capital of the state of Sinaloa. The Instituto de
Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (Institute of Economic and Social Research, IIES)
of the Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa (Autonomous University of Sinaloa, UAS) in
Culiacán provided me with facilities needed for the fieldwork, including office space,
access to the Internet, and access to the university’s library. From this city, I also traveled
to different regions of Sinaloa (both PFA areas and non-PFA areas) as well as outside of
the state. Principal sites I visited for the research are listed in Appendix 1. Important
organizations engaged in PS regulations were located in Culiacán, such as a branch office
of the federal agricultural department, the state government, CESAVESIN as an auxiliary
organization for the agricultural ministry, and national agricultural research institutes.
Some of these organizations were particularly instrumental in my document collection
(e.g., governmental papers, technical journal articles, and newspaper articles) and
statistical data collection.
Seeking entry points to the PS regulations network, I contacted representatives of
several major organizations and groups that I considered knowledgeable about PS
regulations (Appendix 1). From the representatives, I requested interviews and asked
permission to conduct participant observation of their organizations’ activities related to
the regulations. Details of the interview method will be discussed later in this chapter. In
addition, seeking potential interviewees, I attended three conferences held in Sinaloa
relevant to my research topic, including (1) the 2nd International “Mega-convention” in
Production Systems and Plant Health of Vegetable Production (August 20 - 23, 2008, in
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Mazatlán), (2) the 7th Meeting of the Working Group on Fruit Flies of the Western
Hemisphere (November 02 - 07, 2008, Mazatlán), and (3) the 7th Meeting of the
Network of Socio-economics Research in Vegetable, Fruit and Flower Production
(March 12 – 14, 2009, Culiacán). At these meetings I met researchers, government
officials, field technicians, mango growers and packers, and requested their assistance
with my study of PS regulations and the mango sector.
In most cases, the representative whom I initially contacted generously assured
me that they would provide me with needed assistance or accommodation for the
research, which I really appreciated. According to an interviewee, people in northwestern Mexico such as Sinaloa tend to be open to guests from outside and like to treat
them very generously. I agreed with his observation, as in most cases, people I contacted
for the research accepted me with a very open, warm, welcoming attitude. With
permission from representatives of the PS regulatory authorities, I conducted
observations of PS regulatory field operations (e.g., inspections of cargo and passenger
transportation at highway inspection points); the personnel kindly accommodated my
research endeavor. Yet, my observations at a single site did not last more than a few days
because I had to cover a variety of activities in different locales. Hence, I would not
assert that I established full rapport with them, which might have given “richer”
information (e.g., in-depth personal experiences or critical assessments about their jobs,
etc) to make my descriptions “thicker.” Still, for my research purposes, I believe, my data
is rich and robust enough to meet the objectives outlined above.
Meanwhile, in some cases, I could not fully convince potential interviewees of the
importance of my research project. As a couple of such individuals indicated to me, their
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operations concerning PS regulations were simply to, without causing major problems,
abide by statutes or governmental orders (“normas” in Spanish); hence they could not
provide me anything more than what was written in the normas. Although such
mundaneness of regulatory operations mattered to my research, I accepted their account.
Moreover, as I was interested in the quarantine inspection of plant products at entry
points on the border between the United States and Mexico, I requested the permission of
one of the field offices of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security in Texas to observe inspection procedures. However,
due to “increasing security concerns” over border control operations, my request was
refused.
3.4

Qualitative Data Collection Methods
Having located entry points to the network of PS regulations, methods for the

collection of data were established. Since the concept of material politics presumes
varying contexts in which regulations draw “pest/non-pest” distinctions and multiple
corollaries the regulations engender, my research goal was to build “thick descriptions”
(Geertz 1973) of the operations of PS regulations. Accordingly, I used sensitive
qualitative data collection measures to capture in detail how PS regulations were working.
The methods or techniques employed to collect data included: document analysis, semistructured and unstructured (informal, conversational) interviews, participant observation,
and photographing operations of PS regulations. Collected data consisted of
governmental documents, scientific/technical articles, interview memos and/or transcripts,
fieldnotes that recorded observations, and photographs of events related to activities of
the PS regulations.
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Using multiple techniques to obtain different kinds of data is often called
triangulation, which was once considered necessary to ensure the validity of data, and/or
to reach “a robust fact,” on the assumption that various methods corroborate with and
consolidate one single “fact” (Yin 1998). However, as recent commentators emphasize, I
consider triangulation to be a way to improve the overall quality of qualitative research,
which could be supplemented by multi-faceted features, including credibility,
trustworthiness, transferability, and diversity, richness, and/or depth of data (Denzin
1970; Flick 2007; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Richards 2005). It is this insight that
underpins the usefulness of combining the following data collections methods.
3.4.1 Document analysis
To understand the historical development of PS regulations as material politics, I
employed document analysis. In general, the analysis of documents as a research method
is especially valuable for historical analysis since they provide stable and evidential
information in an unobtrusive way (George and Bennett 2005; Latour and Woolgar
[1979] 1986; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Marshall and Rossman 1999; Yin 1998). By
historical analysis I do not mean to analyze exclusively “past” documents, but rather to
understand the trajectory of backgrounds and discourses that brought about particular PS
regulatory activities. The “stability” of a document source does not necessarily mean that
a historical “fact” is immutably contained in it. Rather, meanings associated with
documentary data are to be grasped in varying, situated contexts of their making and
(re)reading (Latour and Woolgar [1979] 1986; Prior 2003). My research, which as such
constitutes part of the context of (re)reading and making documents, enacts itself and is
recursively exposed to past and future contexts.

56

In addition, the documentary sources were very important for my research on PS
regulations because documents, including scribbled words, diagrams, or graphics to make
the “natural world” visible, constitute an integral part of science (Eden and Bear 2010;
Latour and Woolgar [1979] 1986; Prior 2003; Thomas 2004). Moreover, documents
could illuminate how they, within themselves, “allocate and define responsibility for the
acts” and have the capacity “to structure identities and bestow attributes on human
subjects” (Prior 2003:94), allowing me to approach my research goals, that is, to
elucidate what actors, and whose or what interests, have been deemed more influential,
and how the responsibility for events is attributed to specific human and non-human
actors.
My theoretical framework also informs me that the document is “material” media.
In other words, the analysis of documents is situated ”to look at how the text is used by
social actors in the course of their everyday activities, and how the text itself can become
an agent in the various social networks in which it becomes embedded. Who recruits the
report as an ally, and who is arraigned against it? What is enrolled within the report as
and what is excluded? And how does the text (report) itself become an agent in a network
of action?” (Prior 2003:66). For instance, I sought material that functioned as a
“generative document,” which “lays down rules as to how other documents should be
constructed. It contains both the conceptual structure in terms of which any explanations
have to be built, and, in addition, rules for the building process” (Prior 2003:34).
Technical manuals to identify, record, and report fruit fly pests are one example of a
“generative document.” The significance of these documents resides in that they serve as
“boundary objects” (Prior 2003; Star and Griesemer 1989), which demarcate something
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to include and exclude in a network, classifying acts of things and humans, making
boundaries between, in my research case, pest/non-pest.
More specifically, I collected the following material. First, governmental
documents were collected to illuminate how the legal and administrative underpinnings
and “official” justifications of PS regulations were developed and altered. In the analysis
informed with material politics, the data of this category, including written laws, other
statutes, and manuals for PS regulatory activities elaborated by the governments of
Mexico and the United States, as well as international organizations, were used to
delineate how such “lighter” media could convey information and transcend geographical,
institutional, or organizational boundaries. To collect them, besides libraries and archives
of the organizations I visited for archival research (Appendix 1), governmental on-line
archives (e.g. U.S. Federal Register (FR), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr, Mexican Diario
Oficial de Federación (DOF), http://www.gob.mx/wb/egobierno/) and commercial
electronic archives such as LexisNexis and HeinOnline, served as the primary source for
this category of documentary data. Second, scientific and technical articles on PS
regulations to control fruit flies were identified within professional academic journals.
These were valuable data sources especially to elucidate how technical aspects of PS
regulations, such as control measures against fruit flies, including use of more “rigid”
materials (e.g., disinfection devices), were developed, and how the research was justified.
While many articles were collected through on-line databases, such as Agricola and Web
of Science prior to and after the fieldwork, a substantial number of documents, especially
those published before the 1990s, including technical reports of Mexican research
institutes, were sought in their libraries during fieldwork. Because these older documents
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were not registered electronically, systematic searches for articles were conducted by
checking titles and keywords through indexes and tables of contents. Third, although
limited in scope and investigated only non-systematically,3 local newspapers and
documents of other key organizations, especially Confederación de Asociaciones
Agrícolas del Estado de Sinaloa (CAADES, Confederation of Agricultural Associations
of the State of Sinaloa), were sought to identify other actors, including farmers’
organizations, whose acts had impacts on making PS regulations constitute a
heterogeneous network. For example, newspaper articles describing mango growers’
responses to governmental decisions about PS regulations were identified and analyzed to
elucidate how such actors might alter the regulations. The library of Instituto Nacional de
Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias (INIFAP, National Institute of Forest,
Agriculture and Livestock Research) in Culiacán and the Central Library of UAS were
major sources of these data. Documents in paper format collected from these sources
were scanned and converted to Portable Document Format (PDF) files for later analysis.
3.4.2 Semi-structured and unstructured interviews
To obtain official accounts of PS regulations as well as narratives of interviewees’
personal experiences and/or opinions, I employed semi-structured interviews, combined
with more informal unstructured inquiries. The semi-structured interview, being apt to
elicit interviewee’s viewpoints in their own words (Flick 1998), used an interview guide

3

I expected that the Central Library of UAS and CAADES’ archival storage would
become the primary source for this data collection. However, it turned out that most of
the UAS library’s periodical collections and CAADES’ documents had been destroyed
by a water leak and a fire incident, respectively. As their collections were very limited
and not well-classified, systematic archival research was not possible during the
fieldwork.
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(Appendix 2) consisting of questions on specific issues, but sought open-ended answers
or narratives.
Throughout the fieldwork, I interviewed 55 key informants, including mango
growers, packers/exporters, representatives of organizations such as CESAVESIN and
EMEX, officials of SAGARPA and USDA-APHIS, and researchers in the natural and
social sciences. Profiles of the recruited interviewees are shown in Table 3-1. The
interviewees were sought and identified based on the assumption that they were
knowledgeable about either specific aspects of or the entire PS regulation network or
mango production and export in Mexico. In this regard, my method might entail
characteristics of the “expert” or “elite” interview (Flick 1998; Marshall and Rossman
1999).
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Table 3-1 Affiliations and professional categories of interviewees
Interviewees by
professional categories

Affiliation categories

Number Total

PS authorities
(including CESAVE, SAGARPA, APHIS)

Management*
Management/Grower
Inspector/Technician

9
1
6

16

Farmers’ organization

Management
Management/Grower
Researcher

1
7
1

9

Packers/exporters (including EMEX)

Management
Management/Grower

5
3

8

Research institutions

Researcher
Inspector/Technician

6
3

9

Workers’ unions

Management

2

2

Other governmental agencies

Management

1

1

Other NGO/Third-party organizations

Management
Inspector/Technician

1
1

2

Independent (including retirees)

Grower
Grower/Consultant
Management
Management/Grower
Researcher

2
2
2
1
1

8

Total

55

* “Management” includes administrator, coordinator, supervisor, and leader of the organizations.

61

While all the interviews basically sought “expert” insights, including official
accounts of how the interviewees’ expertise was related to enacting PS regulations, in
some interviews their personal experiences and/or opinions, which might be inconsistent
with their organizations’ views, were asked. I also asked questions that were not in the
interview guide, but emerged as relevant themes during the course of the interview. This
reflected a recent shift in the practice of interviewing to “encompass the hows of people’s
lives (the constructive work involved in producing order in everyday life) as well as the
traditional whats (the activities of everyday life)” (Cowley, Harte, and Baker 1992:698).
The underlying premise was that my interviews did not presume the “objectivity” or
“neutrality” responses elicited from the interviewee. Rather, interview data were texts
negotiated and co-produced (Cowley, Harte, and Baker 1992) through social processes
between the interviewee and me. In essence, one of my foundational theoretical premises,
that is, reflexive constructivism, reflexively applied to my research inquiry itself as social
practice.
It was also crucial to clarify the measures for protection of the informants’
privacy, as well as associated risks concerning their privacy and the confidentiality of
their narratives. To explain this I used a consent form approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the University of Kentucky, and upon the interviewee’s understanding
the content, obtained her/his signature on it. I taped the conversation when the informant
agreed, along with writing memos (not transcripts) of the circumstances and the content
of the interview either during or after the session. Based on information obtained through
interviews, I also adjusted the questions to include in future interview guides. After the
fieldwork I transcribed the recorded interviews and saved them as electronic files, along
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with additional records of the circumstances of the interviews. Levels (i.e. how verbatim)
of the transcriptions varied according to the relevance to the research questions of themes
discussed in the interview.
3.4.3 Participant observation
The purpose of the participant observation was to grasp how PS regulations,
including mundane practices, operate on-site and how the regulations’ multiple orderings
involving humans and non-humans emerge through mundane practices. Participant
observation allows an ethnographic researcher, through direct experiences and
observation of local activities, to grasp patterns of people’s acts, meanings, or beliefs in
actual contexts (Fetterman 1998; Lincoln and Guba 1985). Moreover, as an essential data
collection method in social sciences, qualitative observation helps this research record not
only verbal and visual data, but also other information relevant to the materiality of social
phenomena, such as touch, smell, and sound (Adler and Adler 1994).
It should be noted, however, that my approach to use observation as a method
might diverge somewhat from a customary view on this method, often called naturalistic
observation, which supposedly “occurs in the natural context of occurrence, among the
actors who would naturally be participating in the interaction, and follows the natural
stream of everyday life” (Adler and Adler 1994:378). Underlying this assumption is that
the observation method can and should seek to increase observational efficacy and reduce
the researcher’s bias to secure the reliability and validity necessary to objective findings
(Aluja, Arredondo, and Diaz-Fleischer 2004; Kanamori and Nakajima 2002). My
methodology, on the other hand, shares more recent commentators’ awareness of the
difficulty or impossibility of participating in a “naturalistic setting,” let alone producing
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“objective ethnographic truth” through observation (Aluja, Arredondo, and DiazFleischer 2004). It is impossible to know how “natural” my observation was because
levels of my involvement varied in the field, although in the field I was more often
“observer-as-participant” and “complete observer” than “participant-as-observer” or
“complete participant,” according to Gold’s typology (Gold 1958). Therefore, I was not
concerned about obtaining “naturalistic settings,” and was fully aware that my data
collection was based on selective, contingent observation. Moreover, I was aware that my
observation might disturb ongoing “naturalistic” phenomena both by my presence and
active intervention into (e.g., asking questions about) those phenomena.
My participant observations took place in diverse settings. Examples and sites of
the PS activities I observed included processes of HWT, roadside inspection, pest
monitoring and control activities on farms and in non-farm settings (e.g., installment and
checking of insect traps, pesticide spraying, and sterile fruit fly release), and research on
fruit fly biology and technical development of control measures. Given my research
purposes to understand the multifaceted socio-material orderings in varying settings, and
considering the resources available to me, I decided that it was more pragmatic to
purposively select various settings for observation lasting one to a few days, rather than
spend a longer time in a single setting. While participant observation usually necessitates
a researcher’s long-term immersion in a local setting, in a qualitative study for
developing, elaborating, or confirming a theory at hand, it is also important to conduct
purposive, strategic selection of cases or settings, depending on the relevance of these
settings (Fox 1993; Kurtz 2004).
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In the sites where participant observations were conducted, I attended and
observed the selected activities, and when possible, took brief memos or scribbles about
what I witnessed and considered significant to the research. When necessary and
appropriate, I informally asked the informants questions about the activity they engaged
in. Upon returning from the observed setting, based on these field memos and my
memory, I typed up detailed fieldnotes, which were stored as electronic files.
In some cases where I was allowed and/or it was appropriate in the field, I took
photographs of scenes of activities, physical objects, or images related to PS regulations.
The analysis of visual images of physical materials used for the regulations constitutes an
important component of the present research to illuminate the material politics of the
regulations. My primary purpose in using visual material was to enhance the richness of
my data records and to result in an effective presentation of findings. The visual data
(photographs taken with a digital camera) were stored in my storage devices (a laptop and
a portable hard drive).
3.5

Approaches in Analysis
The principal procedure of the analysis of the collected data (e.g., texts and visual

images) consisted of sorting and storing the data, coding (identifying and indexing
relevant themes or topics), (re)categorizing and synthesizing the coded themes, writing
short memos on the categorized/synthesized themes representing orderings as phenomena
of material politics along with their concrete examples, and incorporating them into a
narrative. To code the visual material, I added annotations of meaning to the data, and
used these annotations as codes. Yet, this process comprised two major processes:
descriptive analysis and theoretical analysis (Angrosino 2007). The former refers to “the
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process of taking the stream of data and breaking it down into its component parts; in
other words, what patterns, regularities, or themes emerge from the data?” whereas the
latter means “the process of figuring out how those component parts fit together; in other
words, how can we explain the existence of patterns in the data, or how do we account
for the perceived regularities?” (Angrosino 2007:66-67). The descriptive analysis process
eventually leads to the inductive process of “generalization from and justification of a
general explanation based on the accumulation of lots of particular, but similar,
circumstances” (Gibbs 2007a) and to “grounded theory,” or an approach of discovery of a
theory from data (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
However, this research aimed primarily to prove the validity of the theory through
testing the working hypotheses derived from the theory. That means that my analysis was
more likely to take the latter, deductive approach, namely, theoretical analysis, which
would pay attention to identifying anecdotes that fit (or would not fit) the
abovementioned working hypotheses (Gibbs 2007b; Richards 2005). Nevertheless, in the
fieldwork as well as during the analysis, I also left possibilities open for developing other
hypotheses based on what I observed. Accordingly, the final analysis included the latter,
descriptive analysis, with its more exploratory characteristics and sensitivity to what the
pre-established hypotheses would be unlikely to capture, so as to notice relevant themes
and accumulated, particular, similar patterns elicited from the data. Thus, the analysis in
this research drew on both the inductive, data-driven approach to elicit relevant themes
“up” from the data, and the deductive, hypotheses-driven approach to apply the predicted
patterns “down” to the data.
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Throughout the analysis, furthermore, specific attention was paid to how, in the
development and enactment of PS regulations, different actors and entities were
assembled and became a cohesive network capable of drawing legitimate pest/non-pest
distinctions capable of enforcing legal measures to control movements or behaviors of
humans and non-humans involved in or “touched” by the regulation. This analytical foci
followed ANT’s dicta, “follow the actors,” and/or, “follow contestations” (Busch and
Juska 1997; Tanaka and Juska 2010), which commands that the researcher trace how a
specific actor (whether human or non-human, for example, a fruit fly species) moves,
builds relationship with others, and is transformed, within and by the network. In other
words, my analysis followed the ways relevant actors, that is, those considered
responsible for an act (e.g., fruit flies are a relevant actor when they are deemed
responsible for damaging fruits; consumers are an actor when they are responsible for
their demands for quality fruits), were described, narrated, analyzed, discussed, and
communicated in conversations, documents, or other media. The analytical command
following ANT’s dicta is especially useful when the actor is involved in unstable
conditions, for instance, when contestations take place over the nature of the actor (e.g.,
whether the fruit fly is really parasitic to a certain plant), thus revealing the multiplicity of
meanings. By following the movements of the actor within network, my analysis aimed
to elucidate dynamic transformations of PS regulations, extending beyond the boundaries
of institutions and organizations and across space and time.
In the meantime, ANT is said to be less apt for analysis of networks in stable
conditions and for explaining the failure of the extension of a network (Friedland 2001;
Tanaka and Juska 2010). Although scholars employing ANT were aware that a network
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always entails possibilities of collapse (e.g., actor-network of scallop cultivation in
France eventually collapsed (Callon 1986)), an ANT analysis “following-the-actor” is
unlikely to capture the collapse of a network until it really happens. And, this inability to
predict the future leads to criticizing ANT for merely retelling a known story of what has
happened (Collins and Yearley 1992; Yearley 2005). Thus, considering that my research
had the specific interest in mundaneness, or the (apparent) stability, of operations of PS
regulations, it is reasonable to complement ANT’s dicta with an approach, or analytical
attitude, put forward by Luhmann and his followers (Komatsu 2003; Luhmann 1995;
Nagaoka 2006), called “unlikeliness theorem,” that is, to halt the normal presumption that
what looks stable, normal, regular, or mundane, is in fact very unlikely to be stable in
reality. Taking the normality as abnormal, a researcher critically asks what is behind this
apparent stability, what tacit assumptions are underlying and sustaining this apparent
mundaneness, where a “seed” of collapse is hidden, and so forth. Theoretically and
methodologically, therefore, combining the two theoretical strands will better deal with
both the historical development and spatial extension of PS regulations in dynamism, and
with the regulations’ apparently stable, mundane, daily operations with critical eyes.
3.6

Limitations
However, the methodologies I chose obviously have limitations. The first

limitation concerns the generalizability of findings. My case study was intended to
provide in-depth delineations of PS regulations in Mexico, but not to claim that its
findings are generalizable to other locales. Still, readers of a case study can recognize
similarities between its findings and their experiences, and to that extent, outcomes of a
case study can be deemed generalizable beyond the single case (Stake 2000; Stark and
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Torrance 2005). And my study could generate findings that prompt further investigation
of PS regulations as a global regulatory scheme in different places, thereby extending the
generalizability. However, generalization of my findings to other cases is dependent upon
future research, which will enhance relevant literature, including the sociology of
globalization, of agriculture and of food production and consumption.
The second limitation is that my approach to data collection and analysis was
intended to illuminate detailed and “thick” accounts of the PS regulations, but not to
provide accurate quantitative estimations of the consequences of the PS regulations. For
instance, my study did not enumerate how many mango growers were supporting, or
opposing, PS regulations in the state of Sinaloa, or estimate with accuracy how much
economic benefit the PFA could generate. This methodological drawback suggests that it
is difficult for my study to offer political recommendations to immediately alter the
current PS regulations. For example, quantitative data of discontented mango growers
could prompt the authorities to more quickly take action, which often would necessitate
quantified budgets, to improve PS programs, than qualitative descriptions of the
discontent. Of course, instead, one of the strengths of my study lies in its potential to
explore and identify discontent among mango growers that might be unknown to the PS
authorities.
The third limitation relates to the process to recruit the informants that relied on
convenient and snowball sampling strategy, rather than a systematic selection. More
specifically, the interviews and participant observation with the key informants, who
were knowledgeable about the regulations, might be “biased” toward expert or elite
perspectives. The information obtained from them was by no means representing all the
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people involved in the regulations. However, elite interviewees can include not only
economically affluent people, but also those at higher positions in an organization
regardless of economic status (Rubin and Rubin 1995), and have distinctive advantages,
such as access to expert knowledge and to further data sources or research opportunities
(Moyser 2006). I benefitted from interviewing several key interviewees, including senior
officials of the PS regulatory authorities. Still, it is difficult to have a long interview with
busy elite informants, and hence difficult to develop rapport with them (Rubin and Rubin
1995). Accordingly, it was challenging for me to obtain detailed stories, including
personal views or experiences, beyond “official” accounts of PS regulations, from some
of the interviewed representatives of organizations.
The fourth and last limitation is related to the concept of “ordering.” In Chapter 2,
I made the case that the concept was to capture the effect of the PS regulations as an ever
incomplete and temporal outcome rather than as a static status. Yet, my delineations of
the regulations as writings remain to be only static forever. Nonetheless, I insist that the
concept of ordering still has an important implication that my observations and
interpretations of the consequence of the PS regulations will always be open to
(re)interpretations, including criticisms, thereby remain incomplete. It is in this sense that
the outcome of the PS regulations should be grasped as an ordering.
3.7

Summary
The present research drew on the case study approach, consisting of qualitative

data collection and analysis methods. This strategy was premised on the aptness and
sensitivity of the employed methods to generate rich and “thick” descriptions of the
operations of PS regulations, allowing me to understand the performance of rigid non-
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human material beings in the regulation and multiplicity of meanings and contexts the
regulations engender, which the material politics concept envisages. For data collection,
more specifically, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and documentary
analysis were employed in the nine-month fieldwork in Mexico; for the analysis, both the
data-driven, inductive, descriptive analysis, and the hypothesis-driven, deductive,
theoretical analysis were combined and applied, so that while examining the validity of
several working hypotheses derived from the theoretical foundations, the analysis could
also explore other relevant themes. A few dicta suggested by ANT and systems theory,
“follow the actor,” “follow contestations,” and the “unlikeliness theorem,” provided
analytical guidelines to elucidate processes through which PS regulations develop a
heterogeneous network as well as what might be concealed and made latent in such
dynamic assembling processes.
However, there are a few limitations in the research methodology adopted for this
study, including the inability to provide broadly generalizable findings, the inability to
provide a quantified estimation of the consequences of PS regulations, possible biases
towards “elite” perspectives, and the writing that can grasp the ordering of the regulations
only as static fix. Despite such methodological limitations, I believe the data and its
analysis in the following chapters robustly and vividly delineate the material politics of
PS regulations as a global regulation materially enacted at the very local level. Prior to
demonstrating outcomes of the analysis based on the approaches outlined here, the next
chapter, Chapter 4, will provide more detailed descriptions of major actors, such as fruit
flies, mangos, PS regulations, and the site of the research, the state of Sinaloa.
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Chapter 4
Introducing Actors, Setting the Scene
This chapter will delineate the setting of the research and the “actors” as the main
“cast” involved in it, including the legal framework of PS regulations, Tephritidae fruit
flies, mangos, and the principal research site, the state of Sinaloa, Mexico. An “actor” in
this study refers to any entity, whether human or not, to which an event that happens
within the PS regulation network is attributed as an act. This study explores a variety of
actors involved in the PS regulation network, including not only Mexican mangos, but
also other fruit crops, places, devices, and people that make it possible to draw
distinctions between pest/non-pest as to fruit flies. In what follows, I will first provide an
overview of PS regulations with an emphasis on their legal and organizational framework,
followed by presentations of the major actors such as Tephritidae fruit flies and mangos.
The chapter will conclude with an introduction of the principal research site, Sinaloa, as
the scene where these actors are in play.
4.1

Legal and Organizational Framework of PS Regulations
Law and Mol (2008) state that “while material politics may well involve words, it

is not discursive in kind” (141). Material politics is not entirely discursive4—in the sense
of verbal or textual communication and argumentation politics—but it is always
embodied and co-produced with non-verbal material (Jasanoff 2004a). Scientific
knowledge, which would tend to be more textual or reliant on verbal communication or
4

The words discursive and discourse have a variety of connotations, which even appear
contradictory. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.) lists, as meanings of
discursive, “moving from topic to topic without order: rambling,” “proceeding coherently
from topic to topic,” and “marked by analytical reasoning.” Meanings of discourse (as a
noun) include, “capacity of orderly thought,” “verbal interchange of ideas,” “connected
speech or writing,” and “social familiarity.”
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argumentation, and technology which engages less verbal beings in control over nature,
are not separable (David 2005). In this study, laws and related organizations are analyzed
as being constituted by science and technical practices. Laws, co-produced with science
and technology, are critical because they endorse the legitimacy of many modern key
institutions (Jasanoff 1995; 2007). The legal systems and organizations that enact PS
regulations are hierarchically structured (Table 4-1). The SPS Agreement directs that
trade regulations must be “harmonized” by standards such as the International Plant
Protection Convention (IPPC) and International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures
(ISPM) by the IPPC Secretary, an affiliation of the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), in order to reduce unnecessary barriers distorting free trade (Kennedy 2000).
IPPC guides “harmonization” in the area of PS regulations. It convenes negotiations by
government delegates to establish the technical and legal specifics of International
Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs). IPPC also stipulates that Regional Plant
Protection Organizations (RPPO) be formed to coordinate PS activities in specific
geographic regions. In the North American region, Canada, the United States, and
Mexico constitute the North American Plant Protection Organization (NAPPO), which
has its own regional rules.
Under the international legal and organizational framework, each country
establishes a National Plant Protection Organization (NPPO) in charge of domestic PS
regulations (e.g. APHIS in USDA) and its own PS law in line with the IPPC (e.g. U.S.
Plant Protection Act, Mexican Ley Federal de Sanidad Vegetal). For example, according
to the domestic PS law, APHIS officials inspect mangos imported from Mexico at the
U.S. border. Within the national framework, local (state or municipal) governments
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establish their own statutes and affiliated organizations. In each state of Mexico, Comités
Estatales de Sanidad Vegetal (CESAVE, State Phytosanitary Committees) and Juntas
Locales de Sanidad Vegetal (JLSV, Local Phytosanitary Boards) are organizations
stipulated by the Mexican PS law. Personnel of these local governments and
organizations undertake local-level PS regulatory activities, such as pest monitoring.

Table 4-1 Legal and Organizational framework of PS regulations
Organizations

Examples of Statutes

International level
• FAO
• SPS Agreement
• IPPC
• IPPC Text
• ISPMs

Regional level
• RPPO

National level
• SAGARPA
• USDA APHIS

Local level
• State and
municipal
governments
• JLSV

Examples of Activities
• Negotiation for establishment of
international technical standards
• Information clearinghouse
(reporting, collecting, and sharing)
of pest occurrence

• NAPPO Regional Standards for • Negotiation for establishment of
Regional Standards
Phytosanitary Measures on
Establishment of Fruit Fly Pest • Information clearinghouse at
Free Areas in North America
regional level
• PS laws (Mexico Ley Federal
de Sanidad Vegatal) (U.S. Plant
Protection Act)
• Mexican NOM and U.S. CFR
• Work Plan for the Mexican
Mango Treatment and
Preclearance Program

• Mexico national fruit fly eradication
campaign & establishment of PFA
• U.S. border import inspection
• Monitoring at packing/disinfection
facilities
• Bi-lateral negotiation to establish
PS regulations

• Area specific statutes

• Monitoring such as roadside
inspection

Locally practiced PS measures on Mexican mangos are enacted also as legal
practices from within the global structure, which engages and is enacted by diverse actors,
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from government delegates in an international negotiation, to local inspectors in roadside
inspection, from fruit flies to hot water and pest traps. However, as Jasanoff (1995; 2007)
points out, and in resonance with functional differentiations suggested by systems theory,
while they are mutually constitutive practices co-producing knowledge, there are also
distinctive and competing “cultural” differences between law and science. Establishing
and enacting PS regulations as legal statutes whose viability and authority is endorsed by
scientific and technical knowledge may entail conflicting negotiations through which new
orderings will emerge. Such negotiations appear in different forms through the transition
occurring in Sinaloa between technical and legal arrangements of PS regulations on fruit
flies; new statutes and technologies are being enacted.
4.2

Tephritidae Fruit Flies

4.2.1 Biology of fruit fly pests
Tephritidae is one of the families constituting the Diptera order, which includes
species commonly known as flies.5 Tephritidae flies, consisting of approximately 4500
species, have an extraordinary capacity to adapt to different environments and climate
conditions, and are an important agricultural pest that attacks practically all fruit crops
across the world (Aluja [1993] 1994; Carroll et al. 2002 onwards). Among more than 480
genera under the Tephritidae family, of particular economic importance and necessary to
quarantine are Anastrepha, Rhagoletis, Bactrocera (formerly grouped as Dacus), and
Toxotrypana and Ceratitis (Aluja [1993] 1994; Weems et al. 2004). Approximately 250
5

Under the Diptera order, there is another family called Drosophilidae. This family
includes the Drosphila genus to which some species that are also called fruit flies belong.
One of the most known species of this genus is D. melanogaster, which is used as a
model organism for biological research. Although some of the species of Drosphila are
known to have attacked fruit crops (Vancouver Sun 2010), its economic significance is
limited compared to that of Tephritidae species.
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Tephritidae species are considered pests (Carroll et al. 2002 onwards; White and ElsonHarris 1992).
Adult Tephritidae fruit flies have bodies of yellow, orange, coffee, black or
combinations of these colors. They are 0.12 to 0.4 inches (3 -10 mm) in length and 0.05
to 0.13 inches (1.25 to 3.25 mm) in diameter. A pair of wings attached to the thorax allow
an adult to fly more than 200 km with wind.6 An adult female fly can oviposit up to 12
times in a few hours and each time lays 1 - 12 eggs with its long ovipositor in a fruit.
Though there are variations among species, some adult flies can survive for 8 to 12
months. Adult flies feed on the secretions of plants, birds, or other insects such as aphids,
which supposedly provide the protein sources needed for reproductive maturation.
Entomologists assume that bacteria on plant surfaces play significant roles as protein
providers for fruit flies, suggesting the existence of a symbiotic relationship between the
two organisms. Attractant substances used for fly traps, emitting fume of protein sources,
lure flies. Female adults, those inhabiting tropical areas in particular, can lay more than
1000 eggs in a single life (e.g., a female Mexican fruit fly, Anastrepha ludens, lays 40
eggs at a time, 100 or more a day, and about 2,000 over her life span (Weems, et al.
2004)). Eggs laid in a fruit have an elongated form and are less than 2 mm. Larvae
(maggots) are white or yellowish white and vary in length from 0.12 to 0.14 inches (3 to
3.5 mm) depending on the species. Though varying among species, larvae spend a time
period of a week to a month in the fruit, passing three stages (instars), feeding on fruit
pulp, and causing damage to fruits. Mature third-instar larvae transform into pupae in the
soil. While larvae of some species “jump” from the fruit on the tree to the ground, others
6

The family name Diptera means “two wings.”
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(e.g., Anastrepha spp - principal pest fruit fly species in Mexico) escape from the fruit
after it has dropped on the ground. The pupae stage for “multivoltine” species (i.e., those
having various generations in a single year), such as Anastrepha spp., takes a week to a
month until emergence, while pupae of “univoltine” species, such as Rhagoletis
pomonella (Apple maggot, found in the United States), spend a winter before emergence.
Thus, in order to control the major fruit fly species in Mexico, such as Mexican fruit fly
(A. ludens), it is critical to dispose host fruits by burying them deep in the ground in a
timely manner so that mature larvae cannot escape.
4.2.2 The “fruit fly problem”
The “fruit fly problem” includes “direct” and “indirect” economic damage by the
pest (White and Elson-Harris 1992). The “direct” damage by the fruit fly pest is caused
by its larvae feeding on fruit pulp, destroying the crop’s value. Tephritidae pests also
cause “indirect” economic damage. As they have an ingenious capability to adapt to
varying environments and utilize diverse host plants, they can become devastating pests
in places far away from their native areas. Given the fear of the pest’s destructive
potential, plant protection authorities (e.g., USDA-APHIS) apply stringent quarantine
measures, whether domestically or internationally, against these species. Such regulations
can either trample a potential export market for a producing country or force the producer
to apply additional costly disinfection measures, such as heat treatment.
Exact estimates of economic damage by fruit flies, especially potential losses by
“indirect” damage, are difficult to calculate and rarely available (Allwood and Leblanc
1997). Yet, taking Australia’s fruit production in the 1980s as a case, under the
presumption that no control was taken, a potential loss of 100 million Australian dollars
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out of the total production of A$850 million was estimated to be due to fruit flies (FAORAPA 1986; White and Elson-Harris 1992). Also, in Okinawa, a prefecture in the
southwestern archipelago of Japan, Bactrocera cucurbitae (melon fly), a vicious pest to
melon crops, was completely eradicated in 1993. This allowed the shipment of bitter
melon, a vegetable that has become very popular in recent decades, to the mainland Japan,
providing 400 million yens annually (4 million U.S. dollars) to the prefecture, which was
a hidden economic loss caused by the fruit fly (Okinawa Prefecture 2008).
4.2.3 Tephritidae in Mexico
Ceratitis capitata (Mediterranean fruit fly) is native to Africa and has spread to
almost all tropical and temperate areas of the world. Being from Africa, it is an “exotic”
pest to America. There are more than 200 recorded host species for C. capitata, which is
considered one of the worst agricultural pests. Anastrepha species are endemic to
American tropical and sub-tropical zones, extending from the southwestern US (Texas,
California, and Florida) through northern Argentine and Chile, and to the Caribbean
islands. The Anastrepha entails approximately 200 species, being the largest genus in the
Neotropic zone (Aluja [1993] 1994). Both Anastrepha pest species and C. capitata are
“polyphagous,” which means they attack plants belonging to different plant families
(rather than genera). This disposition makes these species more flexible and adaptable to
different environments, thereby highly detrimental to agriculture and thus subject to
stringent quarantine regulations. The range of hosts (i.e., plants on which pests feed) for
the entire Anastrepha genus is very broad with a record of 270 plant species in 41
families, although in fact the majority of the species attack only a relatively limited
number of plant species (Norrbom 2000). Certain species within Anastrepha, especially
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those in the fraterculus group, including those mentioned above, are “generalists” (i.e.,
less selective in plants to feed on) and thus possess detrimental potential as agricultural
pests (Norrbom 2000).
According to Hernández-Ortiz (2007), 37 Anastrepha species are known to exist
in Mexico. Although the information is slightly older, Ireta and Guzmán (2002) note that
eight fruit fly species are known to utilize the mango as a preferred and/or alternative (i.e.,
used when the principal preferred host is unavailable) host. Out of the eight species,
seven are known to exist in Sinaloa among which two species, A. obliqua and A. ludens,
are considered more economically important because of their prevalence, geographic
distribution, and numbers of possible host plants (Huerta Paniagua, et al. 1986; Ireta and
Guzmán E 2002). As I will discuss in Chapter 5, however, it is not a simple, taken-forgranted task to determine a fruit fly pest vis-à-vis a host plant because the relationship
between a “pest” and a “host” plant is contingent, reflecting the complex nature of
ecological and socio-economic interactions involving plants, insects, and humans.
4.2.4 Essentials of controlling Tephritidae fruit fly pests
Given the ecology and physiology of Tephritidae pests and their relationship with
human beings, Aluja ([1993] 1994) argues that collective and coordinated applications of
various pest control measures are essential to achieve the integrated pest management
(IPM) of fruit flies. While there can be different definitions, IPM generally refers to a
system, or a set of diverse practices, that maintains the population of pests below the
level that causes economically unacceptable damages to a crop while minimizing adverse
impacts on society and the environment; IPM practices should be based on the
understanding of the agro-ecology in which the crop and the pest are found (Aluja [1993]
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1994; Norris, Caswell-Chen, and Kogan 2003). Hence, to control7 Tephritidae pests, a
variety of measures are applied, from detection by sampling of host plants and trapping,
chemical control, mechanical-cultural control, biological control, sterile insect technique,
and legal measures. Essentials of these control measures will be provided below. Chapter
7 will lay out detailed accounts of their applications in Mexico and the state of Sinaloa.
Because IPM of Tephritidae pests should be based on accurate knowledge of the
pest’s existence and density, “detection of the pest” is a critically important element. This
is usually done by using different types of traps (Figure 4-1). Throughout a geographic
area with a certain density, traps containing substances (e.g., hydrolyzed protein, insect
pheromone, etc) that lure fruit flies are installed and inspected regularly to see if target
species are captured. Growing healthy and vigorous crop plants is a key for successful
implementation of IPM. Thus, along with soil, fertilization, plant nutrition control, and
plant density management, “mechanical-cultural8 control,” including weed management
to eliminate refuges for the pest and elimination of infested crops, is an important
element of Tephritidae pest control. Many mechanical-cultural measures are feasible for
resource-poor growers. Meanwhile, “chemical control,” or application of pesticides, is
also a common practice for Tephritidae control. This category includes not only spraying
pesticides in orchards, but also fumigation of harvested fruits. However, given growing

7

White and Elson-Harris (2002), following Bateman (1982), make a distinction between
control and suppression: the former refers to applying measures to protect a single
orchard while the latter means measures covering a large area. However, in my study I
will use the term “control” for measures to prevent damages by a pest for in a single farm
and a certain geographic area beyond the farm, whereas I use “suppression” to refer to
procedures designed to reduce the population density of pests in the field.
8

This “cultural” means “of cultivation” rather than ways of life or values of a specific
group or country.
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concerns about the environmental impact of pesticides, “biological control” is also an
important element of Tephritidae control. Included in this category are applications of
natural enemies such as predators, competitors, parasites, or parasitoids in order to
suppress a pest population in the field. “Sterile insect technique (SIT),” a more widely
applied practice in fruit fly control than in any other pest species, is a “birth control”
technique aiming to suppress, or eradicate, a wild pest insect population by rearing and
releasing a massive number of sterile male insects to fields where they mate with females,
which will lay only infertile eggs. Continuous release will deprive the wild insect
population of the chance of reproduction, thereby eventually suppressing the wild pest
population.

Figure 4-1 Traps used for detection of fruit flies in a research laboratory of a
University in Tapachula, Chiapas, Mexico
(Photo by author)
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“Post-harvest quarantine treatments” are also widely used in crops susceptible to
infestation by fruit fly pests, and thus are a distinctive element of Tephritidae control.
HWT, hot-air or vapor treatment, cold-treatment, use of fumigants such as ethylene
dibromide (EDB) and methyl bromide (MB), and use of irradiation are included in this
category of control measures, which allow fruits grown in an area infested with the pest
to be exported to other areas. An alternative to post-harvest treatments to make products
eligible for export or shipment from a pest-infested area is to establish “PFA,” defined by
IPPC as “an area in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific
evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained”
(IPPC 2007). In the state of Sinaloa, my primary research site, the regulatory technical
scheme for exportation of mango fruits is in transition from post-harvest treatment
(HWT) to PFA. These technical schemes will be discussed later in this chapter and in
more detail in Chapter 6 and 7.
Finally, “legal controls” include a variety of regulatory actions legally endorsed or
made mandatory, such as quarantine, certification for movement (transportation) of fruits,
certification of origin and disinfection treatment, record of pest control measures,
inspection of cargo at (air)ports and highways, and so forth. As described above, the
hierarchical legal structure from the international to local levels governs specific actions
for controls. These measures allow for control beyond venues of production and
distribution of the commodity. Given that Tephritidae pests are highly mobile and
adaptive to diverse environments including non-farming sites, it is crucial for the control
to be able to enforce its effects beyond venues of production and distribution of the
commodity.
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4.3

Mango

4.3.1 Description of the crop and its origin
The mango (Mangifera indica L.) is an important global agricultural commodity
that generates substantial export revenues to the producing countries (Jacobi, MacRae,
and Hetherington 2001). It belongs to the Anacardiacecae family, which includes the
cashew, the pistachio, the Japanese varnish (lacquer or urushi) tree, poison ivy, and
poison oak. While the mango is perhaps the most economically important crop in
Anacardiacecae (Rieger 2006), many plants in this family, including mango, produce sap
containing a toxic substance, called urushiol, which causes human allergic reactions, such
as rashes, and prevents some people from consuming the fruits.
The mango is a large tree growing up to 100 feet and lives more than 100 years
(Figure 4-2). Once or twice a year, or sporadically throughout the canopy, leaves flush
and turn from a reddish color to dark green. The leaf is lanceolate (i.e. lance-shaped) of 4
to 16 inches long and 1 to 2 inches wide and may survive for several years. Its terminal
panicles bear tiny (one-eighth to a quarter inch) yellowish flowers (Figure 4-3).9 Only
one or a few fruits grow in a panicle (Figure 4-4). Temperatures or seasonal dry
conditions trigger the formation of flower buds, although there are variations in the
demand for such climatic conditions among cultivars. Lack of conditions that induce
reproductive growth can result in biennial production, which is problematic for
commercial growers. To obtain a uniform formation of flower buds and sets of fruits,
growth regulators, such as potassium nitrate (KNO3), naphthalene acetic acid, and
Ethephone are often applied.
9

A panicle is a type of cluster of flowers and fruits. A “terminal” panicle means a panicle
formed at the end, or top, of a branch.
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Figure 4-2 Old mango tree in Tapachula city, Chiapas, Mexico
(Photo by author)

Figure 4-3 Flowers (panicles) of mango in El Rosario, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
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Figure 4-4 Mangos awaiting harvest in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
Mangos originate from south of Asia, more specifically, the “Indo-Burma” region,
including today’s Myanmar, Bangladesh, and northeast India, where the crop has been
cultivated for over 4000 years (Indian Council of Agricultural Research 1967; Ireta and
Guzmán E 2002; Nakasone and Paull 1998; Rieger 2006). Mango was introduced to
Southeast Asia during the fourth and fifth centuries and to the Philippines in the fifteenth
century, probably by Indian traders or Buddhist monks. The crop was transported by the
Portuguese to East Africa and Brazil, and by the Spanish from the Philippines to Mexico
by the eighteenth century; and during the early nineteenth century by Spanish traders
from Mexico to Hawaii (Nakasone and Paull 1998)10.

10

Ramírez Villapudua et al. (2006) note that the mango was introduced to the Americas
(Mexico and Brazil) even earlier than sixteenth century.
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4.3.2 Worldwide production and trade of mangos
In 2008, the total mango production in the world reached nearly 35 million metric
tons within 4.8 million hectares, with India, China, Thailand, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Brazil, and the Philippines being major countries producing fruits (Table 4-2). Despite
their significant status as a globally traded agro-commodity, most mangos are consumed
in countries in which they are produced. In 2008, less than 1.2 million out of the world
total mango production of 35 million tons was destined for export (Table 4-3). This
relatively limited export is, first, because mangos are highly perishable and susceptible to
cold storage, and second, because they are a host to detrimental fruit flies, for which
many importing countries require quarantine treatments, such as heat treatment, which
can damage the fruit’s quality (Gutierrez et al. 1999; Ponce de Leon et al. 1996; Leon et
al. 1999; Yahia et al. 1999; Yahia et al. 1999; Yahia and Pedro-Campos 1999). This is
why post-harvest PS treatments for disinfection and quality preservation are crucial for
this commodity (Jacobi, MacRae, and Hetherington 2001).
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Table 4-2 Major mango-producing countries in the world (quantity 1000 tons)
Country\Year
India
China
Thailand
Indonesia
Mexico
Pakistan
Brazil
Philippines
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Other countries
World Total

1978
7,527.2
246.7
580.0
164.0
540.7
561.1
709.0
335.2
254.8
350.0
1,924.3
13,195.0

1988
7,927.0
627.5
840.0
532.0
1,091.0
712.8
543.7
361.1
160.2
400.0
2,527.8
15,725.0

1998
10,230.0
2,561.5
1,087.8
600.1
1,473.9
916.8
468.6
945.2
186.8
731.0
3,556.3
22,759.8

2008
13,649.4
3,976.7
2,374.2
2,013.1
1,855.4
1,753.7
1,154.7
884.0
802.8
750.0
5,778.7
34,994.6

Source: FAOSTATS (http://faostat.fao.org/)
Table 4-3 Major mango-exporting countries (quantity in tons)
Country\Year
India
Mexico
Brazil
Netherlands*
Peru
Pakistan
Thailand
Ecuador
Philippines
Guatemala
Other Countries
World Total

1978
3,710
16,740
45
330
1,203
9,034
11,664
42,726

1988
16,876
14,799
5,303
2,630
2,503
11,003
6,713
44
13,591
32,306
105,768

1998
47,149
209,426
39,186
17,154
10,541
40,251
10,209
10,021
52,579
10,195
92,740
539,451

2008
274,854
226,083
133,944
94,646
82,696
69,324
61,608
34,615
20,541
20,315
176,025
1,194,651

Source: FAOSTATS (http://faostat.fao.org/)
* Netherlands does not produce the fruit but only trades as a major entry port to other
European countries.
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4.3.3 Mango production and consumption in Mexico
Mexico is one of the major mango-producing countries and was the world’s
largest mango-exporting country until 2004 (FAOSTATS http://faostat.fao.org/). The
country has a long history of growing, consuming, and exporting this tropical fruit,
although it is a non-native plant. As mentioned earlier, mango was first introduced to
Mexico in the late eighteenth century through a Pacific port of Acapulco from the
Philippines, followed by another wave of introduction through the Mexican Gulf to
Veracruz in the early nineteenth century (Ireta and Guzmán 2002).
The variety first introduced to the country is called Manila derived from the
capital of the Philippines. Unlike the Manila, the cultivars introduced to Veracruz were
monoembryonic, meaning that a seed contains only one embryo. In polyembryonic
varieties, a seed contains several clonal embryos, originating from maternal somatic cells,
along with a zygotic (i.e., hybridized with a male zygote from a pollen) embryo.11 Such
genetically-identical embryos tend to be more rigorous than hybrids, suppressing the
latter’s growth, resulting in the difficulty of cross-breeding for genetic improvements
(Nakasone and Paull 1998). In mango varieties, Indian types, characterized by more
round and plump fruits, with bright red blush skin, exhibit the polyembrionic disposition,
whereas Indo-China types, including the Manila, are characterized with flattened, kidneyshaped, elongated fruits with light green or yellow skin (Rieger 2006). Cross-breeding of
a polyembryonic cultivar is possible by using a monoembryonic cultivar as the female
parent (but not vice-versa).

11

Polyembryonic seeds are found in other fruit crops (e.g., citrus) as well and
demonstrate dispositions similar to those explained here.
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Because monoembryonic cultivars generate hybrids more easily than
polyembryonic types, mangos introduced in the second wave were multiplied through
seeds, repeating cross-breeding, resulting in a large variation of genetic strains, which are
now often called criollos.12 Usually, a criollo does not refer to an established commercial
variety but means a strain of plants that have survived native conditions and/or human
selection since its introduction. Characteristics and qualities of criollo fruits demonstrate
considerable variation.
A more significant event for the commercial production of Mexican mangos was
the introduction during the 1960s of several major commercial varieties from Florida, in
the United States, through the state of Guerrero. These varieties bred and/or selected in
Florida, known as Florida cultivars, such as Haden, Irwin, Keitt, Kent, and Tommy
Atkins, possessed characteristics suitable for commercialization—higher productivity,
tolerance to handling and shipping, and a pleasing external appearance—and thus have
become varieties of economic importance for Mexico, as well as many other mangoproducing countries13 (Campbell and Zill 2006; Ireta and Guzmán 2002). In addition to

12

In general, “criollo” means a native and/or descendant of immigrants, especially to
Latin America, although the word has many different connotations.
13

With the increased effort to breed mango cultivars since the late eighteenth century,
Florida was once recognized as the “second center of genetic diversity of mango” (Ojeda
and Estrada 2002: 9-10) following the original genetic center being India as mentioned.
The USDA collected genetic materials from across the world and used them for
improvement of the plant. One of the most successful results of the breeding efforts in
Florida was the discovery of the cultivar Haden, which maintained the status as the most
important mango variety in Florida for more than forty years (Ojeda and Estrada 2002).
However, along with urbanization in production areas and hurricanes that struck Florida,
the increase in import mangos from Mexico and Tropical America promoted by trade
liberalization (and recent lifting of import bans on mangos from a few Asian countries
will further push this trend) led the commercial production of mango fruits in Florida and
the US to vanish almost completely (Campbell and Zill 2006; Rieger 2006).
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the Florida cultivars, there is another economically important and original variety from
Mexico, Ataulfo. This cultivar, originally discovered and selected from mango trees in
the Chiapas state, has been officially recognized by the Mexican government as a
regionally specific product of the state (Denominación de Origen).14 As with the Tequila
liquor, another official regional-specific product of Mexico, the Ataulfo has to be grown
under specific conditions of the producing region in order to be marketed as “Ataulfo.”
In Mexico, over 97 % of the mango production is concentrated in 10 states,
including Sinaloa, as shown in Figure 4-5(PROSERCO 2007). According to Promotora
de Servicios Comerciales Del Estado de Campeche (PROSERCO), Mexican mango
producers are classified more or less in two groups: “integrated” growers who have the
capacity to sort and pack fruits, and small-scale growers who rely on commercialization
through selling fruits to integrated growers and intermediaries (Figure 4-6) (PROSERCO
2007). Packers who also undertake disinfection, as explained later, play important roles
in the domestic and international distribution of Mexican mangos. Meanwhile, smallscale mango growers, or peasants, who tend to lack technical and financial resources, in
many cases have to rely on packers/exporters or intermediaries (often called “coyotes”)
for marketing their fruits. Their lack of resources puts peasants in a weak or vulnerable
position in negotiations with buyers over prices or conditions to sell their products.

14

It is believed that the Ataulfo cultivar was discovered from mango trees in the city of
Soconusco, Tapachula of the state of Chiapas. Although its progenitor has not been
completely determined, some argue that it originated from a criollo or a plant derived
from the Indian Alphonso variety (Ireta and Guzmán 2002).
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Figure 4-5 Major mango-producing States in Mexico Elaboration by author based
on PROSERCO (2007)
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Figure 4-6 Distribution flows of mango in Mexico and to export to the United States
Elaboration based on the diagram in PROSERCO (2007:24)
* Additions by author to the original diagram
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Although about 80% of Mexican mangos are consumed domestically, their export
also significantly contributes to Mexico’s economy. Mexico exported about 0.2 million
tons of mangos, ranking second in the world total export in 2005 (FAOSTATS
http://faostat.fao.org/). For Mexico, the United States is the most important purchaser of
this commodity. Nearly 90 % of the mango export from Mexico is destined for the United
States. The United States also relies on more than 60% of its import of mangos from
Mexico (USDA-FAS http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx). The fresh
mango import from Mexico to the United States dates back to the early 1950s. However,
the last two decades have witnessed an especially rapid growth, largely because of
NAFTA, which came into effect in 1994 (USDA-FAS
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx).
4.3.4 PS regulations for the export of Mexican mangos
In the fresh mango export from Mexico to the United States, PS regulations to
ensure that fruits are pest-free are crucial. Mexican packers/exporters shipping mangos to
the United States must abide by the Work Plan, which was agreed upon by APHIS and
SAGARPA of Mexico. The Work Plan details technical specifications of the disinfection
and the responsibilities of APHIS, SAGARPA, growers, packers/exporters, and their
organization, EMEX. As the only organization officially recognized by the United States
as representing the exporters, EMEX is responsible for coordinating key activities of the
program. Since its founding in 1991, EMEX has been vital to promotion of almost all
aspects of the Mexican mango industry, including research on mangos, quarantine
negotiations, post-harvest handling, packing standards, and marketing and promotion of
the commodity (Wong-Urrea et al. 1996).
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HWT is the technique used for disinfection. Disinfection and the palatability of
fruits are made possible by precisely controlled temperature and time (115 °F for 65 to
115 minutes). In addition to the HWT process, the Work Plan stipulates numerous
conditions, including registration of orchards, certification of disinfection facilities,
monitoring of the packing, and on-site inspection by APHIS and SAGARPA officers (or
delegated third-party personnel). Practicing HWT engages diverse human and non-human
entities, while simultaneously creating certain orderings among or within varying entities,
such as “clean packing areas for treated fruits” and “non-clean unload areas for untreated
fruits,” within a packing facility. As with the boiling practice of pigswill (Law and Mol
2008), HWT as a mundane practice draws boundaries between pest/non-pest and links
different places.
The current HWT was developed in the 1980s. Prior to that, mangos were
disinfected with a treatment using ethylene dibromide (EDB, a chemical already
abolished for health concerns in the United States) or another technique combining vapor
heat and cold water (Sharp et al. 1989; Sharp 1994a). The development of HWT might be
seen as the result of complex interactions involving diverse actors, such as fruits, pests,
humans, and devices, and negotiations over their unique characteristics, such as a pest’s
heat tolerance, fruit’s quality, equipment’s capacity and costs, and health concerns.
Meanwhile, the PFA is an alternative means for mango export to the United States.
A PFA is described as “an area in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated
by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially
maintained” (IPPC 1995:37) by eradication and monitoring of the target pest. Generally,
once a PFA is recognized by exporting and importing countries, plant products grown
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there no longer need disinfection. In Mexico, the first fruit-fly-free area recognized by the
United States was established in the 1990s in Sonora (Klassen 2005), the state to the
north of Sinaloa.
4.4

Research Site: The State of Sinaloa, Mexico
The state of Sinaloa, consisting of 18 municipalities, is located in north-western

Mexico, facing the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of California (Figure 4-8). The total
population is 2.6 million. The total land area is 58,000 square kilometers, close to the size
of West Virginia. Sinaloa’s long territory stretches from northwest to southeast for 560
km, or 350 miles, with the broadest part being 185 km (115 miles) and the narrowest part
being 70 km (44 miles). In Sinaloa, where the average temperature fluctuates between 22
and 24 degrees C (71.6 - 75.2 F), different climate types can be identified, including two
dominant classes: (1) hot or semi-hot, semi-humid climate with rainy summer and dry
areas covering 47.5 % of the total land, and (2) very-dry climate areas with varying
temperatures from very hot to hot covering 48.3 % (Meza Campusano 2002).
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Culiacán
(State capital)

Figure 4-7 State of Sinaloa and its municipalities
Elaboration by author based on a map images provided by INEGI
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In selecting the site for research on the globalization of agriculture, meaning an
extending web of production and consumption of agricultural products across the world,
a pertinent factor is the political-economic backdrop of Mexico. For the last decades,
Mexico has been consistently transforming its economic policies towards free-market and
free-trade reforms, which have also drastically altered the relationship between the
federal government and the people of the nation (Holzner 2010:15). Mexico’s politicaleconomic reform also created local political environments varying throughout regions in
which diverse political entities have emerged (Holzner 2010:16). Concurrent with the
development of economic policies, including NAFTA enacted in 1994, Mexico has been
advancing neoliberal policies, including promotion of free trade. However, as revealed by
debates over the promotion of free trade in the 2006 Mexican presidential election,
Mexico’s policy orientation has been highly contested (Bruhn and Greene 2007). This
was especially true for rural areas because neoliberal policies included withdrawal of the
federal programs for peasants to buy staple foods, and forced them to give up subsistence
corn farming and become migrant laborers (Carlsen 2003; Echánove 2005; Echánove and
Steffen 2005; Hellman 1999; Kurtz 2004; McMichael 1994b; Myhre 1994; 1998). It is in
this political-economic context that this study explored PS regulations in Sinaloa; these
regulations make the globalization of agriculture from this site possible.
Its geographic position, being relatively distant from the United States border
zones as well as the population centers of Mexico such as Mexico City and Guadalajara,
leaves Sinaloa with a challenge in promoting economic development because of higher
costs of transportation (López Cervantes 2007:68). Some observers argue that historically,
economic development of the state of Sinaloa was arguably associated with the public
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expenditures by the federal government, which financed the construction of production
infrastructures for modernization of agriculture (López Cervantes 2007). Still, primary
sectors, such as agriculture, livestock production, and fisheries, are of the most important
economic significance for the state. Twenty-six percent (26%) of the active labor
population is engaged in the primary sector including agriculture, and twenty-six percent
of the total land is dedicated to agricultural production (SAGARPA 2006). While
Sinaloa’s long coastal shore produces rich marine products, including shrimp, tuna, pen
shell, oyster, clam, and mojarra (a type of fish, called silver biddy in English), the state’s
main economic basis is agriculture (Meza Campusano 2002). It ranks at the top of the
country in the production of tomatoes, chickpeas, potatoes, and corn (SAGARPA 2006).
Its agricultural production is highly export-oriented. Many commodities are exported, in
particular, to the United States. The production of fruits, including mangos, also has
significant economic importance both internationally and nationally. Sinaloa, a major
mango-producing state in Mexico, exported over 50,000 tons of their fruits primarily to
the United States, and ranked second in the country’s mango export in 2002
(PROSERCO 2007; SAGARPA 2006).
However, the prosperous export-oriented agriculture of Sinaloa has not been
without problems. While its agrarian sector was in constant and prosperous expansion
until the 1980s, the entire economic sector of Sinaloa after the 1990s has suffered one of
the lowest growth rates in Mexico due to inadequate economic policies, hindering also its
farming sector from adapting itself to the global economy (López Cervantes 2007).
Among issues drawing the attention of critics are unequal distribution of wealth among
crop sectors, concentration and consolidation into fewer farm operators, and
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environmental degradation, including deprivation of water resources and contamination
with agricultural chemicals (Maya Ambía 2007). Also, faced with the effects of the
globalization of agriculture on the area, it has been an arena of active farm labor
movements (Segura 2005). Recently, rural laborers in the state consistently migrate,
seeking work within Mexico as well as beyond the U.S. border (López Cervantes 2007).
Another noteworthy, yet highly problematic, economic activity in the countryside that
makes the state’s name known world-widely is drug trafficking. Although this is an
emerging industry in rural Mexico, its emergence in the state of Sinaloa in particular
might be attributed to the economic decline since the 1990s; factors that likely lead rural
people to narcotics-trafficking are embedded in historically and culturally complex
backgrounds (Malkin 2001). Yet, López Cervantes (2007) argues that compared to other
states, the Sinaloans have a propensity to take more risks, being inclined to move out to
other territories for new or better opportunities, and even to get involved in delinquent
economic activities, including the long-existing drug trafficking.
4.4.1 Mango production in Sinaloa
According to Ireta and Guzmán (2002), criollo mangos were introduced to the
state of Sinaloa, my principal research site, at the end of the nineteenth century. Although
since then mangos have been grown in the state, the Florida cultivars, which enabled
commercial mango-production, were introduced after the 1970s. As one of the more
promising crops for export-oriented markets, mango production in Sinaloa has been
steadily growing (Figure 4-8). However, the production of mangos is concentrated in a
few municipalities in southern Sinaloa (Figure 4-9), especially in El Rosario and
Escuinapa. The number of mango growers has also drastically increased in these two
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municipalities in the last few decades. Nonetheless, the southern region is where the pest
has not been completely eradicated hence it is called an “Area of Low Pest Prevalence”
(ALPP), from which mango fruits cannot be exported without HWT.
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Figure 4-8 Areas planted with mango in Sinaloa (1992-2009)
Source: INEGI
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Figure 4-9 Areas planted with mango in 3 regions, North, Central, and South of
Sinaloa (hectares)
Source: INEGI
Municipalities in North, Central and South regions of Sinaloa
North (5): Ahome, Choix, El Fuerte, Guasave, Sinaloa
Central (7): Angostura, Badiraguato, Culiacán, Elota, Mocorito, Navolato, Salvador Alvarado
South (6): Concordia, Cosalá, Escuinapa, Mazatlán, El Rosario, San Ignacio
These divisions are based on the pest-prevalence status (Figure 4-10, below). Therefore, North
region corresponds to the PFA recognized by the United States; Central region is the PFA
recognized by Mexico; and South region is the low prevalence area.

4.4.2 PS regulatory scheme under transition
While the substantial mango export of Sinaloa and the political economic
backdrops in the globalization of agriculture are important reasons for the site selection,
more critical for my research is that the active “frontline” of the PFA located in Sinaloa is
about to shift. In 2005, the Mexican governmental eradication campaign led to the
official recognition by the United States that five municipalities in northern Sinaloa are
free of fruit flies (SAGARPA 2006) (). Mangos grown in the PFA no longer need HWT
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to export to the United States. Several other municipalities are awaiting official
recognition as PFAs by Mexico and eventually by the United States.
This changing regulation from HWT to PFA in Sinaloa can yield asymmetrical,
yet contingent, new orderings. The changing legal and technical specifics of PS
regulations will affect people involved in the regulations, such as mango growers,
packers/exporters, their employees, and government officials. Some may benefit from the
new PFA while others will not. Moreover, a PFA generally needs incessant and active
practices engaging diverse actors, such as pest traps installed within the area, release of
sterile fruit flies to prevent re-occurrence of the pest, and roadside inspection. These
practices perform material politics involving humans and non-humans, engendering
socio-material orderings. The shifting “frontline” will clearly illuminate the performance
and effect of different techniques (HWT and PFA). For example, the state government
might begin roadside inspection to prevent smuggling of potentially contaminated items
into the clean PFA. In the new PFA, workers of HWT facilities might see their jobs under
threat, while mango growers might see opportunities to ship their fruits without the
costly HWT. Thus, this research aims to capture enactment of the PFA as material
politics that might produce changes in the relationships and conditions among people
involved in the regulation.
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Figure 4-10 Pest (Tephritidae fruit fly) prevalence status of Sinaloa
Elaboration by author based on a map image by INEGI

Having presented profiles of the actors and the research site, from the next chapter
forward I will demonstrate how PS regulations have developed involving diverse actors,
beginning with an analysis of cases where a few Tephritidae fruit flies were determined
as problematic pests among certain crops.
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Chapter 5
Determination of a Pest and Handling of Uncertainties
Beginning from this chapter, I will present findings from the data and their
analyses. In this first chapter, using case studies of several Tephritidae species and their
relationship to a few crops, I will delineate how certain classes of fruit flies were
determined to be pests vis-à-vis certain classes of plant. As explained in the previous
chapter, because of potential damage Tephritidae can cause a variety of crops, many
countries take quarantine measures to prevent them from entering the territories. When an
importing country attempts to establish a quarantine measure against a fruit fly species, it
is critically important to determine whether a certain class of insect is really harmful for a
certain plant, which is called “host-status,” since it affects the chance for the plant
product to have access to a global market. If a plant product is determined as a host plant
for a detrimental fruit fly species, then this plant commodity is likely to be subject to a
trade restriction by an importing country, including ban of importation. An importing
country may require that plants with higher risks to become a host for Tephritidae go
through pre-export disinfection treatments, such as HWT for mangos.
It can be argued that the significance of host-status determination has been
growing in today’s globalizing agricultural and food provision market. For, on one hand,
an import ban of non-host (i.e., safe) plant products can be taken as distorting equal
access to the country’s market because under today’s scheme of international trade
regulations, a country cannot pose unnecessary import restrictions (Henson and Loader
2001). On the other hand, when a certain host plant is determined as non-host, while that
commodity may be traded without restriction, producers of the importing country could
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be upset because of a potential threat to their fields of production or to their share in the
market in the country. Hence, as reviewed in Chapter 2, under the WTO rules SPS
measures to prevent the spread of agricultural pests have to be based on scientific
knowledge to minimize distorting trade barriers.
Moreover, the host-status determination has implications more than the pest risk
as such, to which an importing country can be exposed through trade. Once a quarantine
regulation is imposed based on a host-status judgment, values or norms (e.g., one may
say that a good production practice to reduce potential risks should be introduced) would
emerge among human and non-human actors enrolled in the production of a global
commodity such that they are “disciplined” to conform to regulations governing
globalizing agriculture. Thus, determining the host-status of a certain fruit fly species visà-vis a certain plant product has significant political, economic, and moral implications
for globalizing agriculture.
However, determining the host-status is not as easy as it may sound, since, as I
alluded to previously with one of the working hypotheses in Chapter 3, pest-host
determination processes can entail and expose uncertainties of behaviors of insects, plants,
and/or humans. This is premised on the claim by STS since the 1970s that scientific
knowledge must be interpreted as the outcome of a temporal settlement of contestations,
and therefore flexible, negotiable, and open to different interpretations (Bloor 1991;
Collins 1983; Yearley 1984; Yearley 2005). My analysis, by “following contestations”
over pest-host relationships and drawing on insights from STS including ANT and
systems theory, will examine how science handles uncertainties of evolving relationships
between pests, plants, and humans; it will also examine how scientific knowledge as an
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outcome of settlement of contestations over the uncertainties will be fed into other
domains of society, such as law. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that while
science, through the supposedly “objective” determination of pest-host relationships, can
generate risk knowledge for legal or administrative decision making, this process also
conceals uncertainties and simultaneously engenders asymmetrical relationships between
those who are involved in and those who are excluded from the decision making.
5.1

Contingency in Determination of a Pest
First of all, what is a pest? In general, a pest means an organism (insect or animal)

that is harmful to humans or human concerns, including crops, and thereby has extended
connotations, such as an epidemic disease or an annoying person (Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary; Encarta World English Dictionary). Fundamentally, however,
what constitutes a “pest” can be elusive. For instance, among different cultural/semantic
systems, concepts of pests can vary considerably. Works drawing on ethno-entomology
or ethno-phytopathology—investigations of classification systems of insects and pests in
different cultural contexts—have documented variability in what constitutes a pest or not
and in how farmers control or avoid insects damaging crops (Bentley 1991; Bentley et al.
2009; Bentley and Rodriguez 2001; Bentley et al. 2005; Bentley, Rodríguez, and
González 1994; Gurung 2003; Morales and Perfecto 2000). Morales and Perfecto (2000),
for instance, have noted that farmers in the Guatemalan Highland insisted they had no
“pests” in their milpa (traditional intercropping farming) because their concept of “pest”
differs from what the corresponding Spanish term, plaga, would mean. The farmers’
concept of a pest hinges on whether the insect causes “economic damage,” which
depends largely on the degree of tolerance of the farmers; and the farmers are quite
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tolerant of “damage” by herbivorous insects on corn, their staple crop, because they,
according to their local religious belief, see it as a “share” for insects. Likewise, van
Schoubroeck (1999) has reported that some religions, such as Buddhism, preach against
unnecessary taking of lives, making farmers reluctant to apply pest control measures.
Rapidly globalizing agriculture also has much to do with changing perceptions of
what constitutes a pest. The Guatemalan farmers Morales and Perfecto (2000) studied
were aware that non-traditional commodities for exports, such as broccoli, were often
harshly damaged by pests. Gurung (2003) also noted that the introduction of new crops or
varieties converted native insects into “pests”—in Nepal, “pest” became a problem only
after high-yield rice varieties had been introduced. In addition, obviously, the fruit fly
became an important problem to mangos in Mexico only after the plant was introduced to
the country and came to be regarded as an important potential export crop. Importantly,
in the case of the Guatemalan Highland, damage to export-oriented commodities was not
tolerated because consumption by insects is judged as “damage” by outside buyers. As
Gurung (2003) indicated, if growers consider “losses” (from the outsider’s view, of
course) of plant products irrelevant, then they would not control insects eating the plant,
and therefore it would make little sense to launch a plant protection campaign. However,
if the farmers were to ship products to a distant place where “share for insects” is not
tolerated, then they have to see the bug as harmful “pests.” Thus, discourses regarding
who, and based on whose interest, determines (or are deemed to determine) what
constitutes damage on a plant product can have a significant impact on those who
produce some plant products and the way they produce them, especially if the product is
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shipped to a different place where different categories or semantics of “damage” are
adopted.
Such elusiveness of the concept of a pest does not seem completely dissolved
even in the globally accepted, “official” definition of a (plant) pest. A pest is defined
“officially” in International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) No.5, a lexicon
of terms and definitions related to PS measures compiled and published by IPPC, as
follows: “pest - any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal or pathogenic agent
injurious to plants or plant products” (IPPC 2007:12). If ingenuously interpreted, this
means that all herbivorous species (Homo sapiens included) should be considered pests.
While obvious exceptions such as the human must have been (implicitly) excluded from
this definition, a more specified concept of a pest subject to PS measures, namely,
“quarantine pest,” is provided in the same lexicon: “quarantine pest - a pest of potential
economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present
but not widely distributed and being officially controlled” (IPPC2007:15). This
seemingly clear-cut specification as such, however, does not necessarily explain what
constitutes “potential economic importance,” how it is measured, and the extent to which
the economic importance is considered, and so forth.
The elusiveness in determination of a pest and its hosts (or a “host range”) calls
for scientific knowledge generated by experts, including entomologists, plant pathologists,
and economists. Science or scientific knowledge is expected to provide objective and
neutral bases for pest-host determination. As some entomologists point out, political or
economic interests may distort scientific objectivity: “economic, social, and political
considerations . . . inevitably creep into the process of host plant status designation” and
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“science-based decision-making processes represent the only acceptable mechanism to
resolve any dispute on this matter” (Aluja and Mangan 2008:486-7). Nonetheless, the
difficulty of host-status determination lies not only with the so-called political and
economic interests, especially in the determination of pest-host relationships in the case
of Tephritidae fruit flies.
As living organisms, fruit flies have very complex characteristics, and their
behaviors vary flexibly and contingently through interaction with their milieu, which
includes humans. In essence, certain fruit flies attack specific fruits on some occasions,
but in other places or circumstances they may prefer other plants. Such contingency or
uncertainty can make it difficult to make a clear-cut judgment of a fruit fly species’ hostrange. Hence, for entomologists, “Host status should be regarded as a continuously
evolving phenomenon” (Cowley, Harte, and Baker 1992:312). Nonetheless, despite the
quite long history of this pest being subject to plant quarantine, attempts to develop a
comprehensive and systematic scheme to determine the host-status of fruit flies seem to
be relatively new and have been contentious, not least because of the species’ biological
and ecological complexity (Aluja and Mangan 2008).
Given the contingency of pest-determination as outlined above, in what follows a
few case studies will illuminate how fruit flies were determined to be pests against certain
plants (host plants). In doing so, the analysis will put specific focus on how contingencies
and uncertainties in the process of determining pest-host relationships were handled,
concealed, and maybe (re)emerged. To this end, scientific and technical journal articles
of agronomy, entomology in particular, and documents produced by governments and
international organizations were analyzed. These documents were collected through
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electronic, on-line databases such as Agricola and Web of Science, as well as at libraries
in Mexico during my fieldwork. The case studies on host status include mainly two
agricultural commodities, avocado and manzano (rocoto) pepper, as to several fruit fly
species, including Anastrepha ludens (Mexican fruit fly), A. obliqua (West Indian fruit
fly), A. serpentina (Sapote fruit fly), and A. striata (Guava fruit fly), along with a few
other similar cases concerning Tephritidae fruit flies, which are found mainly in Mexico
and subject to plant quarantine control measures by the United States.
5.2

Case Study 1: Mexican Hass Avocado — “Uncertainties Transformed”?
The first case concerns how the host-status of avocado (Persea americana) of the

Hass variety produced in Mexico was determined. Detailed accounts of politicoeconomic backgrounds and the consequences or impact of the regulation on Mexican
farmers were skillfully documented by Lois Stanford (2002). She has revealed how local
elites’ lobbying mobilized political actors towards adopting the quality standards of the
Mexican avocado in the state of Michoacán, while small scale growers, regardless of
their willingness, or unwillingness, had no choice but to accept the adopted standards,
thereby bearing a large burden. My focus, meanwhile, was on how uncertainties or
contingencies were handled in the process of scientific judgment over the host-status of
fruit flies against avocado.
In 1997, after the long import ban since 1914, the Mexican avocado of the Hass
variety was allowed to be imported to the United States. Since then the import regulation
has been relaxed such that the export season extended. This ban-lifting and relaxation of
the regulation was made possible by collaborative research conducted by US and
Mexican researchers, with the conclusion that “commercially cultivated and marketed
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Hass avocado should not be considered a natural host of” four Mexican-native fruit fly
species (Aluja, Arredondo, and Diaz-Fleischer 2004; Enkerlin et al. 1993). These
researchers found no infested fruits out of about 22,000 sampled (two studies combined)
in groves and packing houses. Such massive sampling would make disputing the
credibility of the results so costly that no one would attempt to overturn the findings
(Kanamori and Nakajima 2002). They employed field as well as laboratory
experimentation to examine whether fruit flies would lay eggs in fruits, as well as
whether larvae would develop there to complete the insect’s life cycle. The result was
that only very few fruits under “forced no-choice” (i.e., fruit flies have no other fruit to
lay eggs) conditions on trees were found infested but yielded no mature adult flies. In one
of the studies (Aluja, Arredondo, and Diaz-Fleischer 2004), for example, 5,200 fruits
were exposed to 26,000 female fruit flies, but none was infested. However, they also
found that fruits may be susceptible to one of the examined fruit fly species, Mexican
fruit flies (A. ludens) under “forced no-choice” conditions in the laboratory when exposed
to the pest for a longer time period after harvest.
Certainly, their verdict that “commercially cultivated and marketed Hass avocado
should not be considered a natural host” is plausible. My argument is not against the
conclusion and the process to determine whether or not the Hass is a host. My point is
that the researchers control as many uncertain factors as possible to reduce complexity.
They limited the variety (cultivar) for the testing only to “Hass,” used fruits of as much
uniform quality as possible, exposed to fruit fly populations from the same origins, and so
forth. Also, knowledge established from past research served to preclude further research
inquiries. For example, as they had learned that the “life cycle of the concerned fruit fly
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species does not exceed more than 35 days,” they made a reasonable decision to stop
exposure of fruits beyond this expected life span. Along with the aforementioned
example of massive sampling, this is in parallel with ANT’s observation on the way
disputes over a certain hypothesis (e.g., hormone’s structure) is settled and halted using a
difficult-to-overturn credibility of a device (e.g., mass spectrometer) (Latour and
Woolgar [1979] 1986). In addition, they found a very interesting mechanism of this crop
which resists the pest’s invasion. That is, when attacked by a fruit fly, Hass avocado
forms calluses at the point of intrusion, which inhibits the pest’s further normal growth in
the fruit.
However, despite the relatively clear verdict, uncertainties were not completely
eliminated. As mentioned, fruits exposed for a longer period after harvest, or unhealthy or
diseased fruits, might become susceptible, perhaps because the resistance mechanism
does not work well. Under these assumptions, fruits to export should be grown and
handled under stricter conditions in order to reduce fruits of bad quality, and to ensure
proper and quick handling of harvested fruits. This would call for “institutionalized”
regulations such as statutes and other administrative programs over production and
shipping processes to make fruits eligible for export to the United States. This is exactly
what was implied when the researchers concluded, “commercially grown and marketed
fruits are not host”—this in turn implied that poorly-grown and improperly handled fruits
could be susceptible to the pest.
And, it seems, an administrative decision was made in a particular manner, even if
it is fed apparently “objective” scientific knowledge. Based on assessment research
(Aluja, Arredondo, and Diaz-Fleischer 2004), USDA-Agricultural Research Service
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(USDA-ARS) sent a comment to USDA- APHIS, making it clear, “It is the ARS view
that the small infestation rate observed in Hass avocado, in the context of other avocado
experience, is sufficient to classify Hass avocado as a very poor host of Mexican fruit fly”
(USDA-APHIS 2004); however, it added:
It is not an ARS role to take a position on whether low level infestation rate such
as seen in the case of Hass avocado poses an important quarantine risk. Nor is it
an ARS role to suggest whether mitigation is needed or the type of mitigation
required, should APHIS decide one is needed. ARS defers to APHIS’ experience
and expertise in risk assessment and management and notes that APHIS
successfully manages many commodities with quarantine risks (including
avocados) entering the U.S. from all parts of the world. (136)
Thus, scientific communication provided by ARS, while feeding a “scientific” judgment
over the host-status of Hass avocado, delegates to the administrative domain (undertaken
by APHIS) a decision regarding whether specific administrative/political procedures
would be needed. This “delegation” reflects the concept of the Risk Analysis model, a
standard governance scheme in handling of risks, which consists of three different
activities, that is, (scientific) risk assessment, (administrative) risk management, and risk
communications involving all stakeholders, including scientists, administrators, and a
concerned public (Yamada 2004). In this model, which reflects the functional
differentiation of society, to make a decision over whether to adopt a new risk mitigation
measure or just relax the past regulation, the administration (APHIS) would have to
handle lots of “political” uncertainties, such as resistance from U.S. avocado growers,
while it can (at least pretend to) attribute the legitimate basis for the decision to science,
which in turn is (or pretends to be) in a separate domain from political uncertainties.
Furthermore, one of the authors of the study asserted in another article that Hoststatus should be reviewed in 15-20 year cycles because of the possibility of mutation of
the fruit fly population, which is also a source of the pest species’ contingency, and may
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enable, for instance, the insect to break a plant’s resistance mechanisms (Aluja and
Mangan 2008). It should be remembered that not only between humans and fruit flies, but
also between fruit flies as pests and plants, competitions for their survival are happening.
In essence, as entomologists are well aware, the scientific host-status determination is not
necessarily the final, ultimate verdict, but rather should be treated as a temporary pause in
uncertainties or contingencies (Aluja and Mangan 2008; Cowley, Harte, and Baker 1992).
5.3

Case Study 2: Manzano Hot-pepper — Unquestioned “Fact” and Remaining
Uncertainty
Another case concerns the discovery of Mexican fruit flies in manzano, or rocoto,

peppers (Capsicum pubescens) in 2003 at the import plant quarantine inspection at the
U.S. border, and the following investigation of how this unusual infestation occurred
(Thomas 2004). Previously, this crop had not been considered a host for fruit flies.
However, the discovery prompted laboratory tests and careful field observation, which
revealed that Mexican fruit flies (A. ludens), though in rare conditions, could infest this
commodity. The U.S. government then exercised import quarantine regulations on this
commodity.
How did this unusual infestation happen? A researcher I interviewed in Mexico
revealed, first of all, that earlier studies done in the early twentieth century left only very
ambiguous records regarding whether A. ludens attacks this pepper, and there had been
no records since then. In addition, this pepper contains much capsaicin (piquant substance
in hot peppers) and is one of the hottest (spiciest) pepper species. The Mexican researcher
in the interview suggested that with no record of infestation, perhaps everyone just
believed, or probably didn’t even doubt, that capsaicin would inhibit the growth of
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maggots in the pepper fruit. In other words, they just “blindly” believed it. The
unquestioned belief, with no proof, eventually became an unquestioned “fact,”
concealing the uncertainty of the pest’s behavior.
However, it is the case that Mexican fruit flies rarely use this plant as host; this
pepper is too hot to be their preferred host. The infestation case was brought about by
many contingent factors, which, unlike laboratory conditions, were largely unpredictable
and uncontrollable for scientists. The pepper found infested was a new crop to the region
where farmers were not familiar with the crop and potential infestation of it. There were
not plenty of other more preferred host plants. Weather conditions and the ways the crop
was growing, especially under shade in the field, might alter the pest behavior—some
fruit fly species were reported to be prone to prey on plants under shade (Aluja and
Mangan 2008). Finally, as reiterated, fruit flies’ foraging behaviors are flexible. Thus, the
infestation occurred, and the concealed uncertainty re-emerged.
In fact, a similar case of a conditional host has been reported between lemon and
Mediterranean fruit fly (medfly; a non-native of Mexico) (USDA-APHIS 2008a). Based
on reviews of over 90 scientific articles, a team of experts of USDA-APHIS concluded
that while lemon fruits were a conditional host for medfly, an immature fruit (green) was
not a host. Interestingly, one of their reviewed articles, which was very old (published in
1948), suggested that “common acid lemon [was] ‘immune’ based on chemical and
physical factors” (USDA-APHIS 2008a:6). However, subsequent studies have shown in
some cases the susceptibility of lemon, and in other cases not, depending on several
factors, including fruit maturity, or whether a puncture on the fruit was found, and so
forth. A consensus among the APHIS experts was that there was “uncertainty about the
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shade of light yellow at which lemons change from being non-susceptible to becoming
susceptible, but an overripe or over-mature condition leads to susceptibility, especially in
the presence of high Medfly densities” (p3-4). According to this conclusion, USDAAPHIS amended the U.S. PS regulations in 2010 such that lemon is now subject to PS
regulations (Federal Register 12961, Vol. 75, No. 52).
5.4

Discussion and Summary
In the reviewed host-status determination cases, uncertainties and contingencies

were dealt with, halted, and concealed. In the first case regarding Hass avocado, for
instance, “established knowledge” from past research “shut down” further inquiries. In
the second case, the absence of records, blind belief, and neglect or ignorance kept
halting and concealing uncertainty of the pest, which eventually reasserted itself in 2003.
Scientific knowledge thus established as to a host-status was an outcome of processes
that handle and conceal, and thereby settle disputes over uncertainties of acts of pests,
plants, and humans.
The main argument here pertains to how scientific knowledge of the pest-host
relationship was developed, and how the knowledge as the basis for regulatory activities
in the field was fed into different domains of society. In ANT’s term, this process is
called “translation,” through which different actors handle and transform knowledge
and/or objects, expanding the network of associations (Callon 1986). As will be shown in
detail in later chapters, scientific knowledge as to whether an insect is a pest vis-à-vis a
plant constitutes the basis for PS regulatory activities established and enacted by
administrations (i.e., government) and legal systems (i.e., statutes). Hence, the
consequences of scientific determination of pest-host relationships, or host-status, do not
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remain in the network of science, but extend its influence throughout society. From what
ANT calls the “center of calculation” where scientific knowledge is accumulated,
actors/networks develop further networks, mobilizing a variety of resources including
technologies and legal/administrative regulations to overcome resistance, such that a
“network of control” builds up (Latour 1987). Those who are touched by the network
would become subject to control, which embodies a moment of enactment of power, that
is, drawing a distinction between those who or that control and those being controlled.
However, this “translation” cannot be taken as mere transformation of certain
information from one actor to another; but rather, according to systems theory, it entails
concealment of the uncertainties. Systems theory suggests that differentiated domains of
society operate by handling risks according to their own programs, concealing
uncertainties that persist in science (e.g., as scientists knew that fruit flies could behave
volatilely, the knowledge of host-status was in fact temporary) (Hijikata 2002; Luhmann
1993). In other words, in the process of extending the network of control, different
networks, including law and administrative systems, conceal uncertainties, not resolving
them completely. Hence, an important insight from the cases presented above is that the
temporarily concealed uncertainty does not disappear, but is just transformed into risks
for other domains to handle (Hijikata 2002). As the ARS’s statement above indicated,
science withdrew from judging whether administrative or legal risk mitigation measures
were needed. The established regulations, in turn, might bring to the fore different types
of risks such as “human errors” in operating regulatory programs. Despite the apparent
robustness of the network of control, the whole system, which appears to be working
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“normally,” may in fact be quite vulnerable, especially when different systems are
involved, increasing internal complexity (Perrow 1984).
Also, since the uncertainty is not completely solved but just concealed, the risk
would appear as more tangible to those who are discontented with the decision. For
example, Californian avocado growers expressed their concerns over USDA-APHIS’s
continuous relaxations of import restrictions on Mexican avocados associated with a few
critically important pests including Mexican fruit flies (Vogel 2000). Although APHIS’s
decisions to relax rules were based on the fact that “seven years of Mexican avocado
shipments to the U.S. [had been] without a pest problem,” to the Californian avocado
growers, “past performance of the import program simply is not a reliable indicator of its
future success,“ and decisively important was that it was not researchers nor
administrators, but the very growers who “have first-hand experience combating insect
pests from Mexico—at a cost of millions of dollars annually” (California Avocado
Commission 2004). Such concerns were officially recorded and handled as public
comments to which APHIS meticulously responded with a variety of justifications,
whether science-based evidence, or claims for adequacy of legal measures (e.g., 66 FR
55530, published November 1, 2001). With this formal administrative procedure, the
concerns of the avocado growers were blocked off; but, even if APHIS gave “rational”
answers to the concerns through the formal channel, the possible introduction of the pest
and its hazards to the growers would never vanish.
Likewise, U.S. citrus growers expressed their concerns about the risk of
Mediterranean fruit fly when USDA-APHIS decided to resume importation of clementine
from Spain after several insects of this species were intercepted from the commodity in
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2001 (Livingston, Osteen, and Roberts 2008; Federal Register Vol. 67, No. 203). The U.S.
fruit growers’ concerns about the pest risk indicated that the pest risk was still pertinent
to them and posed real threats to their survival, because they would be economically
affected if the pest was really introduced. Their perceptions of the threat of hazard would
not be solved easily, even if the administration and experts scientifically concluded that
the risks would be minimal and made administrative/legal decisions based on cost and
benefit analyses with reference to the entire nation (primarily consumers), rather than the
growers. With insights from ANT and systems theory, I argue that although the extending
network of control would overcome resistances by mobilizing a variety of resources,
resistances would not disappear but only keep smoldering, as it were, or just be
temporarily halted at best. The growers’ concerns might sound more plausible when we
are reminded of the vulnerability of control systems faced with the unpredicted
resurgence of concealed uncertainties. Indeed, the interception cases of Mexican fruit
flies in manzano hot peppers and medflies in Spanish clementine, as presented above,
seemed to have occurred in unusual and unanticipated conditions (Livingston, Osteen,
and Roberts 2008; Thomas 2004).15
Thus, works employing systems theory to understand risk (Komatsu 2003;
Luhmann 1993; Nassehi 2002) emphasize the difference between “risk” and “danger,”
while commonly “risk” is juxtaposed with “safety.” “Risk” is hazard perceived by those
who are included in decision-making and hence deem the hazard under control, while
15

Livingston, Osteen, and Roberts (2008) mentioned that “[i]nvestigators determined that
the infestations were due to a number of factors, including unseasonably warm weather
conditions and above-average medfly populations during the 2001-02 growing season,
susceptibility of early-season clementine varieties, and problems with the application of
cold treatment” (P21)
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“danger” is hazard perceived by those excluded from decision-making but affected by the
decision, who therefore feel as if the hazard is out of control. Therefore, theorists
employing systems theory pay attention to how and who makes a decision concerning
risks. In the presented cases, the entomologists and/or economists engaged in the
estimation of the pest risks and the benefit/cost calculation would consider the hazard
controllable (by concealing residual uncertainties). On the other hand, the hazard would
likely appear more uncontrollable to those fruit growers opposed to the decision because
for them threats caused by the residual uncertainties would be real and pressing.
To address the incongruence between decision-makers and those affected by a
decision, on one hand, it is vital to call for more open, transparent, participatory or
“democratic” processes in addition to scientific decisions as bases for regulatory
administrative actions, rather than letting “experts” monopolize them (Fujigaki 2002;
Massimiano and Neresini 2007). Indeed, comments opposing the results of pest risk
analyses and proposed rules based on them were made through public comment
opportunities arranged by the U.S. government to ensure transparency in decision-making
processes. Meanwhile, however, making decisions through such “open” processes, hence
spending more time on making the decision, could provoke among some parties (e.g.,
growers of a crop waiting for an export permit hinging on a decision by an importing
country) a perception of a different kind of danger (e.g., lost economic opportunities by a
deferred decision-making) (Komatsu 2003). Fruit fly pests, furthermore, would not care
whether a decision was made “democratically” or whether knowledge is monopolized by
experts. The pest would only resurge when it can regardless of how scientific or
democratic a decision was made as to its risks. Thus, the difference between “risk” and
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“danger” would not disappear but continue to (re)emerge in different contexts of
networks. It is therefore an essential task for sociologists to keep elucidating in what
contexts, by and for whom, a decision is made, and who will be affected by it.
To summarize the findings and analysis, this chapter has elucidated how scientific
determination of host status was made regarding a few Tephritidae fruit flies. While
science was expected to provide objective and unbiased knowledge about uncertainties of
fruit flies or any other biological organisms, the host-status determination process
entailed concealment of, rather than complete solutions to, uncertainties, which were
temporarily halted, pushed aside, or ignored. In the meantime, scientific knowledge of
host-status would eventually be fed, or translated, into other social domains, such as law
and administration, thereby constituting and extending the network of control, which
embodied the enactment of power and drew the distinction between actors who control
and those subject to control. The uncertainties remaining in science were transformed
into risks to be handled in other social domains (e.g., legal and administration systems),
while science itself shied away from making legal or administrative decisions regarding
risk mitigation. Through the translation, also, the asymmetry between those who were
involved in making decisions regarding risks emerged, dividing those “experts” who
were deemed responsible for decisions and those who were discontented with the
decision. In the following chapters I will delve into how PS regulations as the network of
control were enacted based on the scientific judgment of host-status as well as other
scientific and technical knowledge about the fruit fly pests. Presenting details of PS
activities, I will demonstrate how this regulatory network extended its reach of control
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over a variety of entities from packing houses to non-farming areas, beyond spatial,
organizational, and institutional boundaries.
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Chapter 6
Engaging Humans and Non-humans for Control I:
Post-harvest Treatments
The previous chapter illuminated how a specific class of insects, Tephritidae fruit
flies, are determined to be an agricultural pest vis-à-vis plants. Yet, the regulation makes
not only the distinction between pest/non-pest as to existing objects, but also more
actively converts potentially infested objects into pest-free. The following three chapters
will focus on the process through which diverse agents are engaged to make objects (e.g.,
mango commodity, packinghouses, and certain geographic areas) pest-free. The network
of PS regulations as material politics (Law and Mol 2008) engages diverse actors,
whether so-called human or non-humans, and functions continuously to engender the
pest/non-pest distinction. It was posited that processes to make the commodity, mangos,
pest-free would engage a variety of humans and artifacts, including machines, tools,
documents, and statutes. ANT can be used to gain perspective on the work of PS
regulations, which constitute a process to build a network or association of heterogeneous
actors to make possible the distinction between pest and non-pest. From the systemstheoretical perspective, this creation of the network is a process of selection and
simultaneous exclusion of specific actors as different networks (i.e., systems) with
different operations that may be incompatible with other networks.
These overarching theoretical perspectives guide the following three chapters,
which will present the key components of PS regulations for the mango export program,
that is, the post-harvest treatment, the campaign against fruit flies, and the role of
CESAVESIN. This first chapter of the three chapters will trace how several post-harvest

122

treatments have developed to enable the export of Mexican mangos to the United States.
The central theme is that the development of various treatment techniques was a process
of engaging and assembling different artifacts into a relatively spatially concentrated
apparatus to annihilate the fruit fly pest. This assembling process was accompanied by
the classification and exclusion of particular objects as well as meticulous controls over
the treatment processes. The next chapter (Chapter 7) will highlight the national
campaign against fruit flies of Mexico. As with the post-harvest treatment, the campaign
is constituted as the assemblage of a variety of regulatory measures including legal,
chemical, and biological agents. Nonetheless, this newer regulatory scheme employs
more spatially diffusive measures to exert controls over not only sites of production and
distribution of mangos but also non-farming areas. Chapter 8 will illuminate how
CESAEVSIN and other new entities including third-party organizations enact the entire
regulatory network in a distinctive political climate of neoliberal reform in Mexico. With
their multi-faceted polyvalent characteristics as quasi-governmental and civic/private
entities, CESAVESIN and third-party organizations aptly mobilize growers and allocate
resources with flexibility to enable the operation of the spatially and institutionally
diffuse regulatory network. Yet, the chapter raises critical assessments of the legitimacy
of authorities as well as their limitations, which resulted in frustrations among growers.
6.1

Post-harvest Quarantine Treatments: Overview
Disinfection treatments for harvested fruits are the principal PS measure currently

enabling the export of Mexican mangos to the United States. A variety of post-harvest
treatments using both chemical and non-chemical materials, such as heat-treatment using
hot water, vapor and heated air, cold treatment, fumigation by ethylene dibromide (EDB)
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and methyl bromide (MB), pesticide dipping, wax-coating, and irradiation, have been
tested and practiced to enable trade of mangos and other commodities susceptible to
Tephritidae (Follett and Neven 2006; Hallman and Quinlan 1994; Mangan and Moreno
2002). Technical development always opens new possibilities for different commodities
and people growing them to exploit new markets. Reefer, or refrigerated containers, for
instance, made possible disinfection of citrus fruits by cold air during transportation
without causing damage to fruit. Use of irradiation nullifies the capacity of fruit fly larvae
to emerge or reproduce offspring without diminishing the quality of a product. The
irradiation method enabled trade of some fruits such as guava, which are not tolerant to
other disinfection methods. Perhaps mangos are one of the best examples of fruit
commodities that post-harvest treatments have made eligible for global trade.
However, many challenges in post-harvest treatments have been reported.
Pesticides used for fumigation provoke concerns about health and environmental issues.
For instance, despite its effectiveness as a fumigant and its low cost, EDB turned out to
have carcinogenic, mutagenic, and adverse reproductive risks. Given this, the U.S. EPA
banned its use in 1984, which eventually led to the introduction of hot water treatment
(HWT) of mangos. Although in some products EDB can be substituted by MB, MB
treated mangos can spoil faster. Also, as MB is linked to depletion of the ozone layer, its
use has been severely reduced under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer and alternatives have been investigated.16 Costs for additional
treatments are another burden that shippers or growers try to minimize. As Hallman and
Quinlan (1994) have reported, untreated Mexican mangos have been smuggled into the
16

However, since the Montreal Protocol allowed the use of this material for plant
quarantine purposes, MB is still commonly utilized as a post-harvest fumigant.
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United States despite the availability of HWT and other post-harvest treatments. Different
types of damage to the fruit by post-harvest treatments are persistent problems of many
post-harvest treatment (McDonald and Miller 1994). For instance, HWT and MB as
substitutes for EDB fumigation shortens shelf-life of mangos or causes “burn” in their
pulp. Researchers and growers are always seeking new alternative treatment measures.
When an existing post-harvest treatment encounters a challenge, new measures to ensure
pest-free status and palatability of products evolve to allow existing or new products to be
traded to distant places. Thus, “Phytosanitary Regulations Shape Fruit and Vegetable
Trade Patterns” (Romberg and Roberts 2008).
Importantly, changes in PS regulations accompanying new treatments, while
enabling the export of mangos and other fruits, have simultaneously and continuously
altered the socio-material landscape involving humans and non-humans. That is, once a
treatment measure is modified or altered with other means, new technical specifications,
including novel devices, procedures, and standards (e.g., hot water tank, temperature and
time of heat treatment, classifications and standardization of mango fruits) will be
introduced; these specifications function to categorize and sort out non-humans
simultaneously (re)establishing their values and the social life of things (Bowker and Star
1999). Humans, engaged in the specific processes associated with the regulations, are
categorized (e.g., an inspector of mangos), sorted, or (re)evaluated according to their
roles in the enactment and/or how well they do it (e.g., a good inspector). In the following
analysis, these outlined theoretical considerations will be applied in tracing how the
changing post-harvest treatments to kill Tephritidae have made possible the export of
Mexican mangos and altered landscapes surrounding actors engaged in the regulations.
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6.2

Vapor-heat Treatment: Dawn of Post-harvest Treatment for Mexican mangos
Historically, the Mexican mango export has been conditioned by PS regulations to

control some Anastrepha fruit fly pests. In September 1945, the USDA approved
importation of oranges, pomelos (grapefruits), and mangos of Manila variety produced in
Mexico, if they were treated with vapor-heat of 110 degrees Fahrenheit for more than 14
hours (Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, Sección de Investigación y Divulgación
1945). Insights about the heat susceptibility of fruit flies (Weddell 1931) led to the
development of vapor-heat treatment (VHT) and a similar forced hot air treatment
(FHAT)17 as quarantine treatments against fruit flies to sterilize citrus in Florida,
California, and Texas, and other fruit commodities in various places since the late 1920s
through 1930s (Balock and Starr 1945; Hallman and Armstrong 1994). The development
of these heat-processing techniques in the United States was in response to the growing
recognition of the threat of economic loss in citrus industries caused by Tephritidae pests,
including Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata) and Mexican fruit fly (Anastrepha
ludens). In the United States, the Mexican fruit fly, then also called “orange fly” or
“orange worm,” had been observed as early as the end of nineteenth century in California
and shortly after, in 1905, in Texas. U.S. official notices of “Quarantine No. 5, Mexican
fruit fly” promulgated in 1913, and “Quarantine No. 56” issued ten years later, prohibited
entry to the United States of all Mexican fruits due to threats of the pests (in 1936, the
latter, Quarantine No. 56, incorporated the regulations of the former No. 5, which was
17

VHT and FHAT differ in relative humidity of air for disinfection (i.e., VHT uses
saturated or nearly saturated air, whereas in FHAT relative humidity can be as low as 30
percent) and means for transfer of heat (i.e., in VHT heat is transferred by condensed
vapor on fruits and convection, whereas FHAT uses only convection) (Hallman and
Armstrong 1994; Jacobi, MacRae, and Hetherington 2001).
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thereby revoked). In 1927, moreover, citrus orchards in Lower Rio Grande Valley, Texas,
were found infested with the fly, resulting in the USDA’s rigid domestic quarantine
controls of fruits grown there (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999; Berry
1943).
Early recommendations to prevent the pests included simple and idyllic
recommendations such as letting turkeys and chickens eat larvae in orchards (Mangan
and Ingle 1994). However, alarmed by the infestation in the Valley, Texas citrus growers
and state agricultural officials urged the USDA to establish a research institute in Mexico
City in 1928 to investigate Anastrepha flies in cooperation with Mexico (Comisión
Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999; Shaw, Lopez, and Chambers 1970). The
partnership between the United States and Mexico was possible because of their growing
concern for economic loss caused by the Mexican fruit fly as citrus and mango fruits
were under embargo by the United States. The joint research carried out in Mexico
contributed to improving control measures against the flies, as illustrated with a decree by
the Mexican government in 1934, which detailed instructions to combat the pest in order
to protect two states of Sonora and Baja, California (both considered pest-free at that
time) from Anastrepha species spreading from infested states of Nayarit and Sinaloa
(Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento 1934). The 1945 approval of heat treatment was
also an outcome of the research in Mexico (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria
1999; Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento 1945).
The ruling to approve the VHT for citrus and mango import to the United States
was published in the Federal Register on September 4, 1945 by amending the U.S. Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 7 (Agriculture), Part 319 (Foreign Quarantine

127

Notices), Section 56 (Subpart – Fruits and Vegetables), known as “Q56,” which today
still regulates importation of fruits and vegetable products. The specifics of the approved
VHT method, described in the Federal Register (10 FR 12075) were relatively simple: (1)
only the Manila variety is eligible; (2) the treatment shall be carried out in a room
approved by USDA Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine; (3) treatment should be
done under supervision of a USDA inspector; (4) a mixture of heated air and water spray
(or other devised means) to give saturation and condensation shall be used; (5)
temperature of the center of a fruit shall be raised to 110 degrees Fahrenheit and
maintained at that temperature for more than six hours, with a total treatment time for not
less than 14 hours; and (6) “those in interest [i.e. those who want to export fruits by this
method] must make advance arrangements for supervision of the treatments and the
approval of the plant and give acceptable assurance that will provide transportation and
per diem for the inspectors” (10 FR 12075).
Although the approval of the VHT was a victory for Mexico, during the years that
followed, the export of mangos was quite limited (Table 6-1). Circumstantial evidence I
collected suggests a few factors that could explain the scant shipment. According to my
interviewees, the Manila, the only mango variety eligible for the export in 1945, is
considered less tolerant to heat treatment—a heat-treated Manila is prone to perish
quickly. Even today, the export of Manila to the United States is limited because of its
alleged shorter shelf life, possibly because of its thin fruit skin. The newer Florida
cultivars (i.e., Hayden, Tommy Atkins, Kent, and Keitt), which are more tolerant to heat
treatment (Jacobi, MacRae, and Hetherington 2001), were of course not available yet.
The then limited freight meant relying mostly on train, which would not allow quick and
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flexible transportation and might also restrain growth in the Mexican mango export trade.
VHT, though it was then the only measure to ensure pest-free mangos, did not allow full
access to the U.S. market.
Table 6-1 Import of Mexican mangos to the United States 1944-1961
Fiscal year
(July to June)
1944-45
1945-46
1946-47
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50
1950-51
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61

Volume of imported mangos from Mexico
(pounds)
Fresh
Frozen
0
132
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,204
3
0
6,742
700
235,392
1,131
422,713
0
602,868
0
697,685
0
824,839
0
450,383
0
392,325
0
322,89
28,474

Remarks

Data missing
Not specified as fresh
Frozen includes puree

Data source: USDA, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations (1944-1951) and Foreign
Agricultural Service (1952-1961), Foreign Agricultural Trade United States Imports of
Fruits and Vegetables under Quarantine By Countries of Origin and Ports of Entry

6.3

EDB Fumigation: Real Opening of Export of Mexican Mangos

6.3.1 History of EDB fumigation
Following the years of meager export, however, there was an abrupt increase in
the mango shipment after the 1953-54 season as shown in Table 6-1. In 1953, EDB
fumigation was approved by the USDA as a new post-harvest treatment for Mexican
mangos (Shaw and Lopez 1954). The use of EDB against Tephritidae was pioneered by
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Balock and Lindgren (1951) and Balock (1951) who demonstrated its effectiveness as a
fumigant for treatments of several fresh produces of Hawaii, including avocado, bell
pepper, papaya, pineapple, guava, cucumber, and tomato, to kill Mediterranean fly
(Ceratitis capitata) and Oriental fruit flies (Dacus dorsalis) without causing substantial
damage (McPhail 1958). This success led to applications to mangos grown in Puerto Rico
in 1951 (Richardson 1952) and Mexican mangos in 1953 (Shaw and Lopez 1954), both
of which were approved by the USDA as domestic quarantine measure to allow entry of
the products to the mainland.
As with the 1945 approval of VHT, the technical and administrative specifications
of EDB fumigation were published through a Federal Register (19 FR 2005, April 8,
1954) as an amendment of Q56 (CFR 7 §319.56-2). The instructions, as summarized
below, became more detailed than the previous VHT protocol: (1) fumigation shall be
done in a chamber approved by USDA; (2) the dosage shall be applied at the rate of 1
pound of EDB per 1,000 cubic feet of space at a minimum temperature of 77 degrees
Fahrenheit for two hours after the chamber is filled with the fumigant; (3) Manila mangos
shall be put in containers or boxes that give no interference with movement of fumigant
gas; (4) boxes or containers loaded in the chamber shall be separated by at least two
inches from each other; the chamber shall not be loaded to more than one-third capacity;
(5) USDA inspectors shall supervise the fumigation process and prescribe additional
safeguard measures, including handling, packing, and transportation; (6) all costs of
fumigation equipment and carrying out of safeguard measures shall be borne by the
owner of fruits.
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The same Federal Register also provided a justification for the introduction of the
new treatment: “The newly authorized procedure provides an alternative treatment that
may be applied in a much shorter time with less expensive equipment” (19 FR 2005,
April 8, 1954). In general, the use of pesticides, including fumigants, has several
advantages, such as lower costs, flexibility, and ease of operation, although health and
environmental concerns are raised as its major disadvantages (Heather 1994; Yokoyama
1994). With its effectiveness, efficiency, and ease of application, EDB fumigation
remained the principal quarantine measure for Mexican mangos destined to the United
States from its approval in 1953 until 1987. In this time period, the export of Mexican
mangos to the United States increased 422 times from 107 metric tons to 45,140 metric
tons. The approval of EDB fumigation marked the real opening of export of Mexican
mangos.
Sinaloan growers did not miss the opportunity opened up by the EDB treatment,
although they were quite late to engage in mango export. In 1970, more than 15 years
after the 1953 approval of EDB fumigation, a grower in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, exported for
the first time—he so claimed—EDB treated mangos from the state to the United States.
In the interview, this mango grower showed me a letter from the buyer in Los Angeles,
California, who purchased the first shipped mangos and was “happy with the transaction,”
indicating that the grower’s pioneering attempt of mango export was a success.
Of course, his success was not without labor. With no equipment of his own, to
meet the U.S. requirement he had to use a fumigation chamber that belonged to his friend
in Sonora (a state located north of Sinaloa) who was treating oranges with EDB. Thus,
successful enactment of a PS regulation, which connects non-humans and humans to

131

distant places, is very dependent on local specific circumstances in which needed
resources might be unequally available to some actors and completely unavailable to
others.
Despite some difficulties, such as the above example, the EDB fumigation
approved in 1953 played an essential, if not the key, role to prepare the mango export
sector of Mexico to become enrolled in the growing export market (McPhail 1958).
Growers in Sinaloa were among those who benefitted most from the growing mango
export market. After the pioneering endeavor in the 1970s until the mid-1980s
infrastructure for mango export, such as packing facilities and fumigation chambers
(Figure 6-1), continued to be strengthened and eventually their share in the nation’s total
mango export reached 45 percent (Segura 1986). However, cold water was soon thrown
on the prospering Mexican and Sinaloan mango sector—in 1983, the EPA announced
that the use of EDB would be terminated.
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Figure 6-1 Old EDB fumigation chamber (currently used as a general shed) in a
mango packinghouse in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
6.3.2 “Traumatic ban”
On September 28, 1983, the EPA issued a notice (published in Federal Register of
October 11) of its intention to cancel the registration of pesticides containing EDB
because of its carcinogenic, mutagenic, and adverse reproductive risks (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 1983). While the ban on the use of EDB as a soil
fumigant took an immediate effect (announced by 48 FR 46228), the EPA decided to
delay the cancellation of EDB products used for post-harvest fumigation of citrus,
tropical fruit, and vegetables until September 1, 1984, “in order to allow time for
alternatives for this use to become available on a commercial scale” (48 FR 46234). This
phase-out cancellation was premised on the anticipation that alternative quarantine
treatments, namely, cold treatment and gamma irradiation, would be available in one year.
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Unsurprisingly, however, the USDA opposed the EPA’s proposal not only because
“citrus and tropical fruits are imported from countries such as Mexico, Haiti, Israel, and
Morocco, thereby strengthening our trade position with them” (48 FR 46234), but also
because the export of Florida grapefruits to Japan was reliant on EDB fumigation as per
Japan’s PS requirement. Also, in objecting to the EPA’s optimistic anticipation that the
alternative treatments would be available soon, the USDA argued that cold treatment was
not suitable for fruits other than citrus, and gamma irradiation would not be feasible in
such a short time period.
In response, in August 1984 the EPA proposed to establish a temporal tolerance
of residues of EDB up to 0.03 parts per million (ppm) in or on mango fruits. The
proposed tolerance meant that, while domestic EDB use in the United States was banned,
mangos treated with EDB abroad could be imported to the United States as long as
residues in fruits were less than the tolerance level. The EPA also suggested that instead
of cold treatment and irradiation, other quarantine measures including HWT and
designation of pest free areas in exporting countries could be viable alternatives to
disinfect mangos. The proposed rule took effect in January 1985 to remain effective until
September 1 and was extended twice until September 1987 when completion of HWT
technologies finally came into sight (Table 6-2).
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Table 6-2 Process of the withdrawal of EDB fumigation for mango fruits 1983–1988
Date
Oct 11, 1983

Event

Federal
Register

EPA announces the intention to cancel the pesticide
registration of EDB for post-harvest fumigation of citrus and
tropical fruits as of Sep 1, 1984
EPA proposed to establish tolerance of 0.03 ppm for residues
of EDB in or on mangos resulting from post-harvest
fumigation
EPA establishes the tolerance rule as proposed (effective until
Sep 1, 1985)

48 FR 46234

Feb 14, 1986

EPA extends the tolerance rule until Sep 30, 1986

51 FR 5682

Sep 29, 1986

EPA extends the tolerance rule again until Sep 30, 1987

51 FR 34469

Sep 30, 1987

The tolerance rule expired

Apr 1, 1988

USDA approves HWT as a quarantine treatment for mangos

Aug 10, 1984

Jan 17, 1985

49 FR 32088

50 FR 2547

53 FR 10525

Understandably, the proposed tolerance rule and its extensions drew both
opposing and supporting comments from a variety of stakeholders, as summarized in the
Federal Registers that promulgated the decisions (50 FR 2547, 51 FR 5682 and 51 FR
34469). Opposition was raised by U.S. mango growers, primarily those in Florida, who
condemned the tolerance rule for unfairly favoring foreign mango growers; and consumer,
environmental, and other public interest groups were concerned about the hazardous
effects of EDB to food safety and public health. Support came from U.S. mango
importers, distributers, and retailers, who could continue their mango business thanks to
the tolerance, and governments of mango exporting countries including Brazil, Columbia,
Haiti, Mexico, and Peru, representing the mango growers and exporters for whom the ban
of EDB fumigation was a “traumatic event” (Aluja [1993] 1994:7).
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Among those who most fervently supported the tolerance rule was Mexico, the
largest mango supplier to the United States, who claimed that if the rule was not
established, mango prices in the United States would triple, five to six million dollars of
U.S. tax revenues would be lost, and “60,000 Mexican workers would suffer adverse
economic consequences” (51 FR 5682). Likewise, the state government of Sinaloa
expressed strong support of the tolerance rule, asserting that “mango production requires
a year round labor force providing permanent employment for farm families, who would
contribute to the migratory problems of US if they were not employed” (51 FR 5682).
For Sinaloan mango growers facing the economic menace, even the EPA’s “scientific”
risk assessment of EDB appeared to be questionable. A leader of CAADES (a state-level
organization of private-landowning farmers in Sinaloa) pronounced that the EPA decided
to withdraw EDB fumigation because of pressures from political groups “without
scientific, reasonable, and proofed evidence that this [EDB] is a carcinogenic product,
capable of causing sterility in humans” (Segura 1986:16). In the comments by the
governments of Mexico and the state of Sinaloa, it is notable that the risks of the pest (i.e.,
fruit flies), and of the hazardous substance (i.e., EDB), were almost completely
“economized” and “politicized,” as it were. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
scientifically calculated, or “scientized,” risks are prone to be transformed and converted
into other types of risks, which cannot be handled by scientists who calculated the risks
as such.
Given the magnitude of anticipated economic loss by the ban, growers of export
mangos in Sinaloa were in “anguish,” according to a local newspaper’s editorial
(Noroeste, Sep 7, 1985). To cope with the crisis and to seek alternatives to EDB
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fumigation, CAADES launched Comité Técnico de Investigación, Fitosanidad y Defensa
de Mango (Technical Committee of Research, Plant-health and Defense of Mango,
“Technical Committee”), and along with federal and state government authorities, started
a campaign against the fruit fly in 1984 (Anonymous 1986; Segura 1986). The campaign
entailed diverse pest-prevention activities, such as monitoring by field traps and sampling
of fruits, chemical and cultural-mechanical control, along with technical extension
(Anonymous 1986). Research using traps to monitor distributions of the fruit fly pests in
the state was also conducted (Huerta Paniagua et al. 1986). Technical Committee and
CAADES continued actions to save the mango production of Sinaloa, as frequently
reported by local newspapers during 1984 and 1985 (Figure 6-2). For instance, CAADES
made a petition to the Mexican government to request that the U.S. government extend
the deadline of EDB prohibition (Noroeste, September 6, 1985). They also requested the
federal and local governments to take measures to block fruits from regions heavily
infested with fruit flies (Noroeste, June 1 and 19, 1984). Although other alternatives such
as application of insect hormone and irradiation were sought (Noroeste, September 6,
1985), major efforts were concentrated on two scopes: (1) research and development of
HWT, carried out mainly by researchers of USDA-ARS in its research facility in
Weslaco, Texas, and (2) establishment of an official campaign against fruit flies in
Mexico, including area-wide management strategies to eradicate and/or suppress fruit fly
pests.
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Figure 6-2 A local newspaper article reporting export restrictions caused by EPA's
ban on EDB fumigation
Noroeste (Mazatlan, Mexico), June 13, 1984

6.4

HWT: Determining the Social life of Mangos

6.4.1 History of HWT
HWT was applied as early as the late 1800s for disinfection of a variety of plant
products; later, in the 1950s to the early 1970s, combined with aqueous solutions of EDB,
it was used on fruit flies in mango and papaya (Burditt et al. 1963; Seo et al.1972; Sharp
1994). In search of an alternative to the banned EDB, HWT alone (i.e., without EDB
solution) as a quarantine treatment was first investigated in Florida mangos infested with
Caribbean fruit fly (A. suspensa) in the early 1980s (Sharp and Spalding 1984), then was
tested with different varieties of mangos, grown in various places (Australia, Brazil,
Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru, Venezuela, and so forth) infested with Tephritid species
(Jacobi and Giles 1997; Jacobi, MacRae, and Hetherington 2001; Nascimento et al. 1992;
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Sharp et al. 1989; Sharp et al. 1989; Sharp 1988; Sharp and Picho-Martinez 1990; Smith
and Chin 1991). These experiments were conducted to determine the time-mortality
relationship of larvae in fruits (i.e., rate of larvae killed as function of treatment time) to
attain Probit 9 (99.9968 percent) mortality level at the 95 percent confidence level (i.e.,
the treatment should not allow more than 32 insects to survive when 1 million larvae are
treated), which has been the most frequently accepted quarantine security level in the
United States (Baker 1939; Follett and Neven 2006).
Basic HWT testing processes (Figure 6-3) and its experimental equipment (Figure
6-4) seem relatively simple. Still, the experimentation would demand a researcher’s care
and patience in handling thousands of tiny organisms. In addition, because importing
countries demand slightly different levels of quarantine security, a country wishing to
export mangos (and other fruits as well) to a different country may call for alternative
evidence that meets its requirements. Different cultivars with varying physical and/or
physiological characteristics can present different responses to the pest as well as heat
treatment and the following cooling procedure (Follett and Neven 2006; Shellie and
Mangan 2002). As described in the previous chapter, the relationship between fruit fly
pests and their host plants entails complex and contingent factors. In fact, initially the
USDA did not allow importation of mangos grown in Chiapas even if treated with HWT,
because a different cultivar Ataulfo was dominant there and this southern state was
infested with Mediterranean fruit fly against which HWT had not yet proved effective
until another test (Sharp et al. 1989) was carried out.
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Figure 6-3 Outline of an experimental use of HWT
Elaboration by author based on the description by Sharp et al. (1989)
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Figure 6-4 Equipment for HWT experimentation in Metapa, Chiapas, Mexico
(Photo by author)
6.4.2 Meticulous and thorough control
On April 1, 1988, Federal Register (53 FR 10525, April 1, 1988) pronounced that
HWT was approved thanks to research by USDA-ARS. Unlike the previous cases of
VHT and EDB fumigation, the technical and administrative protocol of HWT for the
export of Mexican mangos was not published in Federal Register. Instead, the technical
and administrative specifications were detailed in Plant Protection and Quarantine
Treatment Manual (PPQ Treatment Manual) and Work Plan. PPQ Treatment Manual
includes a section that deals exclusively with HWT and “treatment schedules,” which
specifies parameters, such as water temperature and time duration for different
commodities and fruit sizes (USDA-APHIS-PPQ 2010). Meanwhile, the Work Plan is “a
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formal agreement signed by a representative of each treatment facility in a particular
country, the Agriculture Ministry of the host government, and by USDA-APHIS” and
“govern[s] the day-to-day operations of each facility and can be improved from one year
to the next” (USDA-APHIS-PPQ 2010:3-3-15). Transferring decision-making authority
from a “higher” (e.g., Federal Register) to a “lower” order in administrative and
organizational hierarchies (e.g., administrative manual) would allow PS officials to
introduce detailed technical specifics. Indeed, both PPQ Treatment Manual and Work
Plan meticulously stipulate technical and administrative specifics of the disinfection
procedure. They are frequently modified as new technical knowledge or administrative
needs emerge through “day-to-day operations.” The Work Plan, for example, is renewed
every year. Administrative procedures are meticulous and thorough. For instance, in
contrast to the 1945 VHT instruction’s simple requisite of “arrangement for the
inspection and . . . acceptable assurance . . . [of] transportation and per diem for the
inspectors” (see page Error! Bookmark not defined.), the 2009 Work Plan meticulously
stipulates USDA treatment technicians’ (i.e., inspectors’) work duties as follows (USDAAPHIS and SAGARPA-DGSV 2009):
USDA treatment technicians will be assigned to work Monday through Friday.
Working hours will be 10:00 hours to 19:00 hours with 1 hour for lunch. Work
performed in excess of 40 hours per week or 8 hours daily, will be reimbursed at
2 times the basic hourly rate, for the first 9 hours, 3.0 times the hour1y rate for all
hours worked thereafter . . . . (11)
Moreover, the Work Plan defines in detail responsibilities of participants in this
preclearance (i.e., PS measures taken prior to entry to the country) program for export of
mangos, including USDA-APHIS, SAGARPA, and EMEX. And, such meticulousness
has grown since the first signed Work Plan, indicating that the scope of regulations over
operations of HWT has been expanding beyond the packinghouse where the treatment is
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conducted. For instance, recent Work Plans demand that groves of mango for export be
registered prior to harvest and shipment to ensure traceability, although the USDAAPHIS in the first approval of HWT in 1988 did “not believe that tracing fruit back to its
origin will be necessary” (FR 53 10526).
Thus, when compared to the administrative instructions for VHT and EDB
fumigation (only one to a few pages on Federal Register), the administrative and
technical specifics detailed in Work Plan of HWT, especially those of recent versions,
have become remarkably meticulous and thorough. Non-humans (e.g., mango fruits) and
humans who handle them are disciplined to conform to the specific procedures and
physical settings of the treatment, which creates and maintains the distinction between
pest and non-pest. Further analysis will be provided later in this chapter where I discuss
such disciplining effects by the regulation with more specific examples.
Moreover, it can be inferred that as the rules became meticulous and thorough,
financial and technical costs to conform to the regulation increased. As indicated in the
Work Plan, burdens for acquiring equipment, coordinating labors, and handling
administrative red-tape were basically borne by packers/exporters interested in exporting
fruits. The gap between growers and packers who could afford to conform to the rule and
those unable to do so would widen, producing a similar asymmetrical consequence in
prospects of economic gains. Also, the contrast between those who are controlling the
rules and those who abide by them would become stark, and might result in more
conflicting confrontations (Chapter 9 will address such conflicting cases).
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6.4.3 Tódologo’s trial and error to make HWT work
Meanwhile, the 1988 approval of HWT and the concurrent formation of the Work
Plan did not mean that mango packers were able to immediately begin shipping fruits to
the United States. Certainly, as explained earlier, the PPQ Treatment Manual and Work
Plan specified in detail technical parameters of the treatment and administrative
procedures. Nonetheless, setting the parameters does not suffice to enact the regulation
on site. The regulation has to be “materially” (i.e., as a more concrete physical
embodiment) enacted. Designing, constructing, and operating a physical apparatus to
meet the specifics at a commercial scale would demand painstaking work.
To document how Sinaloan packers tried to adapt to the new HWT regulation, I
conducted formal and informal interviews with more than six individuals in Sinaloa and
other places in Mexico. The stories I heard from them, however, varied and seemed fairly
blurry perhaps because twenty years had passed since the introduction of HWT. For
instance, a grower told me that a dealer from the United States had brought some packers
a design of a treatment facility. For another packer, a company in Culiacan, the state
capital, designed and constructed the facility. My interviews were unable to reach a
single consistent narrative of the process through which HWT was introduced and began
its operation in the area.
Yet, I learned that interestingly two different designs of HWT unit, namely,
“continuous” (Figure 6-5) and “batch” (Figure 6-6), were developed. In a continuous unit,
baskets containing mangos are dipped, continuously one by one, in a long hot-water tub
(trench) from one end moving toward the other; and fruits are disinfected and move at a
constant speed. In a batch unit, a basket is simply immersed until a treatment is finished
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without moving—since hot water circulates intensely in a tank looking like a hot tub, this
design is also called “Jacuzzi.” A packinghouse technician suggested that a Culiacan
manufacturer of meat processing equipment had come up with the idea of the continuous
treatment design based on a hanging conveyer for beef carcasses. Although this company
went out of business, the idea survived and was embodied as the continuous system.
However, in fact, the continuous type was almost extinct by the time of my fieldwork;
out of more than 45 mango packers in Mexico, as of 2009 only one packinghouse in
Sinaloa was using a continuous unit (Brazil and Peru did not have this system, according
to a USDA inspector). The continuous unit has a disadvantage—if a sensor in even only
one basket finds temperature lower than the standard, then all fruits in other baskets in the
water disqualify for export. This might be one reason why this design was disappearing.

Figure 6-5 Continuous HWT unit (the last one in Mexico) in Escuinapa, Mexico
A basket, hanging from above (like a gondola lift), moves from this side towards the
opposite end in the trench, which will be filled with hot water when in use
(Photo by author)
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Figure 6-6 HWT unit, "batch (Jacuzzi)" type
Unlike in the “continuous” type, a basket does not move during treatment but stays
in a separate tank. When a treatment is finished, the basket will be hoisted and
moved beyond the screen wall (behind the last tank) for packing in Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
Unfortunately, the limited time for fieldwork did not allow me to determine the
origins of these different designs—who developed them and brought them to Sinaloa—or
more detailed stories of how one particular type survived while the other was
disappearing in Mexico. Still, the personnel of two packers, which were using a
continuous unit and a Jacuzzi unit respectively, noted that regardless of the types of unit,
the packinghouses had to do everything almost on their own because all that was
provided by USDA was a set of parameters of temperature and time. It was very likely
that, at least in Sinaloa, to build and operate an HWT unit initially, packers/exporters
relied on different resources, including their own experiences and connections to venders
or constructors of packing devices. The packer that still uses the continuous unit had to
set up, modify, and maintain the equipment by hands of a technician, whom its manager
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called “todologo (utility man, all-rounder),”18 through “todo inventando en todo lado
(inventing everything in every aspect).” After initial installation, the HWT equipment
kept being upgraded through trial and error based on experiences and skills gained in
day-to-day operations. It was through continuous trial and error through mundane
operations that the HWT as a technology has gradually become a mature technique, or to
borrow an expression by an interviewed USDA official, a “técnica cubierta (covered or
secure technology).” It is the mundane operations of HWT that continuously establish the
distinction between pest/non-pest statuses of the commodity and simultaneously
determine the “social life of the thing,” that is, mangos as an export commodity.
6.4.4 Destinies of mangos
The 1945 approval of VHT, which first opened export of Mexican mangos,
already specified the Manila as the only eligible variety of mango for export. Mangos
criollos (diverse local strains that have not been fixed as distinctive commercial varieties)
were excluded. They could not be an export commodity. Instead, the PPQ Treatment
Manual (as of October 2011) classifies origins, shapes of varieties, and sizes of the
commodity with varying dipping treatment durations (Table 6-3).

18

Todólogo is not a common Spanish word but an invented term combining todo, which
means all or everything, with a suffix -logo, which means someone specializing in or
being good at something especially in an academic domain. For example, sociólogo
means sociologist; entomólogo means entomologist. A todólogo is a person who is good
at handling everything.
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Table 6-3 Classification of fruits and their dipping time in HWT
Shape of the fruit
Flat, elongated

Examples of varieties

Weight of the fruit
(grams)

Dipping duration
(minutes)

Frances, Carrot, Zill,

Up to 375

65

Ataulfo, Carabao, Irwin, and

376 to 570

75

Tommy Atkins, Kent,

Up to 500

75

Hayden, and Keitt

501 to 700

90

701 to 900

110

Manila
Rounded

Note: These specifics are for mangos grown in Mexico or Central America (north of and
including Costa Rica). Different weights and dipping durations are applied to fruits from other
origins.
Source: Treatment schedule T-102A, PPQ Treatment Manual (USDA-APHIS 2010:5-2-56-58)

As if it is a rite of passage to become an export commodity (Tanaka and Busch
2003), mangos go through HWT processing. However, not all fruits can qualify for the
treatment. The Work Plan for 2009 dictates that a SAGARPA official or personnel of an
authorized third-party inspect ripeness of fruits because mangos “not meeting the degree
of ripeness will not . . . qualify for treatment for exportation” (USDA-APHIS and
SAGARPA-DGSV 2009:6). As per the size classification (Table 6-3), furthermore, fruits
over 900 grams are not eligible for the treatment, hence, for the export.19 Harvested fruits
therefore must be pre-sorted by weight classes, using a sorter machine (Figure 6-7).
Large mangos are eliminated by an eliminator (Figure 6-8), which is the very passage
point that determines whether a fruit can become an export commodity or is forced to
stay in the country.
19

Mangos over 700 grams up to 900 grams were not allowed for import to the US until
2003.
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Figure 6-7 Fruit sorter in a packinghouse in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)

Figure 6-8 Fruit selector in a packinghouse in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
The device is installed before the fruit sorter (Figure 6-7, above). Large mangos that
are ineligible for HWT drop into the container.
(Photo by author)
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Pre-selected and pre-sorted mangos go through a HWT, which has to be
conducted under precise and thorough control, monitored, and with a record of
temperature and time parameters. A USDA inspector tolerates no deviance from the
standards. Fruits that are treated for “even one minute short” (a USDA inspector) of the
requirement are rejected. Or, a failure of monitoring or logging parameters—although a
newer model is equipped with an automatic data-recovery program—results in rejection
of the treatment and fruits must be re-disinfected from the beginning (but a packer would
not do this at least for fresh mangos because of excessive damage caused by heat).
6.4.5 Controlling behaviors of humans and non-humans
Once mangos are successfully treated with hot water, they are moved to a secured
holding area to be cooled for packing and shipping. A USDA stamp with a unique
number of the treating packinghouse is put on each box as proof of HWT. The holding
area, as per the instruction of Work Plan, must be secured at all times to prevent untreated
fruits from being mixed with treated fruits. This ruling is so stringent that if a live fruit fly
is found in the secured area, all fruits in the area must be rejected.
The stringent control to “secure” a holding area means to control acts or behaviors
of humans and non-humans. One of the packinghouses I visited had “double screen-doors”
and a buffer space between them, dividing the clean holding/packing area and the
(maybe) infested pre-treatment area (Figure 6-9). When the facility is handling mangos,
the double doors cannot be left open simultaneously. An employee standing in the buffer
space is assigned specifically to control traffic. When someone approaches to cross this
area, the assigned personnel opens the first door, lets him/her in, closes the door behind,
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and then opens the second door. Also, loading boxes from pallets onto a trailer must be
done in a secured way; a trailer’s rear hatch must be firmly pressed into a loading dock
fringed with cushion foams, leaving no gaps (Figure 6-9). A trailer loaded with fruits is
sealed with a metal tag with an ID number and the letters “APHIS” (Figure 6-11); the
sealed consignment, which will not be opened until it arrives at the U.S. border, is
accompanied with certification documents as a transit pass for domestic and U.S.
inspection points.

Figure 6-9 Double screen doors in a packinghouse in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
Both doors are left open in this picture taken during an off-season (Photo by author)
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Figure 6-10 A loading dock in a mango packinghouse, Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
Trailer's rear hatch is tightly pressed against sponge-foams of the dock.
(Photo by author)

Figure 6-11 Metal tag at Las Brisas inspection point, Sinaloa, Mexico.
The tag is proof of sealing a consignment of mangos destined to the US accompanied
by a PS certificate document (Photo by author)
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6.5

Irradiation: A New Paradigm?
As shown above, the HWT has become the most common quarantine measure to

enable the export of Mexican mangos. But, as the HWT has several problems, such as
damage to treated fruits, efforts to develop options of post-harvest treatments have never
ceased. More recently, for instance, variations of temperature treatments and highpressure processing combined with cold or heat treatment have been tested, although
these methods still need improvement to completely kill larvae in fruits (Candelario et al.
2010; Castañón-Rodríguez et al. 2010; Velazquez et al. 2009; Velazquez et al. 2009).
Another new post-harvest treatment is the use of irradiation, technically referred to as
ionizing radiation. While different irradiation sources exist (Burditt 1994), those
commonly used for plant quarantine and approved by USDA-APHIS are electron, gamma
rays, and X rays (USDA-APHIS 2010, PPQ Treatment Manual Irradiation). Irradiation is
an effective alternative to previous post-harvest measures and for some plant products is
the only or the best pest risk mitigation measure; the treatment schedule is designed to
attain required quarantine securities without causing major damages to product quality or
hazardous effects on food safety (it is a misconception that irradiation makes products
radioactive) (USDA-APHIS 2008b; Burditt 1994; Bustos et al 2004; Ferrier 2011; Follett
and Neven 2006). Nonetheless, with concerns about adverse effects in food safety,
irradiation has been controversial, and costs of the treatment are high compared to other
measures (Ferrier 2011; Ten Eyck 2002).
This technology was first approved by USDA-APHIS in the 1990s for use on
papaya from Hawaii and in 2002 for other fresh fruits and vegetables from all countries
(USDA-APHIS 2010). Yet, it was not until 2006 that irradiation as a quarantine measure
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was actually applied to fresh produce. In 2011 USDA-APHIS established generic
irradiation doses for different pests; since then several fruit commodities including
mangos from India, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan and guava from Mexico
have been approved for the treatment, although their imports are still quite limited
perhaps due in part to “stigma” associated with irradiation (USDA-APHIS 2008b; Ferrier
2011).
An intriguing consequence of this quarantine method is that unlike the previous
EDB fumigation and HWT, which were intended to achieve the immediate mortal effect
on fruit flies, such quick killing is not needed. The dose of irradiation to treat fruit fly
pests is intended only to prevent larvae from becoming adult flies (although stronger
irradiation can cause immediate death to insects, such a high-dose treatment can damage
products, too). This means that the U.S. PS officer at the import inspection may find
living larvae in mangos treated by irradiation. While a live larva intercepted in mangos
treated with hot water results in serious consequences for packers/exporters, including
temporal suspension of export certificate and correctional actions, that is not a problem in
irradiated mangos as far as the consignment is accompanied with documents verifying
that fruits have been exposed to the required dose of irradiation. Hence, “the use of
irradiation as a phytosanitary measure presents a new paradigm” (USDA-APHIS 2010:38-2) for PS regulations on fresh produce.
Furthermore, what is remarkable about this treatment is that its effects and
processes are only indirectly perceivable to humans and instead seem to be increasingly
reliant on what ANT scholars might call “inscription devices,” which capture the
treatment’s workings, convert, and store them in a form perceivable to humans. Certainly,
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the previous treatment schemes, such as heat treatment, utilize devices to monitor and
record parameters of a treatment (e.g., thermo-sensor and data logger). However, its
effectiveness is perceptible by human sensory mechanisms. Water is hot (and EDB
smells sweet—but you should not inhale it). When a treatment is completed, its effect
becomes visible—maggots should be dead in mangos. Ionized radiation as such cannot—
and should not—be directly perceived by us, humans, unless we are willing to be
seriously damaged. Irradiation as a quarantine measure does not have to cause immediate
effects (i.e. instantaneous mortality). An invisible effect, which is only inscribed on nonhuman devices, now substitutes for a more direct sign of effect (i.e., dead larvae). Thus,
monitoring of the treatment and records of its invisible effects are becoming essential to
enable the working of the irradiation treatment as a quarantine measure.
Yet, such reliance on inscription devices and extended monitoring does not
pertain exclusively to the irradiation treatment. The extending scope of regulations was
already notable even in the protocol of HWT with the intention to meticulously control
many aspects of operations not only in a packinghouse but also outside of the facility
(e.g., orchard registration required by recent HWT Work Plans). In this sense, it might be
inadequate to consider the irradiation a “new paradigm.” As I will discuss in the next
chapter, more recent alternative PS regulatory schemes, including pest eradication and
establishment of pest-free areas, rely on a spatially and institutionally wide-ranging
regulatory network that monitors beyond the loci of production and distribution (Follett
and Neven 2006).
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6.6

Summary
As posited with the working hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology),

the history of post-harvest quarantine treatment to make export of Mexican mangos
possible has been a process that engages a variety of entities, including devices and other
physical objects as well as human agents. These diverse actors in association constitute
the materially heterogeneous network that draws the distinction between pest/non-pest,
making possible the export of Mexican mangos. The process of association, however, is
also a process of demarcation, classification, and exclusion of certain things. Some
mangos (e.g., criollos and large mangos, and mangos grown in Chiapas when the HWT
protocol took first effect) were disqualified for export to the United States. Some growers
and packers/exporters might have managed to find treatment equipment, but others might
not have. The destinies of mangos, growers, and packers were thus determined by the
regulation and financial and technical ability to abide by the regulation. Some mangos
might go to export fresh and others might remain in the country maybe fresh or become
mango puree; growers of the export mangos might benefit from the new market
opportunity, but others might not.
What PS regulations accomplish is not merely the shaping of the trade of fruits
and vegetables. Every aspect of the treatment is under meticulous and thorough control,
comprising subcomponents within the network, as predicated with one of the working
hypotheses drawing on the evolutionary development of systems. The stringent control
measures engender “disciplining” effects over behaviors of non-human things and
humans. They act, or are disciplined to act, conforming to norms of a globally extending
PS regulation network though in a very local context (e.g., at double-screen doors in a
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packinghouse). It can be inferred that similar ordering of behaviors is happening in a
packinghouse, whether in Mexico or other countries, where post-harvest treatments are
employed to export mangos to the United States. USDA-APHIS has been sending its
employees to help countries wishing to export mangos establish HWT as a preclearance
program. As with the case of Mexico, these countries were required to agree with Work
Plans, which dictate operations of the treatment. As Alvarez (2001; 2006) points out, this
might be an indication of postcolonial U.S. domination through enactment of its agency
over the nation’s borders, embodied as “encroachment” of the U.S. border into other
countries. While this postcolonial critique seems very plausible since it is the United
States that seems to dictate commodity export programs overseas, it is also possible, and
reasonable, to comprehend this extending regulation beyond nation-state borders as an
outcome of the prevailing science-based, global regulatory governance. Under this
governance scheme reigning today’s global trades, it seems, even the United States has to
conform to specific scientific rulings. Mexico, though at a much smaller scale, was
requiring a PS preclearance program on apples in the United States (Ramos, Perera, and
Sliter 1999) and similar programs in a few other countries exporting agricultural products
to Mexico. In 2004, Mexico banned the importation of California peach and nectarine
due to risks of oriental fruit moth (Follett and Neven 2006). In essence, it is the scientific
governance scheme that makes possible the apparent “postcolonial” and neoliberal
domination by certain countries over others in an era of global trade.
Indeed, one of the highlights of the next two chapters is an observation that the
science-based governance is growing as a spatially and institutionally diffusive network
of regulation, substituting partially if not completely the post-harvest regulation scheme,
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whose focus still seems to be concentrated on the process of disinfection. Yet, it is the
case that, recently, protocols of post-harvest treatments also entail a broader scope of
regulations. Groves must be pre-registered prior to shipment and trailers loaded with
treated mangos must be sealed and accompanied with certifications. As illustrated more
evidently in the case of the irradiation treatment, some treatment measures employ
devices to capture subtle, imperceptible effects to human sensory mechanisms. These
observations indicate a trend in the regulatory mechanism, which hinges on stringent
monitoring, documenting, and record-keeping to ensure traceability. And, as illuminated
in the next chapter, this trend is parallel with the trend of recent alternative PS measures
such as PFA, incorporated in the campaign against fruit flies in Mexico.
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Chapter 7
Engaging Humans and Non-humans for Control II:
Campaign against Fruit Flies
While the post-harvest treatment examined in Chapter 6 is still a very common
measure to control and quarantine mango pests, alternative measures such as the
establishment of PFAs, eradication programs, determination of host status (Chapter 5),
and systems approaches (integration of more than one risk mitigation measure to achieve
cumulative quarantine safety) have also been investigated and are becoming common
(IPPC 2007; Follett and Neven 2006). The significance of these alternatives has been
growing as the Probit 9 morality, a widely accepted quarantine security level, has come to
be deemed not always adequate—insufficient or too stringent—for certain pests and/or
commodities (Follett and Neven 2006; Landolt, Chew, and Chambers 1984; Mangan et al.
1997). Another persistent and intrinsic problem of the post-harvest treatment measure is
the damage to products, which has prompted the search for alternatives to post-harvest
treatments. Moreover, MB, a commonly used fumigant for plant quarantine use, is an
ozone-depleting substance. The use of MB is to be terminated or at least drastically
limited, resulting in the urgent need to develop alternatives. In short, PS measures that
can handle pests flexibly in accordance with differing levels of risk without causing
damage to products and the environment are currently being sought (USDA-ARS 1997).
In Mexico, alternative measures to post-harvest schemes for the mango export
have been explored and in some cases have generated significant outcomes. In Sinaloa
and 21 other states in Mexico (as of 2009), the National Campaign against Fruit Flies
(“the Campaign,” hereafter) is in operation to eradicate or suppress fruit fly pests in some
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areas for recognition or protection of PFAs and areas of low pest prevalence (ALPP).
Some municipalities in northwestern states (Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, and Sonora)
have been recognized as fruit-fly-free. Once an importing country officially recognizes an
area as pest-free, mangos and other fruits grown there, even if they are hosts of the pest,
can be exported without additional treatment. The Campaign employs a variety of PS
measures, including legal and technical activities, as alternatives to the post-harvest
treatment. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, regulatory activities of the Campaign,
in comparison to the post-harvest treatment, extend far beyond a packinghouse, extending
even to non-farming areas and those who are not involved in mango production. The
regulatory network stretches out not only spatially, but also institutionally and
organizationally, involving diverse organizations and individuals and non-human beings
(e.g., machines and organisms).
This chapter will focus its analysis on how these outspreading PS regulatory
activities have developed. While post-harvest treatments have been enabling the growing
mango export from Mexico for about 60 years, incessant research efforts have expanded
understanding of the biology of fruit flies, resulting in the massive national program to
control the pest in the field. The Campaign’s activities include day-to-day mundane, and
even quite boring practices, but it is such tedious and recurrent practices that continually
enact distinctions between pest and non-pest. Also, the Campaign employs on different
occasions something similar to what Latour and Woolger ([1979] 1986) call “inscription
devices,” or “apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can transform
material substances into a figure or diagram which is directly usable” (51). For instance, a
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set of apparatuses used for bioassay20 that provides written output to be used for further
arguments by scientists can be considered an inscription device. In this regard, as
described in the previous chapter, inscription devices played important roles in the postharvest treatment scheme (e.g., thermo-censer, dosimeter, and data logger). In the
Campaign too, certain devices, including traps to capture fruit flies, function in a similar
and critically important manner, that is, they convert something that is not perceptible or
directly observable to humans into visible formats (e.g., number of captured fruit flies).
From ANT’s perspective, this process could be called “translation,” through
which actors in a chain transform artifacts and build and extend networks (Callon 1986;
Latour 1986). Phenomena observed in the field are converted into written format,
including tables or diagrams. These inscribed records are continuously processed by
different human and non-human actors, and eventually accumulated as data, which then
become the basis for an “empirical” and “scientific” judgment of whether the pest exists
in an area. The judgment of the existence of the pest, whether in paper or electronic
format, is easily distributed, transcending space and time, and translated further in
different domains of society. From the Luhmannian system theoretical perspective
(Nagaoka 2006), furthermore, critical attention would be placed upon specific operations
of actors involved in the translation processes, which block simple “transmission” of
knowledge and conceal complexities or uncertainties. In processing the “scientific”
judgment, other social domains such as a government are very unlikely to and almost
never doubt the validity of such an “expert” judgment. As demonstrated in chapter 5, this
can lead to a situation where the scientific community could shy away from making an
20

A bioassay is a measurement using a living organism of a substance or its effects.
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administrative decision over whether a specific risk-mitigating measure should be taken
and stick to its role as the provider of “objective” bases for decision-making. Indeed, Risk
Analysis, which has become the dominant framework of risk governance, divides
scientific (hence “objective”) risk assessment, and, risk management as an administrative
process (and risk communication as a process to inform stakeholders) (Yamada 2004).
Given the above conceptual lineament, the sections that follow will provide an
overview of how some of the major components of the Campaign operated in the field.
Specific attention will be paid to ways invisible events or phenomena supposedly taking
place in the “natural” field are inscribed and thereby secured as meaningful records to be
circulated for further processing in society. This is a process through which uncertainties
and complexities in the field are converted into seemingly secure, objective, and plausible
knowledge of whether a geographic area is pest-free or not (i.e., pest status of the area).
That said, however, the purpose of this research is not to assert that scientific practices
and resultant administrative determinations of the pest status are invalid. My analysis is
not to cast a doubt on whether the pest free status of a geographic region is valid, but
rather will revolve around a simple question: how is the making and maintaining of the
pest-free status of a vast geographical area, which seems almost impossible, made
possible?
In what follows, I will first provide a historical overview of the research and
development of major components of the Campaign as an area-wide integrated pest
management (AW-IPM) system. Then, I will delineate how the major components of the
current Campaign operate in the field. The chapter will conclude with a summary of
important themes elicited from the findings, including notable characteristics of the
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Campaign as AW-IPM, its scope extending to non-farming areas and populations, and its
“disciplining” effects that make the behaviors of humans and non-humans conform to
global PS regulations.
7.1

Research and Development toward Area-wide IPM against Fruit Flies
Efforts to develop area-wide pest control programs, that is, PS measures to control

pests in the field (rather than solely in packinghouses) have a long history in Mexico.
Investigations of pests of important crops, such as mango, citrus, wheat, and cotton, have
been undertaken since the beginning of the last century. Among them, the battle against
fruit flies was probably the most important, the most actively discussed, and the most
challenging issue. For example, Fitófilo, the bulletin of the Mexican PS authority
(currently, SAGARPA-DGSV) published since 1942 (suspended in 1946, resumed in
1951, and terminated in 2000), featured Mexican fruit fly as the bulletin’s emblem on its
cover page during several years following the resumption of publication (1951),
indicating the gravity of concern the PS authorities had about this pest at that time
(Figure 7-1).
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Figure 7-1 Emblem of a governmental bulletin Fitófilo, featuring Mexican fruit fly
This bulletin is a copy of the first resumed issue published in 1951.

Before VHT was approved in 1945, with no methods to disinfect harvested fruits
available, the control of fruit flies basically meant to eliminate the pest in the field rather
than in packinghouses. Since fruit flies are highly mobile and can take advantage of
diverse wild hosts, getting rid of the pest temporarily from a single grove would not
suffice. Efforts to achieve or maintain area-wide pest-free status were needed. Thus, in as
early as 1934, the Mexican federal government proclaimed the Cuarentena Interior No. 4,
Contra la Mosca de la Fruta en la Zona de Defensa del Noroeste (Domestic Quarantine
Regulation No. 4, Contra the Fruit Fly in the Northwestern Protection Zone), which was
intended to protect the states of Sonora and Baja California, then considered fruit-fly-free,
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from invasion of the pest from other southern states (Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento
1934).
Collaboration through the joint research program with the United States (see
Chapter 6) also encouraged Mexico’s venture to combat the pest. U.S. researchers first
introduced non-native natural enemies from Hawaii to Mexico for testing in 1954
(Jiménez Jiménez 1956; Jiménez Jiménez and Smith 1958). Another important reason for
U.S. involvement in fruit fly control programs in Mexico was an incident in 1955 in
Costa Rica. One of the worst, or maybe the worst agricultural pest, Mediterranean fruit
flies, were detected and began spreading to other Central American countries
(Anonymous 1955). In 1955, the U.S. government started to collaborate with Mexico to
prevent pest introduction from the border with Guatemala and Belize, in fear that once
the pest entered Mexico it would quickly reach the U.S. border. Mexico and the United
States established preventative measures throughout the southeast states of Mexico
including Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Yucatan, Campeche, and Veracruz. This consisted of a
“cordón (cordon)” to block the pest (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999).
Activities within the quarantined cordon included border inspection of traffic, liberation
of natural enemies, and monitoring of the pest by traps (Ríos Martínez 1961), which are
principal activities practiced in today’s Campaign. As will be explained later, the idea of
the cordon is still active and plays an important role in keeping vigilance over the
nation’s PS conditions.
Research and development did not cease even after the VHT and EDB treatments
protocols were approved in 1945 and 1953 respectively. The Mexican PS authority and
researchers continued to explore technologies to suppress or eliminate fruit flies of both
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Anastrepha species and Mediterranean fruit fly in the field, not solely in a packinghouse.
Articles featuring fruit flies as the topic of research and development for the PS
regulatory administration constantly appeared in Fitófilo as well as other Mexican
academic journals in entomology. To grasp general trends of research and development
in the area of fruit fly control in Mexico, I conducted a simple content analysis of articles
(the methodology of which is described in the following paragraph) using Fitófilo and
Folia Entomologica Mexicana, the non-regular journal of Sociedad Mexicana de
Entomología (Mexican Society of Entomology). The presumption underlying the content
analysis of these journals was that the former, Fitófilo, as an official publication of the
Dirección General de Defensa Agrícola, the then national PS authority, would present the
most imminent issues concerning fruit flies facing the nation’s agriculture and the most
appealing advancements to tackle them. I anticipated the latter, Folia Entomologica
Mexicana, would present the then up-to-date original research articles. This journal also
occasionally doubled as conference proceedings of the society’s meetings, containing
titles and abstracts of presentations. Publications of these journals have not been constant.
Fitófilo in particular went through major suspension periods. Still, their contents were
expected to be relevant, if not thorough, indicators of trends of investigations on fruit
flies in the field of Mexican entomology, especially in the area of regulatory-oriented
research and development.
At five libraries in Mexico (see Chapter 3), I manually reviewed all available
issues of the two journals, and photocopied or scanned titles, abstracts, and/or articles that
dealt with, even if only partially, fruit flies of major importance for Mexico, including
Anastrepha spp, Apple maggot (Rhagoletis pomonella), Papaya fruit fly (Toxotripana
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curivicauda), and Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata). For Fitófilo, 82 out of 92
issues published from 1951 through 2000 were included in the analysis; for Folia
Entomologica Mexicana, 108 out of 110 issues published from 1961 through 2000 were
analyzed (note that this journal is still being published and includes some “combined”
issues; therefore, the number of volumes I checked was less than 108). The missing
issues (10 of Fitófilo and two of Folia Entomologica Mexicana) were lost or not available
at any library. Thirty-nine (39) articles mentioned fruit flies in Fitófilo; 72 in Folia
entomologica Mexicana. The main themes of the articles are identified, categorized, and
summarized in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2. The categories of the themes include basic
biological knowledge about fruit flies (e.g., taxonomy, physiology, population, and
migration in the field, reproductive behavior, dietary habits, or host preference),
biological control (search and evaluation of natural enemies of fruit flies), technologies
relevant to Sterile Insect Technique (SIT), trapping, and attractants (i.e., substances that
attract wild insects to trap), chemical control, regulatory activities (e.g., cordon and pest
control campaign), and, especially in Fitófilo, presentation of fruit-fly-related information
in other countries, including the United States.
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Table 7-1 Articles related to fruit flies that appeared in Fitófilo, a governmental bulletin on PS administration, 1951-2000
Years

Number of
published
issues

Mediterranean Regulatory
Other
fruit fly
administration information

Anastrepha fruit fly
Biology

Biological
control

1951-60

28

4

1961-70

37

6

1971-80

18

1981-90

3

1991-2000

6

168

Total

92

Remarks

Number of articles related to fruit fly pests and categories of their topics

Sterile insect
technique

Attractant

Post-harvest
treatment

1
1

1

2
4

1

6

6

1

1 issue
missing
3 issues
missing
6 issues
missing

1

1

10

1

1

1

1

3

1

7

10

8

Note: The bulletin went through three major suspension periods: 1953–54; 1982–93; 1996–98. In addition, numbers of issues
published annually considerably varied among years. Ten issues were not available in the four libraries where I conducted archival
research during my fieldwork in Mexico.

Table 7-2 Articles related to fruit flies that appeared in Folia Entomologica Mexicana, a bulletin of Sociedad Mexicana de
Entomología (Mexican Society of Entomology), 1961-2000
Years

Number of
issues

Number of articles related to fruit fly pests and categories of their topics
Anastrepha fruit fly
Biology

Biological
control

SIT

Trap,
attractant,
bait-spray

Chemical
control

Postharvest
treatment

Remarks

Mediterran
ean fruit fly

Other
information

169

1961-70

22

2

0

1

2

0

2

1

0

1971-80

24

11

0

4

12

2

0

5

4

1981-90

34

2

2

5

0

2

0

6

0

1991-2000

30

4

0

0

0

1

1

1

2

110

19

2

10

14

5

3

13

6

Total

2 missing
issues

Note: The journal has been published since 1961. The number of issues published annually considerably varied among years. As some
issues were published as “combined issues,” the total number of the volumes I examined was less than 110. Two issues were not
available in the libraries in Mexico where I conducted archival research.

Understandably, various articles in the two journals focused on Mediterranean
fruit fly, which became a chief concern for the Mexican and U.S. PS authorities.
Fitófilo’s earlier articles (during the 1960s), in particular, included the regulatory
administration presenting activities of the abovementioned cordon intended to block
Mediterranean fruit flies. Despite these efforts, however, in 1977 the pest was found in
Mexican territory. This occurrence led to the launch of a multi-national (i.e., Mexico, the
United States, and Guatemala), multi-organizational (i.e., Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) pest eradication
project, “Moscamed.” The project entailed the construction of a mass-rearing plant for
sterile flies in Metapa de Dominguez, a township near Tapachula city, Chiapas, Mexico,
in 1979 (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999).
A notable research agenda from the 1950s through the 1970s was a focus on
biological control measures against Anastrepha flies, including the use of natural enemies
(Arrieta M and Coronado Padilla 1968; Cons Duarte, Patton, and Trujillo García 1966;
Jiménez Jiménez 1956; Jiménez Jiménez and Smith 1958). The use of natural enemies
was of particular interest for the Mexican PS administration at this time as they were
expected to self-sustain in the field if introduced appropriately and hence were considered
more cost-effective than pesticides (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999;
Jiménez Jiménez and Smith 1958). More recently, biological control has increased in
importance because of the growing interest in practicing sustainable agriculture (Montoya
and Cancino 2004).
In the more research-oriented journal, Folia Entomologica Mexicana, the major
research agendas included fruit flies’ biology (19 out of 72 articles in Table 7-2) and
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effective trapping and attractants (14 out of 72 articles). Technical knowledge is essential
since IPM necessitates deep ecological understanding of the pest, including the behavior,
physiology, and relationship with plants or other insects, to acquire an accurate
estimation of the wild pest population. SIT is another noteworthy topic of research and
development, discussed in 10 out of the 72 articles (Table 7-2). The first release test of
chemically sterilized fruit flies was conducted in a citrus orchard near Mexico City in
1961 under continuous cooperation with the United States and the technology proved
very promising. This cooperation led to mass-rearing of three to five million sterile
Mexican fruit flies to release in northwestern states bordering with the United States
(Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999; Parker 1968). The research on SIT
in Mexico sought very specific technical improvements for effective and efficient massrearing of sterile flies, which was a critically important component of SIT. For instance,
as sterilization affects male flies’ competitiveness in reproductive activities, it is
necessary to ensure that male flies have sexual capability to actively seek a female and
successfully copulate (Calkins 1984; Delgado García and Enkerlin 1973; Esther González
and Enkerlin 1975; Hendrichs 1982). Another important agenda is selective mass-rearing
for male immature insects (Lozoya S and Aranda H. 1981). In SIT, it is sterile male
flies—not vice versa—that can effectively hinder the reproductive process of a wild fly
population; sterile female flies are not needed for release (Willhoeft, Franz, and Mclnnis
1994). Although it is desirable to raise only male flies for cost efficiency, in reality both
sexes of Anastrepha are still reared together even today because there is no effective
method for sexual selection at immature stages.21 Other unique and finical yet important

21

In production of sterile Mediterranean fruit flies, selective mass-rearing techniques
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aspects of SIT were also reported, including: control of quality (i.e., the competence to
find female flies and mate with them in the field) of reared flies; methods to mark
sterilization-treated flies (because sterilized flies released in the field and captured by
traps must be distinguished from wild flies); and tolerance of insects to anoxia (because
irradiation under high concentration of oxygen can worsen the quality of treated insects)
(Antonio and Enkerlin S. 1982; Chambers 1978; McFadden 1964).
In the meantime, there were surprisingly few articles that explored post-harvest
treatments, even during the 1980s when alternatives to EDB fumigation treatment were
desperately sought. As noted in the previous chapter, studies on HWT for mangos were
led mainly by U.S. researchers, especially those belonging to USDA-ARS, who had
previous experience with research on disinfection of commodities from Hawaii. In the
meantime, in Mexico, studies on post-harvest treatments as such were rare with few
exceptions to complement ARS’s work conducted in Chiapas (Enkerlin 1989). The
research funding by the Mexican government for HWT studies seemed to be limited as
well (Acuña Martínez 1987). In recent years, studies dealing with post-harvest treatment
in Mexico have tended to focus on its effects on quality parameters of the fruit and have
been reported in horticultural science journals (e.g., Luna Esquivel et al. 2006; Osuna
Garcia et al. 2002; Zamora Cienfuegos et al. 2004). These studies undertaken by food
scientists or horticulturalists seem to take the post-harvest treatment for granted as a
prerequisite for marketization. Mexican entomologists, meanwhile, have been making
consistent efforts to deepen understanding of diverse yet essential aspects of native fruit
flies, which laid the groundwork for the development of the Campaign against fruit flies
using genetic sexing strains have been developed and successfully applied to produce
male flies exclusively (Zepeda-Cisneros, Cristina Silvia. 2005).
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as AW-IPM. In addition to the aforementioned journals, diverse works to extend the
understanding of bio-ecological aspects of fruit flies, especially of Anastrepha species,
were reported in various venues in Mexico (Liedo F. and Bravo M. 1991; Wolfenbarger
and Bravo M. 1989). The Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales y
Agropecuarias (INIFAP, National Institute of Forest, Agriculture and Livestock
Research) also conducted extensive studies of the biology and control of Anastrepha
species for mangos in eight major mango-producing states (SARH-INIFAP 1987).
Outcomes of this research became the basis for the Campaign as a scientific-technical
governance project. The agenda of research and development entailed a variety of
programs, for instance, the population dynamics and behavior of flies in the field, as well
as the trapping, the SIT, biological control using natural enemies, the technology for
mass-rearing of sterile insects and natural enemies, and other control measures including
chemical and mechanical-cultural. Also, legal-administrative measures, such as the
cordon, were established. The diversity of the technical and legal bases for establishing
the Campaign signaled the magnitude and the complexity of the pest control program to
be launched, which would grow far beyond the site of production, packing, or distribution
of fruits.
The steady research effort in Mexico to investigate fruit flies, especially the
important native Anastrepha species, began proving its significance in the 1980s. This
was the exact time period when the traditional EDB fumigation was terminated by the
EPA and alternatives were desperately sought. In a sense, it was the EDB ban that
prompted the full-fledged endeavor to move from decades-old, stagnant control measures
against Anastrepha fruit flies toward AW-IPM (Aluja [1993] 1994). The foreign-
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developed HWT then became the de-facto principal quarantine measure to allow the
export of Mexican mangos since 1988. After the EPA’s announcement of the EDB
cancellation in 1983, the Mexican federal government promulgated, based on “public
interest,” a decree intended for preventative and combative measures against fruit fly
pests (SARH 1985). In 1984, Sinaloan mango growers with CAADES membership, with
the support of the Mexican federal and state government, started a campaign against fruit
flies (see Chapter 6). This campaign introduced concepts of IPM, primarily consisting of
preventive measures including trapping, fumigation, and elimination of indigenous host
plants (Anonymous 1986). It was a significant outcome of the rigorous research on wild
fly population that 10 municipalities in Sonora were officially recognized as fruit-fly-free
by USDA-APHIS in 1988; apples, peaches, and citrus fruits grown there qualified for
export without post-harvest treatment (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria
1999) (53FR50508). Furthermore, technical insights gained through the Moscamed
project and the previous release of sterile Anastrepha flies resulted in a nation-wide
control program using the promising SIT. In 1992, the Mexican government launched the
Campaña Nacional contra las Moscas de la Fruta (National Campaign against Fruit
Flies). Right next to the Moscamed mass-rearing plant, a new plant, “Moscafrut,” was
constructed with the weekly capacity to rear 300 million sterile pupae of Mexican fruit
fly (A. ludens) and West Indian fruit fly (A. obiqua) in addition to 50 million
Diachasmimorpha longicaudata, a parasitoid wasp of fruit flies.
After the passing of the current Mexican plant protection law in 1994, the legal
framework of the Campaign was also reinforced. The campaign was underpinned with a
newly standardized national governmental decree, Norma Oficial Mexicana (NOM,
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Official Mexican Standards/Regulation), NOM-023-FITO-1995 Por la que se establece
la Campaña Nacional contra Moscas de la Fruta ([the rule] by which the National
Campaign against Fruit Flies was established) with the aim of establishing PFA and
ALPP. In 1997, another decree, NOM-075-FITO-1997 Por la que se establecen los
requisitos y especificaciones fitosanitarias para la movilización de frutos hospederos de
moscas de la fruta ([the rule] by which the requirements and phytosanitary specifications
for the transport of host fruits of fruit flies are established) was promulgated to protect the
established PFAs and ALPPs. I will henceforth call the operations of both statutes “the
Campaign,” because these two regulations combined (and a few other related statutes that
determine specifics) function as AW-IPM to establish and maintain pest-free or lowprevalence status, although, technically, only the former (NOM-023) was decreed as its
legal basis. Since the promulgation, the Campaign has successfully achieved eradication
of the pests in northern and central municipalities of Sinaloa as well as some areas in
other states. The next section will delineate current operations of the Campaign through
examining the essential components of these two regulations.
7.2

Operations of the Campaign
Now that I have reviewed the historical development of research and development

to establish the Campaign, this section will present contents of the Campaign, beginning
with an overview of two principal statutes, NOM-023 and NOM-075, followed by
descriptions of field operations based on these statutes. My accounts will demonstrate the
way the Campaign’s operations extended their reach of disciplining effects beyond sites
of mango production, involving people with no direct connection to the mango sector. PS
regulations added thorough regulatory procedures (i.e., subcomponents) to deal with
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more diverse actors and entities in different sites. The Campaign thus came to put them
into socio-material orderings, revolving around the distinction between pest/non-pest, and
simultaneously disciplining them to conform to the commands of the global regulations.
Although it is not my intention to present all of the specifics of the Campaign, I will
provide somewhat detailed descriptions of the major components of the Campaign. Doing
so will persuasively demonstrate the extensiveness and complexity of the Campaign and
its particular mechanisms including monitoring, record-keeping, or use of non-human
devices.
7.2.1 Overview of NOM-023 and NOM-075
First, NOM-023 (see Appendix 3-1) specifies areas of regulatory actions,
mandates subjects of control (fruit fly pests and fruit that are hosts for the pests, or “host
fruits”), and stipulates the specifics of the administration and organization. This statute
also specifies the field operation of the Campaign, including monitoring of the pest,
control measures, standards for recognition of pest-prevalence status, along with more
detailed manuals as technical appendices. NOM-075 (see Appendix 3-2) specifies pests
and host fruits subject to the regulation and conditions of transport of the host fruits
between areas of different pest prevalence statuses. Both NOMs clearly pronounce that
failure to comply with the rules will result in sanction, indicating that they are mandatory.
Besides these two NOMs, a few other supplemental regulations, including NOM-069FITO-1995, which specifies procedures to establish and recognize PFA, were
promulgated; and NOM-069 is in accordance with standards elaborated by international
regulatory bodies such as IPPC and NAPPO. Also, technical and administrative details of
the Campaign specified in technical appendices to NOM-023 and relevant technical
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manuals prepared by SAGARPA also have incorporated international technical standards
and recommendations elaborated by IPPC, NAPPO, FAO, and IAEA. These examples
clearly indicate that technical and administrative specifics of the PS regulations have
been increasing “harmonization” with international trade rules.22
Meanwhile, insights accumulated through the incessant research in Mexico about
the biology of fruit flies were also incorporated into the NOMs. NOM-023’s article 4.9.4
(“Of cultural and mechanical control”) commands that all unharvested fruits in an
orchard be incinerated or buried in soil deeper than 20 centimeters because it was known
that adult flies emerging from pupae buried under this depth cannot escape from the
ground. As demonstrated with this example, it is also notable that technical specifics of
these NOMs are quite detailed. NOM-075, for instance, in stipulating the procedure for
testing sampled fruits (article 4.3.1), requires that a sampled fruit be cut into slices of less
than one centimeter thick so that a living larva, if existing in it, can be observed. In what
follows, I will present some details of the field operations to control acts of humans and
non-humans in accordance with the commands of the two statutes.
7.2.2 Detecting and monitoring the pest
The first critically important element of the Campaign is the detection and
monitoring of the pest. An IPM intends to apply necessary measures based on
information about pest existence rather than a rigid schedule of uniform applications of
control measures such as spraying pesticide. Thus, obtaining knowledge about the
22

In fact, the original NOM-023 and NOM-075 contained clauses that declare that the
statutes as such were not, at the points of their promulgation at least, in accordance with
any specific international standards (perhaps because international standards specifically
corresponding to these national rulings were not then available). Nonetheless, this fact
does not mean that these NOMs were against then available international standards.
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existence of a target insect through intensive and incessant monitoring is the most
important element in enacting IPM. For detection of Anastrepha fruit flies, the McPhail
trap with a solution of hydrolyzed protein as attractant (Figure 7-3) has been the most
commonly used since the 1940s or earlier (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria
1999; Aluja 1999; Díaz-fleischer et al. 2009).
The Campaign also never stops its operations to detect fruit flies by trapping
using McPhail traps. Numerous traps containing material attracting fruit flies are installed
throughout monitored regions, whether commercial production areas or non-commercial
farming areas, such as urban and wilderness zones, to construct a web of trapping in the
entire region. Methods and density (i.e., number of traps to be installed in a certain area)
of the trapping are specified in NOM-023. The trap density varies depending on pest
prevalence level, season, and characteristics of areas (e.g., whether agricultural
production areas, wild forest, or urban residential areas). Each trap is checked weekly to
see if a target pest is captured. The exact locations of all the installed traps are identified
with a GPS device and recorded in a nation-wide database.
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Figure 7-2 McPhail trap on a mango tree for the Campaign in Sinaloa, Mexico
The glass pot, with the opening at the bottom center to allow flies to enter the inside,
contains attractant substance. (Photo by author)

Figure 7-3 Inspection of insects in a McPhail trap by a CESAVESIN technician in
Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
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In Sinaloa, CESAVESIN is responsible for the operation of trapping. Its technical
personnel who manage the traps are called tramperos (trappers in English). Each trapper
is assigned a certain geographic area in the state and establishes trapping routes along
which traps (forty to fifty, depending on conditions of the areas) are installed. Generally,
one trapper is responsible for four to six routes, checks one route a day, and inspects all
the trapping routes in a week, and repeats this cycle. Trapping routes are to be modified
seasonally and/or depending on phenological conditions of plants.
A trapper, arriving at a trap site, unloads a trap from a tree that is a potential host
plant and inspects the liquid inside containing carcasses of insects (Figure 7-2). When
completing inspection of a trap, the trapper washes the inside of the trap, pours attractant
liquid, and hangs it back on the tree. The trapper makes a record of every trap in an
established format. When a Tephritidae fruit fly (including those not subject to the
regulation) is found, the trapper must keep it in a small plastic bottle filled with alcohol
and report it to the office.
Despite the common usage of the McPhail trap as the detection device, its
effectiveness to capture wild fruits flies has been subject to debate (Aluja 1999; Díazfleischer et al. 2009). In general, according to an interviewed U.S. entomologist, about
one percent of fruit flies of a wild population in the field are supposedly captured by the
McPhail trap. The effect of the McPhail trap using hydrolyzed protein is biased toward
attracting more female flies and can be less effective under conditions of high humidity
(Díaz-fleischer et al. 2009). Aluja et al. (1989) reported that almost 70 percent of fruit
flies visiting a McPhail trap escaped. In an interview, another Mexican entomologist
(specializing in insect population dynamics) who had been involved in a study of fruit
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flies expressed his bewilderment on the topic of whether or how population dynamics of
highly mobile wild flies is accurately captured by traps, in comparison with his
experiences with other less mobile insects whose movements can be observed under a
more controlled environment. Besides its effectiveness, trapping using the McPhail has
other drawbacks such as the fragility of the glass bottle, cumbersomeness of setting, and
potential killing of other insects including beneficial ones (Díaz-fleischer et al. 2009).
Thus, from the perspective of entomologists, it is certainly necessary to continue
improving the effectiveness of trapping, including development of a better attractant.
My point, however, is not to cast doubt upon or object to the use of the McPhail
trap for monitoring. Rather, it seems that the central question of the effectiveness of the
trapping revolves around how phenomena that are not directly observed by humans can
be converted through a particular device (i.e., the trap) into secure and plausible
knowledge of pest-free status. Except specific situations (e.g., research to examine
effectiveness of the trap such as Aluja et al. (1989)), the working of a McPhail trap and
responses of fruit flies attracted to it are not directly visible to human eyes. The trap
converts this invisibility into a visible format that makes sense (i.e., meaning). In ANT,
such a device that converts invisible phenomena into visible information is called an
“inscription device.” Through the trap as an inscription device, phenomena in the “natural”
field are translated into a domain of meaning, that is, society. In this specific case of the
trapping, the uncertainty of the pest (e.g., its behavior in the field) is converted into a
simplified distinction: whether the pest is trapped or not (note, however, a trap with no
flies does not necessarily, in the strictest sense, indicate that there is no fly in the field).
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Of course, a simple distinction of whether or not a fly is captured in a trap does
not immediately result in a more secure knowledge of whether the pest exists or not in an
area. In the strictest sense, even if no flies are trapped by all traps installed in a
geographic area, whether a fly exists in the area cannot be known. There is no guarantee
that the number of insects captured in traps in the area proportionally reflects the real
number of fruit flies. Hence, repeated practices of inspection using numerous traps are
needed to convert the uncertainty of invisibles into something certain and to conceal the
uncertainty of invisible wild flies to allow us to plausibly assume that there is no pest in
the field. The more repeated the practice is, the less likely or possible to cast doubt upon
the assumption. As the practices are repeated and records are accumulated, the
assumption eventually becomes secure “knowledge” of pest-free status of the geographic
area. Then, we now “know” that there is no pest in the area. Meanwhile, the debate over
the effectiveness of the trapping is basically a scientific one. Yet, when the knowledge of
“pest-free” status is secured through repeated practices, it can become like a black box, of
which plausibility is rarely asked, and which can be “fed” from the scientific domain to
other networks, including legal statutes, which can legitimately dictate and command acts
of humans and non-humans.
Another important feature of this monitoring by traps is that the monitoring itself
is monitored for control of quality of the trapping. Supervisors of the trappers
(CESAVESIN, as per direction of SAGARPA-DGSV) or USDA-APHIS officials (only
in the northern PFA in Sinaloa) occasionally, without notice, visit a route where a trapper
is not present, and put a dead fruit fly in a trap to mock a capture. The supervisors take a
record of the trap location and wait for the trapper responsible for the trap, without being
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notified, to report it in the earliest occasion. Since all the trappers are aware that a “mock”
detection may be set up, they would (or at least are expected to) report a detected fruit fly
(even if it is a “real” detection) without making an unnecessary judgment over its
significance (e.g., the detection might lead to devastating impacts on the mango export
industry). Such “nested” monitoring for “quality control” of acts of humans is essential to
secure the boundary of pest-free.
According to CESAVESIN personnel (trappers and supervisors) that I
interviewed, a few trappers had indeed failed to report a simulated detection. The
personnel who failed the test were not punished in any way but called to the office and
asked to inspect traps with more caution. Although the interviewees did not explicitly
mention it, it could be reasonably imagined that repeated failures would lead to a harsher
punishment. By making and keeping the personnel aware of such a possibility, the nested
monitoring would continue to exercise its capability to “discipline” them in accordance
with global PS regulations—I make the case that this is a global measure since securing
quality control measures in monitoring is included in International and Regional (i.e.,
North America) Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM and RSPM).
This nested monitoring would remind those who are familiar with Michel
Foucault’s observations on a specific design of prison, Panopticon, to self-discipline
inmates by having them feel under perpetual—whether or not perpetual in fact—
monitoring, and its extended form, the surveillance society, which spreads from the
prison to every locus of modern society, illustrated with conspicuously installed
surveillance cameras—whether or not surveying in fact—making us feel constantly
observed and monitored (Foucault 1977). As mentioned in the review of literature in
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Chapter 2, the use of such rational means to control human behaviors could be
comprehended as a reflection of governmentality, especially that of a neoliberal era
where the conduct of an individual is conducted through self-disciplining political
technologies for more efficient control (Dean 2010).
The sampling of host fruits for inspection is another important component of the
Campaign and a task in which CESAVESIN personnel are engaged. As per the NOMs,
throughout the season of harvest or fructification of host plants, fruits are sampled in
orchards, non-farming areas where they grow, and other places where fruits are handled
commercially such as packinghouses, processing facilities, distribution markets, and
wholesale markets. At mango packinghouses, in particular, personnel of third-party
organizations authorized by the government are engaged in sampling and inspecting
fruits (see the next chapter for explanation of the organizations engaged in the inspection).
Not only commercially grown fruits such as mangos are collected, but also other native
host fruit plants grown in non-farming areas.
When I accompanied a team (in their term, brigada, Spanish word for brigades)
of CESAVESIN personnel in field operation, I witnessed them collect samples from
fruits being loaded to a truck on the roadside. A couple CESAVESIN technicians at the
office received the samples and chopped them for inspection. At packinghouses and
traffic inspection points on highways (to be explained in Chapter 8), responsible
personnel would do the same—slice and inspect sampled fruits. As mentioned earlier, the
sample fruits must be cut into slices of about one centimeter thick to thoroughly inspect
for a larva inside. The CESAVESIN technician at the office swiftly chopped dozens of
the sampled mangos brought by the field staff. They repeated this until all the sampled
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fruits were sliced. One of them told me that on a day in a peak mango-harvest season they
would chop as much as 250 kilograms or 500 pounds of mangos. Their cutting-boards
(more accurately, round slices of lumber) reflected their repeated cutting in their
hollowed center (Figure 7-4). As the technical appendix of NOM-023 dictates, the
technician dissecting fruits for inspection should work with precision and agility to be
acquired through sufficient training. Understandably, such training cost the technician
many wounds until he became capable of wielding the knife so swiftly. He, after
throwing the final batch of the samples into a plastic container under the table, said
casually, “Salió nada (Nothing came out).” His utterance involved nothing exciting and it
must have been a mundane scene of the Campaign.
Nonetheless, although this casual utterance, “Salió nada,” as such will not
immediately result in legitimate recognition of an area as pest-free, the nonchalant and
even apparently trivial fact that “nothing came out” from a batch of sampled fruits would
eventually lead to the significant distinction of pest-freedom of the entire region. As with
the case of the monitoring by the McPhail trap, a distinction of whether a fly is in a fruit
is elicited by repeated practices of slicing, and as it is accumulated through repeated
practices, then, the repeated distinctions will eventually lead to a plausible assumption
that there is no pest. In the strictest sense, even if no larva is found in every slice of fruits
sampled in a geographic area, whether a fly exists in the area cannot be known. Yet,
recurring practices of sampling and slicing fruits accumulate the small distinctions of
whether the pests exist. Accumulated distinctions, or data, will eventually result in a
plausible assumption that there is no pest in the area.
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Figure 7-4 CESAVESIN technician inspecting sampled mangos in El Rosario,
Sinaloa, Mexico
The hollow surface of the cutting board was a sign of repeated chopping of fruits.
(Photo by author)

In southern Sinaloa, which is ALPP, oftentimes adult fruit flies, including the
problematic flies and those not subject to the regulation, are caught in the traps, or larvae
are discovered in sampled fruits, but optically determining the species of a larva is
difficult.23 In this region where mass-release of sterile fruit flies (Mexican fruit flies A.
ludens, and West Indian flies A. obliqua) is under operation, they are also captured in the
traps. Thus, it becomes necessary to identify whether a captured insect is really a
problematic pest or not.
In an event of capture of flies, the specimen is brought to the laboratory of
CESAVESIN in the southern region for identification. Immature fruit flies found in
23

I suppose that a microscopic observation of a larva’s morphology or even DNA testing
would allow identification of species. However, it would be impractical for the Campaign.
186

sampled fruits are sent to the laboratory and put in Styrofoam boxes (as shown in Figure
7-4) in a secure place to let the larvae grow into adult flies. It is much easier and more
practical to use adult flies for determination of species. Adult flies captured by traps are
examined to identify species. Additionally, trappers determine whether they are wild
insects or artificially reared sterile flies—a sterile fly is marked (as noted earlier in review
of the research) with fluorescent in the heads at the Moscafrut plant in Chiapas where
pupas are mixed with the coloring powder; when flies emerge from the cocoons, the
coloring attaches to their forehead.
In the identification laboratory, a CESAVESIN technician optically examines the
specimen to determine their species, sex, and if they are A. ludens or A. obliqua, then
whether released or wild insects. During my participant observation, the quiet technician
poured the insects in a bottle onto a petri on a microscope, piled them up on one side,
picked one by one from the pile with tweezers, inspected each, and then moved it to
either a pile of female flies or another for male on the other side (Figure 7-5). To
determine whether a fly is wild or reared, he squeezed the fly’s neck with the tweezers to
pull out its fluorescent-marked forehead retracted between its compound eyes. If the head
is shining with the fluorescent, the fly is not a wild one. In some cases, when the mark
was not clear, he used the microscope to shed strong light from beneath the insect to elicit
pinkish shining reflection of the coloring. He let me try this, but to my eyes—I have light
color blindness—the fluorescent looked orangish rather than pink. In rarer cases when he
was still unsure (there were no such cases during my observation, but he demonstrated to
show me), he would remove the fly’s head, press and spread it on a filter paper, and shed
light to surely see the distinctive fluorescent. During my observation, no target pests
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(wild flies of the Anastrepha species) were found. Yet, he would definitely find some of
them sooner or later as the mango-harvest season advanced. Having finished examining
specimens in a bottle, he took records of each inspection, including numbers of insects,
species, sex, whether wild or sterilized, on a form. After completing the form, he would
give it to a secretary who input the data into a database.

Figure 7-5 Identification of fruit flies in the CESAVESIN laboratory in El Rosario,
Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)

In a peak season, as with the technician inspecting sampled fruits, he would have
to inspect thousands of flies a day. Compared to the inspection by the skillful dissection
of fruits, the identification task in the laboratory entailed more complex procedures and
required substantial knowledge in morphologies of the pests and techniques in handling
them. However, again, the identification was constituted with repeated practices that
make the apparently minuscule distinction between pest and non-pest of each tiny insect
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(although sterile flies are pest species, they are not treated as problematic pests). And, it
is this practice, as repeated, accumulated and recorded, that eventually leads to
establishment of the boundary of pest-free at the significantly large geographic scale.
7.2.3 Biological control: Elegant stinger of parasitoid wasp
The Campaign employs a variety of measures to reduce and/or eliminate wild
flies in the field. Biological control using natural enemies of the fruit fly pests is such an
example. Biological control refers to pest management practices using natural enemies
such as predators, competitors, parasites, or parasitoids in order to suppress a pest
population in the field. Whereas a parasite means an organism that lives for most of its
life in or on another organism (host) and is usually not lethal to its host (although it may
cause some damage), a parasitoid refers to an organism that in its immature stage
parasites in another organism and eventually kills the host (Dent and Elliott 1995; Norris,
Caswell-Chen, and Kogan 2003). A well-known example is the introduction of an exotic
(non-native) predator, Vedalia beetle (Rodalia cardinalis) for control of the cotton scale
Icerya purchasi, which damaged citrus in the United States during the 1880s (Dent 1995).
As an important component of IPM, biological control measures have advantages,
including reduction of pesticide use, little impact on the ecosystem, and cost effectiveness
(Aluja [1993] 1994; Norris, Caswell-Chen, and Kogan 2003). Certainly, there are known
drawbacks, including its modest effect, inflexibility in application in fields, and intensive
knowledge required to identify and rear an effective natural enemy. Also, the cost
effectiveness of biological control is premised upon the assumption that once an enemy
population is established in an area subject to control, its effect lasts permanently or at
least for a considerable time period. However, the permanent establishment of a
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biological control agent, which was previously considered as a benefit, now can be
viewed as an impediment because the establishment cannot be “undone” and may
engender unpredicted and undesired outcomes in ecosystems (Syrett 2002).
In the control of Tephritidae pests, interest in using parasitic Hymenoptera (wasps,
bees, and ants) species as biological control agents can be dated back to the early
twentieth century; since then, over 100 parasitoid species have been tested (Wharton and
Yoder N.d.). As Hymenoptera parasitoids lay eggs in immature fruit flies (i.e., eggs and
larva) eventually killing them, artificially reared and released parasitoids can be used to
suppress wild fruit fly populations. In Mexico, as reviewed above, since the 1950s
parasitoid wasps, both native and introduced foreign species, have been tested or
liberated (Aluja [1993] 1994; López, Aluja, and Sivinski 1999), and the active search for
biological control agents, including methods of mass-rearing, has continued. Among
them, Diachasmimorpha longicaudata, a parasitoid wasp, native of the Indo-Pacific
region, is one of the most important biological agents in the control of fruit flies applied
in the United States (Hawaii and Florida), Latin America, and elsewhere (Wharton and
Yoder N.d.). Female adults of D. longicaudata are 3.6 to 5.4 mm long not including
ovipositor, while male adults are 2.8 to 4.0 mm long; the female lays eggs using her
elongated ovipositor—looking like a straight, even elegant, sword—which is often longer
than the body and allows her to reach fly larvae inside a fruit (Figure 7-7). D.
longicaudata has been successfully mass-reared and released for pest control since the
1950s in Mexico (Aluja [1993] 1994; Wharton and Yoder N.d.), including Sinaloa,
primarily in non-farming, wilderness areas where higher fruit fly infestation is found.
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This parasitoid wasp is artificially reared in the plant for mass-rearing of sterile
flies in Chiapas because it feeds, namely, on fruit flies. Reared pupae are transported by
airplanes to a nearby airport then transferred to a facility of CESAVESIN where they
emerge to become adult wasps in paper bags. The full-grown wasps, having emerged
from pupae, are transported to sites of release either aerially or by truck, then manually
liberated. The use of the wasp (and other potential organisms under investigation) for
biological control epitomizes the diversity of agents, whether human or non-human,
constituting the network of regulation.
Interestingly and arguably, no one would track all the wasps released in the field
and witness exactly what would happen to them. Some of them might successfully find
an immature fly in fruits and lay eggs into its body using their elegant sword-like
ovipositor, eventually terminating its life. Or, others might end up wandering in the field
and eventually dying, without being able to find any larva. Still, as far as wasps are
released constantly and traps capture less and less flies in the area where they were
released, we can “know,” even if we do not witness it on site, that this agent has done its
job.
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Figure 7-6 Diachasmimorpha longicaudata, a parasitoid wasp in El Rosario, Sinaloa,
Mexico
The wasp with a remarkably long straight ovipositor is used for biological control
against fruit flies (Photo by author)
7.2.4 Sterile Insect Technique: Set a thief to catch a thief?
Another “weapon” of the Campaign to eradicate fruit flies, specifically, Mexican
fruit fly (A. ludens) and West Indian fruit fly (A. obliqua), is the use of sterile insect
technique (SIT). SIT is likened to a “birth control” technique aiming to suppress, or
eradicate, a wild pest insect population by rearing and releasing a massive number of
sterile male insects to fields where they mate with females, which will lay only infertile
eggs. Continuous release will deprive the wild insect population of the chance of
reproduction, thereby eventually suppressing the wild pest population. SIT is applied near
completion of an eradication program because it is ineffective when a population density
of wild insects is still high (ratio of released sterile insects to wild insects must be so
overwhelmingly high that a wild female insect cannot find a wild fertile male). Generally,
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combined with support by other techniques such as chemical control, SIT constitutes one
of the key components of AW-IPM to eradicate or prevent (re)establishment of a pest
population in a certain geographic area (Klassen 2005).
The idea of using sterile insects for pest control can be dated back to the early
twentieth century. But, not until the 1950s was the first notable success recorded with an
eradication program against New World screwworm, an animal parasite (a fly) that was
causing devastating damage to livestock in the United States and Central America
(Calkins, Klassen, and Liedo 1992; Ebbels 2003; Klassen and Curtis 2005). Since then,
successful applications of SIT have been reported in various pest control programs,
including those against gypsy moth and cotton boll weevil in the United States as well as
fruit flies in the United States, Japan, and Mexico (Klassen 2005). Where it is feasible,
SIT can be cost-effective without causing significant damage to the environment,
although there are many conditions for a successful SIT program to meet (Ebbels 2003).
For instance, an SIT program against Tephritidae needs a large-scale facility to rear tens
or hundreds of millions of flies weekly, equipped with an irradiation apparatus to make
reared flies infertile, transportation of flies to fields, and devices for release, along with
sizable financial resources including initial startup capital as well as running costs of the
program (Hendrichs 2000). To launch the SIT program for the eradication program
against Mediterranean fruit flies, as mentioned above, Mexico with the support of the
United States constructed a mass-rearing plant (Moscamed plant) in Metapa de
Domínguez, Chiapas, in 1979 and expanded the plant to produce sterile Anastrepha flies
in 1992 with the capacity of producing 300 million pupae weekly (Moscafrut plant).
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The Moscafrut plant, which I visited in March 2009, was an enormous and
complex facility composed of fine-tuned subcomponents (Figure 7-8). It began with
establishing “colonies” of artificially grown flies. While maintaining them for
generations, the technicians have kept improving techniques for more efficient
production, for instance, the best-balanced diet (feeds) (Figure 7-8-5), the optimum
temperature and humidity for growing flies and larvae (Figure 7-8-1 and 6), a “trick” to
induce female flies to oviposit (Figure 7-8-2), and efficient means to separate larvae from
feeding medium and pupae from pupation medium (Figure 7-8-8 and 11), among others
(Domínguez Gordillo and Castellanos Hernández 2005). Besides a couple of remaining
technical challenges under investigation, including establishment of techniques for massrearing of guava fruit fly (A. striata), and as mentioned earlier, selective mass-rearing
technique of male flies, critically important and perpetual problems of the mass-rearing
were cost-reduction and quality control of reared flies. Despite these challenges being
addressed in the Moscafrut plant, the photos demonstrate a complex system that has been
built, mobilizing and assembling human and non-human beings, biological and nonbiological agents, into a series of procedures, or a materially heterogeneous network of
(sub)components of the PS regulation system.
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Figure 7-7 Procedure of mass-rearing of sterile fruit flies in Metapa, Chiapas, Mexico
(See the next page for explanations of each process) (Photos by author)
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Figure 7-7
Photo 1: Colonies of adult flies maintained in screen cages. Temperature and humidity of the room was optimized for the insect.
Photo 2: Eggs of fruit flies (small white lumps against the black backdrop). Female flies mistakenly laid on silicone gum attached on
screen. The use of the gummy silicone was one of many serendipitous but ingenious devices developed in Planta Moscafrut.
Eggs were rinsed off by gentle water spray.
Photo 3: Incubation of eggs (3 or 4 days, depending on species) in water circulated by injected air for supply of oxygen.
Photo 4: Planting eggs. Eggs were pumped out from the incubation bottle and automatically sprayed on a tray filled with feeding
medium.
Photo 5: Massive feed blender. Basic ingredients of feeding medium for larvae include water, corncob powder, corn flour, sugar,
torula yeast, and so forth.
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Photo 6: Stacks of trays containing larvae in the incubation room. Larvae go through three stages (instars), each of which lasts five to
eight days depending on species. Temperature is manipulated to synchronize timing of hatching and regulate the
development stages of larvae, varying 25 to 38 degrees Celsius.
Photo 7: Larvae (second or third instar) and feeding medium.
Photo 8: Riddling machine to separate larvae and feed medium. The mesh drum at the center, turning round, separates larvae and
feeding medium.
Photo 9: Pupae (brown, darker color) and larvae (white, lighter color). The larvae would pupate shortly.
Photo 10: Dye to mark pupae for identification.
Photo 11: Blower to separate pupae from waste.
Photo 12: Irradiation chamber. Gamma-ray source (Cobalt 60) was stored underneath the floor. When starting an irradiation treatment,
it would rise from the floor. Of course, when in use, no human shall be inside.

In the meantime, the quality control of flies, which in this context referred to the
competency of reared insects to fly robustly in the field and find and mate with wild flies,
was addressed by incessant monitoring, the key concept underlying the whole PS
regulatory network. Quality control measures were applied not only to humans, as
witnessed in the case of the nested monitoring of trappers, but also to non-humans. Sterile
fruit flies reared in the Planta Moscafrut were under strict quality control.
Due to exposure to irradiation, sterilized fruit flies tend to be weaker compared
with wild insects in their reproductive capacities, including the ability to fly to find a wild
fly with which to successfully copulate. To assure the quality of a specific batch of fruit
flies, the quality control department of Planta Moscafrut kept sampling pupas from a
batch and conducting quality testing, including counts of eclosion and testing capacity to
fly (Figure 7-8). Results of the quality testing will constitute feedback to the rearing
procedure to improve it, including optimizing balance of feeds. Ensuring the quality of
mass-reared, sterile fruit flies was one of the urgent concerns facing researchers and
technicians engaged in the eradication program, because there was strong pressure to
reduce costs and to respond to growing demands for sterile flies. While it was ironic that
mass-reared fruit flies in Planta Moscafruta were under thorough and generous care as if
they were not a vicious pest, it was also essential for the success of the Campaign to
eliminate uncertainties in any aspect of the operations.
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Figure 7-8 Format for quality control of mass-reared fruit flies at Planta Moscafruit
in Metapa, Chiapas, Mexico
Frequencies of adult flies emerging from pupas are counted for quality evaluation of
the mass-rear processes (Photo by author)
As with the parasitoid wasp, D. longicaudata, sterile fruit flies in the form of
pupas reared in the plant in Chiapas are air-shipped to several states of Mexico where SIT
for eradication is in operation as stipulated by NOM-023. In Sinaloa, personnel of the
CESAVESIN office in the city of El Rosario regularly receive shipments of pupae at the
local airport. Upon arrival to an eclosion facility attached to the CESAVESIN office,
pupas are repacked in paper bags and put in an emergence room where temperature and
relative humidity are optimized for the flies to hatch. Adult fruit flies after emergence are
packed in a device specifically designed for air-release. This device, filled with adult
sterile flies, is loaded on a plane. While flying, this plane releases the flies inside
constantly in an automatic manner. From the CESAVESIN office (to which an airstrip is
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attached), a couple of aircrafts fly almost daily to release sterile flies in the field. Flights
take place in early morning before air conditions become turbulent.
During my fieldwork, I had an opportunity to accompany such a flight for release.
I flew with one of the two old Cessna aircrafts, which, according to the young pilot, had
just recently got a new engine. Right behind the front seats, a few CESAVESIN
technicians loaded the release box with a holding capacity of five million sterile flies
(Figure 7-10-1). Then, I climbed up to the co-pilot seat for which no belt to buckle up
was equipped. As the Cessna started to taxi onto the airstrip, through the aircraft’s
windshield, I saw a few familiar faces of CESAVESIN technicians shouting to me, “Do
you have a bag?” (for throwing up), rousing laughter. But, the flight was smooth except
when the pilot suddenly banked the aircraft trying to frighten me. After takeoff, over the
roar of the new engine he and I had a fairly animated (or it might sound so because we
had to talk loud) conversation about his work, his ten years of flight experience since he
was sixteen years old, and his father and siblings, who were also pilots engaged in aerial
spraying. Shouting in the roar tired us, and after quick topics of conversation ran out, we
remained silent. The pilot then started to listen to music as he normally would do when
flying alone. I took pictures of mango groves underneath. As we approached our
destination, an area of over 3000 hectares surrounding Escuinapa, he adjusted the course
toward the release area with the guidance of a GPS device (Figure 7-10-2). As our plane
entered the target area, as shown on the screen of the GPS, the pilot pulled a knob on the
front panel to start releasing the sterile flies. Evidence of release began appearing on the
GPS (Figure 7-10-3). Although the silver release box behind me supposedly began
slowly releasing sterile flies transported from one thousand miles away, I could not see
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from the tight co-pilot seat how they were being released into the air. The pilot was just
listening to music. Only when we reached the end of the release area (which we could
know only through the GPS device), he firmly grabbed the control stick, banking the
Cessna to repeat the process (he said he would usually make a much sharper turn). The
only evidence of making progress is a black band extending on the GPS screen,
indicating the flight path through which the flies were released (Figure 7-10-4). As our
Cessna flew back and forth over the release area, stripes of black bands on the screen
eventually covered all of the target area (Figure 7-10-5). After finishing the release, the
flight to return to El Rosario was quick and the landing was much gentler than most
commercial flights. After our landing, on the way back to the apron (or CESAVESIN’s
parking space), he said that his friends envied his job of flying every day; but, although it
had been exciting at first—he loved flying anyway—in fact just after a while, it became
boring, mundane, repetitive work.
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Figure 7-9 Procedure of aerial release of
sterile fruit flies during a flight over El
Rosario and Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
1. Release box loaded on the plane.
2. The aircraft approaching the release
area indicated on GPS device.
3. The aircraft began to release fruit
flies. The black “band” indicates the
aircraft’s path releasing sterile flies.
4. Aircraft went back and forth on the
area continuing the release.
5. Release completed.
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Indeed, as with the case of trapping and sampling for inspection by slicing fruits
and identification, it could be argued that it is such mundane, repetitive, even boring,
practices that keep drawing boundaries between pest/non-pest. Interestingly, and
arguably, again, no one would pursue and witness exactly what would happen to all the
sterile flies released from a couple of hundred meters above the ground. Some of them
might successfully copulate with wild flies, terminating their reproduction cycle. Or,
others might end up feeding birds (and at least about half of the released insects, namely,
female flies, do not serve to suppress the wild fly). What converts such invisibility and
uncertainty into something visible and relatively certain is the GPS monitor (Figure 7-10
above) as another inscription device. The course of a flight releasing sterile insects was
made visible by the GPS device so as to generate secure “data.” Under the theory that
sterile flies released at an inundating scale will deprive wild insects of the chances of
“natural” copulation, the accumulated data proving the mass-release serves to secure a
plausible assumption that the density of wild flies decreases, regardless of what really
happened to the released insects in the field.
On the ground where the released flies are expected to suppress wild flies, the
web of McPhail traps, as explained earlier, is awaiting insects to be entrapped.
CESAVESIN’s trappers also repeat their field trips to inspect traps. The traps capture
both released sterile and wild flies. As trap inspections are repeated, hopefully, only
sterile files come to be detected and no wild flies are captured in a certain area. That is
when the area is deemed free of the pest.
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7.2.5 Mechanical-cultural control: Globalization in your backyard?
The mechanical-cultural control against fruit flies is a very effective, simple, and
efficient measure, and according to the technical appendix of NOM-023, when carried
out under a well-designed scheme, it could reduce the wild fly population up to 60
percent. Generally, the mechanical-cultural control includes a wide variety of practices to
reduce the chance of infestation of plants with pests and they are simple and feasible for
even less-resourceful farmers. Basic cultivation practices, including growing vigorous
plants through proper fertilization and soil management, control of weeds to eliminate
where pests can hide, and elimination of infested crops, are examples of preventive
actions.24 In the control of Tephritidae pests, this approach is essential to sever the
lifecycle of the insect by, for instance, collecting and disposing of infested fruits (e.g.,
burning, treating with lime, or burying deep in soil), eliminating non-commercial host
plants, and controlling weeds. To better control the pest through cultivation practices,
moreover, a grove involving different crops or varieties varying in their harvest seasons
requires specific caution because they provide the pest with fruit throughout the year,
making such a grove “a true heaven for the pest” (Aluja [1993] 1994:128).
In the Campaign, the mechanical-cultural control consists of elimination or
destruction of non-commercial host fruit plants, and good management of commercial
groves including weed control as well as appropriate disposal of unharvested or nonmarketed fruits of commercial crops such as mangos. Most of these preventive measures
are to be carried out by growers in their own orchards. Most commercial growers wishing
24

Also, post-harvest treatment of fruits, including heat treatment with hot water or air,
are often deemed mechanical-cultural control measures.
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to market mangos in the country (and all growers wishing to export mangos to the United
States) have to practice these measures in order to qualify for the registration and
certification of their groves for shipment of fruits, as per the NOMs governing the
Campaign. One of many challenges of the Tephritidae pest control, however, is to
manage host fruits grown naturally or not for commercial purposes in non-farming areas,
such as urban-residential areas and wild forests, where the pest can take refuge. In
Sinaloa, therefore, the pest control in these areas is undertaken by CESAVESIN.
As this case indicates, the Campaign reaches not only growers but also nonfarming areas and ordinary people’s lives. I observed such activities when I joined a
group of CESAVESIN personnel in an operation in central Sinaloa. This field operation
was somewhat unusual as it was part of the intense emergency action against sporadic
occurrences of the pest in the area, which was already recognized as pest-free. The team,
or “brigada” (brigade) of CESAVESIN technicians were involved in various activities
such as intense trapping, spraying in urban areas (to be explained in the next section), and
mechanical-cultural control. In the search for infested plants in Navolato, a town near
Culiacán, the state capital, they spotted, in a backyard, a tree of ciruelo or jocote,
commonly known as “Spanish plum,”25 a host fruit plant preferred by fruit flies. The
CESAVESIN crew examined fruits and found maggots in them, then requested that the
owner eliminate the plant (Figure 7-11). The tree was too big and the family loved it as it

25

Spanish plums belong to Spondias, a genus of Anacardiaceae family, and are different
from the fruit known commonly as plum in the United States (Prunus, Rosaceae family).
Mango (genus Mangifera) also belongs to Anacardiaceae family.
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provided shade in the garden; although the family would not eliminate it, they agreed to
collect fruits and bury them deep in soil to prevent larvae from emerging from fruits.
In another case, I witnessed the crew members cut down a host plant tree upon the
owner’s consent (Figure 7-12). They eliminated the tree, collected all fruits and branches
on the ground, poured chemicals onto the stump to completely kill the tree, and cleaned
up the backyard. In such a case where people cooperated with the Campaign,
CESAVESIN provided the owner with seedlings of oranges or grapefruits for the price of
the eliminated plant. While orange and grapefruit are in fact fruits highly preferred by
fruit flies, the assumption was that people would give more care to the trees to harvest
fruits than the native host fruits such as ciruelo, which are, though edible as well, more
likely to remain unharvested or just left on the ground creating safe refuge for the pests.
The brigada’s activity in backyards illuminated how the Campaign was creating
certain orders among things, and perhaps humans, in accordance with the regulations. As
with disqualified mangos sorted out before post-harvest treatment (in the previous
chapter), some fruit trees were not only disqualified for export or even commercial
shipment. In the Campaign, the host trees, as well as gardens where they grow or their
owners, were put under control measures. If, in a PFA, the pest reappeared, urging an
emergency action, these host trees would be hunted and spotted, even worse—or better
from the regulator perspective—eliminated, or at the least, their fruits were ordered to be
buried. Of course, possessing the host fruit plants in a backyard per se was neither illegal
nor immoral—yet. As ciruelos or jocotes, and other native edible fruit plants abound in
the area and have been consumed by local people, it was not reasonable to eliminate them
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completely. Nonetheless, it was still the case that they were already subject to ordering
effects by global PS regulations.

Figure 7-10 CESAVESIN technicians requesting the owner of a host plant to collect
frutis to prevent fruit flies in Navorato, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)

206

Figure 7-11 CESAVESIN personnel cutting down a host plant (ciruelo) in Navorato,
Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)
7.2.6 Chemical control: Urban areas as battlefield?
Another important component of the Campaign to suppress wild fruit flies is
chemical control. Basically, this means application (spraying) of pesticide, although
chemical control in a broader sense can include post-harvest treatment using fumigants
such as MB or EDB. Because fruit flies are susceptible to a variety of insecticides, there
are many options of applicable insecticides. Cost and potential impacts on the
environment are the most important factors in selecting a pesticide to apply. Several
textual sources in fruit fly control and mango production (e.g., Aluja [1993] 1994; Ireta
and Guzmán 2002; White and Elson-Harris 1992) refer to Malathion, an organophosphate
insecticide, as one of the most commonly used substances for the control of fruit fly pest.
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Malathion has been registered as a pesticide in the United States since 1956 and the most
commonly used organophosphate pesticide in the country. It is applied in agriculture,
residential gardens, public recreation areas, and in public health pest control programs,
including mosquito control for prevention of malaria and West Nile disease. When
applied appropriately, it can effectively control pests without posing unreasonable risks to
human health and/or the environment (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008).
Whereas pesticides, including Malathion, can be fumigated to all trees in an entire
orchard or to a wider area by sprayers or airplanes, spot application of the pesticide,
combined with “bait,” or attractant to the pest also used for the McPhail trap, is more
often recommended. Bait-insecticide solution, containing hydrolyzed protein and
insecticide, was developed for fruit flies in the 1950s in Hawaii (Christensen 1958). This
mixture is often applied as “spot spray,” which means to repeatedly spray very limited
amounts of the solution onto a plant (ideally a host plant), although aerial blanket
fumigation of a bait-insecticide mixture of very low concentration can also be practiced.
Female fruit flies needing protein sources to develop eggs are attracted to hydrolyzed
protein contained in the sprayed spot, then touch the pesticide, which is absorbed through
their skin and kills them. In general, the use of a bait-insecticide mixture applied as spotspray allows cost-effective application and reduction of possible risks to human health
and the environment. Also, traps made with plastic bottles of soft drink containing
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bait/insecticide mixture are installed to detect, attract, entrap, and kill the pest. The field
technicians call these traps “trampas matadores” (killer traps) in Sinaloa.26
In the Campaign in Sinaloa, for commercial orchard areas bait-insecticide mixture
was sprayed aerially, that is, by airplanes (each owner could apply pesticide to her or his
orchard, if necessary, as part of usual pest control). In the non-commercial areas,
including urban residential areas and wilderness areas, aerial spraying was no longer
allowed, according to a CESAVESIN senior officer. In non-commercial farming areas,
therefore, the spraying was carried out by CESAVESIN technicians on the ground.
CESAVESIN technicians would make a brigada, riding on a pickup truck equipped with
a 400-liter mixture tank, a pressure pump, and two high-pressure nozzles (Figure 7-13).
As per a regional spraying plan elaborated based on pest detection records, the brigada
would make expeditions to remote forests or residential zones in urban areas.

26

While the field technicians certainly called this type of trap matador, a CESAVESIN
senior officer denied such a name and instead called “estación cebo (bait station),” which
aimed to attract flies primarily for detection rather than suppression of the pest as such.
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Figure 7-12 Equipment of chemical control (insecticide spraying) in preparation for
expedition in Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)

Figure 7-13 "Spot" spray of bait-insecticide mix in a town near Culiacán, Sinaloa,
Mexico
(Photo by author)
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In an expedition I accompanied, two technicians and I made the round of several
towns near Culiacán to spray host plant trees. A CESAVESIN technician, wearing a
mask and a hood for protection and sitting on the cargo bed of the pickup running slowly,
kept giving flashes of spray to trees on roadsides and yards facing streets (Figure 7-14).
The flash sprays, which left spots or stains of bait-insecticide mixture on target trees,
would suffice to attract and kill flies supposedly proliferating in the area. Outside
temperatures rising to perhaps 32 or even 35 degrees Celsius (90 to 95 Fahrenheit) and
the high humidity of the semi-tropical zone in October must have made the technician
feel unbearably hot under the protection equipment. Nonetheless, the spraying expedition
was slow not to miss host plants in the towns we visited. I saw beads of sweat on his
forehead every time he took the mask off until we finished the expedition to spray six
towns.
In the case of chemical controls such as this one, because it obviously entailed
fumigation of insecticide, there could be concerns about potential hazards for human
health and the environment. During the expedition for fumigation, I witnessed a few
residents with infants escape into their houses in a hurry as they noticed the spraying.
Although CESAVESIN informed the governments of the municipalities where the
Campaign operated (and an officer alluded that CESAVESIN had announced its presence
through radio as well), many people obviously did not know about the Campaign
(otherwise, why did the CESAVESIN personnel have to explain what they were doing to
people in the town?)
To delve further into this issue, I interviewed a representative of the state health
department. His response was that since pesticides in general posed health and
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environmental risks, strong legal controls including pesticide registration were applied
whether a pesticide was used in private farms by owners or in public places by
CESAVESIN; as far as a registered chemical was used in an appropriate manner, there
should not be unreasonable health concerns. Yet, he acknowledged that people were
concerned about pesticides in general and there was a non-governmental, non-profit,
organization actively committed to addressing such concerns. According to him, however,
intense reactions against the pesticide use as such were rarely heard. Likewise, to my
question asking if they heard complaints about spraying, a couple of CESAVESIN
technicians answered that certainly there had been complains, but they were concerned
about stains on clothes hanging in the backyard (the bait-insecticide mixture leaves dark
hard-to-wash-off spots) or noise of fumigation. A possible reason for the docile—or no—
reaction to the spraying in urban areas might be that in semi-tropical Sinaloa where
diseases transmitted by insects (e.g., dengue fever) prevailed, spraying in urban
residential areas for pest control, especially to kill mosquitos, was a quite common
practice (I witnessed this once in my neighborhood). Besides, the flash spot spraying
could limit diffusion of pesticide to the atmosphere (aerial spraying in non-farming areas
was already prohibited, as mentioned); and CESAVESIN technicians were trained to not
spray when people were in sight. Indeed, CESAVESIN technicians had to demonstrate
exemplary practices in pesticide application, given pesticide intoxication cases reported
in the state.27

27

During the fieldwork, I heard from my colleague at IIES quite a few stories about
intoxication among workers in large-scale commercial vegetable farms.
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Besides the use of pesticides, especially in urban areas, which could be a serious
safety concern for residents, what drew my attention was that the operation of the
Campaign was no longer carried out solely in orchards of mangos or other commercial
fruit products. Expeditions for spraying in non-commercial farming zones were always
undertaken somewhere in the state. To clean up the areas and enable exports of these fruit
products without treatment, the Campaign was already involving, whether posing health
hazards or leaving stains on hanging clothes, those who were not directly involved in the
production of mangos or other fruits. For the same purpose, as demonstrated with the
cases of the post-harvest treatment and the mechanical-cultural control, some plants or
fruits that did not qualify for trade—although they were edible and some people
consumed them—were excluded. Also, the regulatory network for the Campaign
involved other organizations and institutions (e.g., local governments or the health
department). In essence, the web of the PS regulatory network was extending its reach
out of the farming sector, crossing spatial and institutional/organizational boundaries,
creating orders among things, places, or humans so as to make them conform to the
global regulation for agro-commodity trade, even in backyards of Mexican towns.
I am not condemning this trend but wishing to shed light on the making of some
agricultural products I am familiar with. Also, I want to note that during my observation,
the CESAVESIN personnel in the field were very polite and thorough in explaining the
Campaign to individuals who asked questions or those whom they asked for cooperation.
Still, it was the case that the making of the order permeating through the Campaign into
non-farming areas and non-farming people could engender normative expectations
among them to conform to the regulation. Before I will delve into the observation of
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emerging norms in Chapter 9, however, in following sections I will further present how
the Campaign was extending its reach through other PS control measures, such as traffic
inspections on highways, to ordinary (i.e., non-farming) people.
7.2.7 PFA and legal control: Expanding network of regulation
The PS activities in Sinaloa described above, from the detection and identification
of pests to SIT and bait-spraying, were principally intended to establish PFAs and protect
them in the state from re-invasion of fruit flies. According to International Standards for
Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) by IPPC, a Pest Free Area (PFA) is defined as “an area
in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in
which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained” (Convention
2007). Central to this concept is to integrate three program components to establish and
maintain a PFA, including (1) systems to establish freedom, (2) PS measures to maintain
freedom, and (3) checks to verify freedom has been maintained (IPPC 1995). Actions
needed for a PFA include a survey of documented data (on a target pest and its hosts),
trapping, maintaining fruit identity (i.e. origin of a fruit must be always certified),
activities for prevention and emergency action, such as bait-insecticide spray and
biological control, SIT, survey, and control of alternative host plants, regulation over
movement of fruits and alternative host plants, and close monitoring of these activities to
maintain the integrity of the entire program (Riherd, Nguyen, and Brazzel 1994).
Once a pest species could be eliminated using the variety of measures from a
certain geographic area, it should be recognized officially as pest-free by national PS
authorities of both exporting and importing countries of commodities produced in the
area. Standards or procedures to establish and recognize a PFA are governed by the
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above ISPM, along with Regional Standards for Phytosanitary Measures elaborated by
the NAPPO (RSPM, for example, North American Plant Protection Organizatioin (2010))
that prescribe detailed rulings applicable to the three north American countries: Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. Of course, to conform to these international standards, the
national governments establish other more specific rules within their territories. As
overviewed so far, the PS regulations, whether the Campaign or post-harvest treatments,
employ a variety of non-textual artifacts as well as non-human agents to physically enact
the rules. Arguably, however, their legitimacy is buttressed with legal documents in the
form of textual artifacts. Without this specific function of the textual material—texts are
specific signs inscribed in material such as papers or electronic files—easily transcending
administrative hierarchies and geographic boundaries (i.e., international, regional, and
national), PS regulations as material politics would not be possible. Combining the
heterogeneous materiality, PS regulations constitute the regulatory network that creates
orderings among those who (or that) are involved.
The first PFA program started in the Rio Grande Valley, southern Texas, against
Mexican fruit fly (A ludens) in 1981, then in the following year the second case was
launched in Florida against Caribbean fruit fly (A. suspensa). The PFA concept, because
of its history associated with fruit fly pests, was intended primarily to certify the area free
from economically important fruit flies. Similar programs for other pests in different
countries are also in progress (Riherd, Nguyen, and Brazzel 1994). In Mexico, the first
PFA was established in Sonora in 1987, a northwestern state, from which fruits
susceptible to harm by the Anastrepha pests can be exported to the United States with no
post-harvest treatment. Efforts to establish PFAs have continued in other areas of the
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country. As of January 2011, 50.25 percent (984,479 square kilometers (km2)) of the
national territory was recognized as pest free by the Mexican government; 10.44 percent
(204,497 km2) was recognized as ALPP; and 39.91 percent (770,272 km2) was
categorized as areas under PS control according to the SAGARPA-DGSV (2011). In
Sinaloa, furthermore, the southern six municipalities were expected to be recognized as
pest-free in 2012, according to interviews with officials of SAGARPA and CESAVESIN.
In the meantime, as of October 2011, USDA-APHIS has officially recognized five
municipalities of Baja California Sur; six municipalities of Chihuahua; five
municipalities of Sinaloa as already explained, and 21 municipalities of Sonora, as pest
free (USDA-APHIS 2010).
A PFA and an ALPP, once established and recognized, requires continuous acts to
protect from invasion of concerned pests from outside. Especially, given that Tephritidae
pests are highly mobile and adaptive to diverse environments including non-farming sites,
it is crucial for PS regulators to apply regulatory actions beyond venues of production
(e.g., orchards) and processing and distribution (e.g., packinghouse and wholesale
market) of a commodity. In addition, immature fruit flies can “hitchhike” on host fruits
transported from one place to another. Accordingly, legally endorsed mandatory
regulations to regulate transport of host plants, including certification for movement
(transportation) of fruits, certification of origin and disinfection treatment, record of pest
control measures, and inspection of traffic carrying fruits at airport, seaports, and
highways, must be carried out.
The Campaign against Fruit Flies in Mexico employs these typical legal measures.
As overviewed earlier (Appendix 3), NOM-075-FITO-1997 regulates transport of 47 host
216

fruits in combination with clauses of NOM-023-1995 that command the inspection and
registration of orchards to qualify for shipment of host fruits. At airports, seaports,
railway stations, or Puntos de Verificación e Inspección Interna (PVIs, Internal
Verification and Inspection Points), federal or local personnel of CESAVESIN (which is
one of 33 CESAVEs in Mexico) are stationed for inspection of cargo or passengers’
luggage. There are 45 PVIs under direct control by the federal government and 67 PVIs
managed by CESAVES as auxiliary bodies, or organizations of farmers virtually
delegated the authority to inspect transportation of plant products (I detail roles of
CESAVES as auxiliary bodies in the next chapter).28 The federal PVIs are strategically
arranged on points where major highways cross five hypothetical “cordónes (cordons),”
or lines of vigilance, to monitor the transport of plants, animals, and related products,
throughout the country (Figure 7-14Figure 7-15). All traffic passing through these PVIs
must be inspected, and if carrying host fruits, has to be accompanied with certification.
For instance, when an ordinary citizen travels in a vehicle carrying apples or oranges for
a snack on the road without a document verifying their origin and/or proofing history of a
PS treatment, they can be confiscated and destroyed at a PVI.

28

There are 255 PVIs to inspect exclusively transportation of animals and animal
products.
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Figure 7-14 Five Cordons for PS and animal health inspections in Mexico
Elaboration by author based on SAGARPA-DGIF (2010), SAGARPA-DGSV
(2008d) and a map image by INEGI
1. Cordón Norte (Northern Cordon)
2. Cordón Centro (Central Cordon)
3. Cordón Sur (Southern Cordon)
4. Cordón Istmo (Isthmus Cordon)
5. Cordón Penunsular (Peninsular Cordon)
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In the state of Sinaloa, there are six PVIs, including two federally-operated and
the rest managed by CESAVESIN. The two federal PVIs are located at “entrance” points
on two major highways coming from the south (Nayarit) to the southern ALPP; two PVIs
operated by CESAVESIN are on two highways on the border between ALPP and the
central PFA; one on the border between the northern PFA and the central PFA; and one
on the highway from Durango (east of Sinaloa). At these PVIs, SAGARPA officials and
personnel of CESAVESIN are engaged for 24 hours, 365 days, in regulatory activities
including inspection of all transportation passing there.
This rigid physical setting of the PVI included a bump or “sleeping police,” a
device that forcibly slows down the traffic and is an infamous example of ANT’s claim
on the significance of non-humans controlling human acts (Figure 7-15) (Latour 1999;
Law and Mol 2008). The primary purpose of the bump might be to protect the inspectors
working there (some reckless drivers have exposed the CESAVESIN personnel there to
danger of serious injury). Still, as with the double screen door in the packinghouses
(Chapter 6), it might be a hallmark of PS regulations to incorporate mechanisms or
devices that rigidly and forcibly regulate movements of humans and non-humans.
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Figure 7-15 “Las Brisas,” installed at the entrance to the northern PFA in Guasave,
Sinaloa, Mexico
All traffic, whether freight or passenger, is subject to inspection. At the gate, a
bump was installed to forcibly slowdown traffic. (Photo by author)

Figure 7-16 Inspection of PS certificate at the PVI "Las Brisas"
Without documentation, host fruits cannot be transported beyond a PVI.
(Photo by author)
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At the PVI, if regulated host fruits are found transported without PS certification
issued as per NOM-023 (Figure 7-16), they have to go through a quarantine treatment
such as fumigation (Figure 7-17) or be abandoned. All retained fruits are tested by
dissecting to see if fruit fly larvae have infected them. The general inspection at a PVI
can be quite thorough and meticulous. Trunk space of a passenger vehicle is constantly
checked. A CESAVESIN staff told me that drivers of freight trailers hide—or just
“forget”—fruits for snacks in the space behind the driver’s seat, or a small storage space
right behind the door, which is an important inspection point (Figure 7-18).
On one hand, the significance of the stringent inspection of traffic is substantial.
A SAGARPA official at a PVI revealed his experience of finding a few hundred fruit fly
larvae in a few oranges he had seized from a passenger. Because a few hundred living
larvae were more than sufficient to cause a grave outbreak in a PFA, intercepting such a
significant amount of hazard directly contributes to protection of the PFA. On the other
hand, more importantly in my view, the strict and often even annoying inspection at the
PVIs, as with any inspection or surveillance (e.g., security check at an airport), would
signal to drivers and passengers a normative expectation that all were to act in accordance
with the regulation. By doing so, the inspection would function to “self-discipline”
people such that the effectiveness and the efficiency of the regulation is maintained or
even increased automatically. Chapter 9 will discuss such emerging normative effects of
the regulation in detail. At this point, however, I highlight that as illustrated by these
examples, the regulatory network to establish and maintain the PFA and the ALPP now
extended its reach beyond farming areas.
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Figure 7-17 Methyl bromide fumigation chambers at the federal PVI, "La Concha,"
in Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico
This PVI is located near the state border with Nayarit. Host fruits without
certificate must be disinfected before passing this point. (Photo by author)

Figure 7-18 Inspection of a commercial freight at the PVI “Las Brisas”
Small space (often used as storage of tools) behind the driver’s door is an important
inspection point. (Photo by author)
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7.3

Summary
This chapter has reviewed how the Campaign against Fruit Fly has developed and

operates as an AW-IPM. I traced research and development, and earlier attempts to
establish PS measures in the field, rather than in packinghouses (i.e., post-harvest
treatments). Some of the PS regulatory measures, for instance, the biological control
using parasitoid wasps, began to be explored as early as the 1950s (when EDB
fumigation had barely begun). Also, other measures, including SIT and research on basic
biology (including physiology, behavior, and ecology), of the fruit fly pests were keenly
conducted, while post-harvest treatments were becoming the principal PS measure to
enable the export of Mexican mangos. It was not until the 1980s, when the EDB
fumigation was banned and extensive investigations of alternatives to post-harvest
treatment began, that outcomes of the accumulated research efforts gradually resulted in
the basis for the Campaign, which was finally launched in 1992. Since then, the
Campaign has demonstrated noticeable progress in establishing more PFAs and
protecting them.
The review of the development of the Campaign as an AW-IPM program has
illuminated several important features and themes to further investigate in the remaining
chapters. First, the Campaign involves diverse and heterogeneous entities, whether
humans and non-humans, including artifacts and other organisms. This association of
these heterogeneous agents constitutes the complex network of regulation, which
transcends spatial, institutional, and organizational boundaries. The legal foundation of
the Campaign, containing mandatory rules, was buttressed with the hierarchical structure
of statutes from the international standards to the national rulings. The regulatory
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network extends both “horizontally” and “vertically,” as it were, involving other
governmental regulatory bodies (e.g., health department), and local governments.
Second, this regulatory network processes, or translates, uncertain and invisible
phenomena taking place in the “natural” into the format compatible for further translation
by using “inscription devices.” The inscription device converts invisible phenomena into
visible formats, reducing the complexity in the field into a very simplified form. Results
of the recurrent practices to suppress wild flies (e.g., biological control and SIT), which
are hardly visible to humans, are converted by this mechanism into visible formats that
make sense. Repeated mundane practices drawing distinctions between pest/non-pest
(e.g., daily checks of traps, slicing sampled mangos, and identification of a trapped pest),
although tedious, nevertheless secure the plausible assumption that the suppressing
practices were working properly because their records constitute accumulated data, and
eventually lead to the assumption that we “know” that a large geographical area is pestfree.
Third, these processes, which secure the knowledge that a certain area is pest-free
(or in low pest-prevalence), are underpinned by ubiquitous monitoring of acts or
behaviors of agents for quality control, and further by re-monitoring of the monitoring,
namely, nested monitoring. For instance, the quality of sterile flies, or the competence of
reproduction in the wild field, had to be secured and improved by the constant monitoring.
Trappers monitor the pest, and are monitored by supervisors, for securing the quality of
their practices. The monitoring serves to discipline acts of those involved in the
regulatory network in accordance with the logic of PS regulations. While, as Foucault has
made clear, disciplining through ubiquitous monitoring and surveillance over human acts
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is a necessary condition to increase productivity in any aspect of modern society infused
with neoliberal political ideals, questions could be raised as to what rationale, logic,
mechanisms, and scope of control, are presumed or employed to enact the discipline.
In this regard, my fourth point is important. The Campaign extended its reach
from packinghouses to groves (i.e., orchard registration) to non-farming areas, and the
disciplining effect also involved not only growers and packers, but also non-farming
places and populations, including backyards of urban residents and passengers and
drivers on highways. The regulation employed rigid physical settings, such as a bump at
the PVI, which forcibly control movements of humans, as well as the thorough and
stringent inspection that signaled the call for self-disciplining of those passing there. Thus,
the regulatory network extended its reach beyond spatial, institutional, or organizational
boundaries mobilizes actors and entities, whether human or non-human material beings,
in “translation” processes, illuminating power exercised such that those actors act
conforming to global regulations (Latour 1986).
My intention to reveal and discuss the working of PS regulations, including the
Campaign for the export of Mexican mangos, is not to accuse or debunk it. From an
agronomical and technical perspective, the Campaign is a surprising case of the
application of complex, vast, meticulous, and fascinating human—and maybe nonhuman—ingenuities. If the Campaign successfully achieves its goals, many growers,
especially those small-scale farmers suffering from lack of stable income sources, can
benefit, as discussed in a later chapter. I hope that the descriptions and anecdotes above
provide a glimpse of what is behind the globalization of agriculture and food, in which
the Campaign is engendering orderings among people, things, and places, tacitly
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disciplining them to conform to the globally prevailing regulations. In Chapter 9, I will
explore how senses of norm, moral, and values conforming to the regulation were
emerging. In Chapter 10, I will specifically discuss whether and how PS regulations
could really benefit small-scale growers. Prior to these chapters, however, in the next
chapter I will further delve into roles and challenges of CESAVESIN as the key player in
the Campaign under Mexico’s particular political-economic backdrop.
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Chapter 8
Engaging Humans and Non-humans for Control III:
CESAVESIN and New Actors
The previous two chapters have illuminated how the PS regulation network as
material politics makes and maintains mangos and geographic areas pest-free. Among
many actors, whether human or non-humans, engaged in this material politics,
CESAVESIN is the most active and important actor. Its stated mission is: “To develop
PS programs and strategies for prevention, control and eradication of agricultural pests
and diseases, with trained and honest personnel and with professional ethics, offering a
service of high quality in benefits for the farmers of the State of Sinaloa” (CESAVESIN
N.d.). CESAVESIN is committed to not only the control of fruit fly pests, but also
programs to control other agricultural pests and assistance to farmers and food processors
to meet demanding standards and regulations to ensure food safety and quality, including
GAP. Nonetheless, for CESAVESIN the campaign against Tephritidae fruit fly is the
most urgent program. Its staff members are assigned to a variety of the PS activities
delineated in the previous chapter, including biological control (e.g. release of sterile flies
and natural enemies), mechanical and cultural control (e.g., elimination of host plants),
and chemical control (i.e. pesticide spraying), inspection and registration of mango
orchards, inspection of freight and passenger transportation, and detection and
identification of the pest (e.g., trapping), in order to monitor, control, and eradicate fruit
flies.
Concluding the three chapters examining how PS regulations have developed into
a materially heterogeneous network and how that network operates, this chapter will
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elucidate specific roles played by CESAVESIN in the assembling of the regulatory
network, as well as mundane operations of PS regulations. One vital insight about
CESAVESIN’s role is that this organization’s “nature” as a hybrid, or multifaceted,
organization mixing governmental authority with private farmers’ organization, aptly
mobilizes resources in a diffusive neoliberal political-economic climate. As detailed later,
CESAVESIN is decreed as an organization of agricultural producers (farmers or growers)
and simultaneously as an auxiliary organization of the Secretary of Agriculture under the
current Ley Federal de Sanidad Vegetal (LFSV, Federal Law of Plant Health). Its unique
status as a growers’ organization and its virtual function as a government proxy allows
CESAVESIN to make vigorous commitments to materialize the campaign against fruit
flies in a distinctive neoliberal political-economic climate after the 1980s.
In the early 1990s, the federal government instigated enhancing the campaign by
actively involving growers in the program. In 1992, the official program was launched as
a campaign against fruit flies by a covenant signed by the federal and state governments
and growers’ representatives (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999). In
1994, LFSV was enacted with a clause that clearly decreed the CESAVE to be an
organization of farmers as collaborators of the Secretary. In 1995, NOM-023-FITO-1995
was issued to establish the national campaign against fruit flies in which the
responsibilities of growers in the operation of the campaign were clearly defined.
Importantly, during the mid-1980s through the early 1990s Mexico was experiencing
massive political, economic, and administrative reforms, making its way into a fullfledged free-market economy. In 1986, Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT, predecessor of WTO) with the purpose of obtaining stable and
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secure access to the global market (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 2000).
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect in 1994, the same year
of the enactment of the LFSV. The law’s enactment marked one of the crucial changes in
Mexico’s neoliberal reform to make possible the country’s entrance into global economy.
The founding of the CESAVE as an organization of farmers took place in the institutional
and organizational transformation of Mexico’s farming sector against this neoliberal
political-economic backdrop. It is in this political-economic context that my analysis in
this chapter situates significant roles of CESAVESIN in the campaign against fruit flies.
What was happening in Mexico’s regulatory administration for farming sectors
during the political-economic reform is in resonance with what I delineated in the review
of literature (Chapter 2) as a governance shift and concomitant regulatory schemes.
Although the term has broad connotations and hence oftentimes seems elusive, the
governance concept has aptly captured broad changes in organizational and/or
institutional structures through which the nation-state government has altered ways it
intervenes in diverse aspects of people’s lives, for instance, economy, social welfare, and
resource/environmental management (Batterbury and Fernando 2006; Jasanoff and
Martello 2004; Jessop 1998; 1999; 2002). One frequently discussed theme in the
literature is neoliberal reform, which privileges: market mechanism, free trade, and an
open economy; retreat, or changes in roles, of the nation-state in intervening economic
activities as well as social programs; re-scaling of regulations including decentralization
or devolution (i.e., granting regulatory authorities to local level government entities);
reliance on and outsourcing to non-governmental/third-party/private bodies; and
increasing use of accreditation, certification, and standard-making bodies. Drawing on
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Foucault’s arguments regarding governmentality, literature on governance notes, as
ideological bases underlying these changes, a stress on self-help, self-responsibility, selfdisciplining, and/or civic participation, which on one hand would allow more effective
and efficient enactment of regulations, but on the other, tends to attributes responsibilities
of handling problems to individuals (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996a; Dean 2007; Jessop
1995; Jessop 2002; Rose and Miller [1992] 2010).
In agri-food governance, in particular, these changes are schematically
comprehended as presented in Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2. The previous regulatory
scheme (Figure 8-1) can be comprehend as one in which the nation-state government is
the dominant, if not the sole, regulatory body, which covers various aspects of food
production through retail in a commodity chain. Legitimacy of regulations would be
strongly tied to legal authorities in governmental agencies. In the meantime, more recent,
emerging regulatory governance can be understood as a more complex web of regulations,
involving different types of entities. The “central” role of the nation-state government in
regulation seems to have waned, or at least altered, as one part of the regulatory network.
Emerging regulatory entities include, for instance, international regulatory bodies such as
WTO, IPPC, and World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), transnational retailers
and agri-food businesses, third-party non-governmental bodies that provide certification
or accreditation services, and local governments. These entities, constituting a regulatory
network covering the food commodity chain, employ non-legal-based norms such as
private standards and certification, making it possible to control in detail conducts of
people and objects (e.g., commodities), allowing global transactions of a variety of
products.
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Figure 8-1 State-government-centered regulatory scheme over a commodity chain
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Figure 8-2 Multi-actor-based regulatory scheme over a commodity chain
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With increasingly detailed norms or standards, a growing number of actors
become involved in regulations; thereby the regulatory network (Figure 8-2) is becoming
more diffusive and complex. The following analysis will illuminate how PS regulatory
activities to control fruit fly pests by CESAVESIN and other non-governmental bodies
have developed and are operated in a changing landscape of regulatory schemes under
Mexico’s neoliberal reform. In particular, my argument will center on their unique,
multifaceted characteristics, which allow these actors to operate effectively in the
increasingly diffusive PS regulatory network.
8.1

Roles of CESAVESIN

8.1.1 CESAVESIN as an organization of growers
CESAVESIN is one of 33 CESAVEs in Mexico (SAGARPA-DGSV 2008c).
Each state has its own CESAVE. Despite its name, “Comité Estatal (State Committee),”
a CESAVE is not a state governmental agency. The CESAVE is decreed as an organismo
auxiliar (auxiliary body) of the Secretary of Agriculture of Mexico. Auxiliary bodies are
defined in LFSV as: “Organizations of agricultural producers, which function as auxiliary
of the Secretary [of Agriculture] in the development of the phytosanitary measures and of
reduction of risks of contamination in the primary production of plants . . . ; and includes
the State Committees of Plant Health [CESAVE] and the Local Plant Health Council”
(Article 5). As this definition makes clear, the CESAVE is organization of farmers.
LFSV also includes as auxiliary body, Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal (JLSV,
Local Plant Health Council). JLSVs are organized as groups of farmers at the local level
for which the CESAVE functions as a state-level umbrella organization. In terms of
divisions of labor or degrees of involvement in activities between CESAVE and JLSV,
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there seems to be considerable variations among states. For example, in Chiapas, the
southernmost state of Mexico, a JLSV was more active in fruit fly pest control programs
than the CESAVE of Chiapas. In Sinaloa, however, although JLSVs were also quite
active, it was CESAVESIN that served as the principal player in the contra-fruit-fly
campaign.
Organizational involvement of growers in PS activities through CESAVE, JLSV,
and its predecessors has a long history in the PS administration of Mexico. Under the Ley
de Plagas (Law of Plant Pests), enacted in 1924 as the first plant protection law of the
country, the government created local, state, and regional boards for a national campaign
against locust, and used the term “auxiliary” as the denomination of these bodies for the
first time (Gutieérrez-Peña 2000). In the 1937 Reglamiento de Ley de Plagas
(Governmental Ordinance for the Law of Plant Pests), CESAVE’s predecessor, Comité
Regional de Sanidad Vegetal (Regional Committee of Plant Health), was established, and
clauses for the Comité were retained in the two plant health laws enacted in 1940 and
1974 succeeding Ley de Plagas (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 1999;
2000).
Yet, until the 1990s, emphasis on Comité Regional as an organization of growers
and its role in fruit-fly control programs were modest. The previous 1940 and 1974 laws
defined the Comité Regional to be formulated by governmental representatives and other
interested sectors (Bombín 1983; Gutieérrez-Peña 2000). When the ban of EDB as a
fumigant in 1984 doomed the export mango industry of the state (see Chapter 6),
CESAVESIN’s contributions seemed to be quite limited, too. Mango growers of Sinaloa
formulated a committee to defend the mango export, in cooperation with the federal and
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state government, and launched a campaign against fruit flies in the state. Although
CESAVESIN (as Comité Regional under the 1974 plant health law) was already involved
in the campaign, most of the major pest control activities of the campaign (e.g., trapping)
were undertaken by CAADES (a state-level organization of private-landowning farmers
in Sinaloa) and other governmental agencies, rather than CESAVESIN (Anonymous
1986). It was not until 1992 that federal and state budgets were earmarked and transferred
specifically to CESAVEs’ operations of PS campaigns (Gutieérrez-Peña 2000).
Today, CESAVESIN explicitly presents its backbone as an organization of and
for growers. One of CESAVESIN’s senior officers emphasized the organizations’ nature,
that is, representing and serving growers: “We represent the growers . . . . The growers
pay for us. The growers dismiss me.” The same officer also stressed the importance of
their participation, including financial commitment, as key to the success of the pest
control program:
If the growers don’t invest, the campaign will have no results. Personally, I tell
you, my experience, in the places where growers don’t get involved in the
campaign, where growers don’t have interest, the campaign does not work . . . .
The backbone [of the campaign] is that the growers commit themselves to the
campaign, participate in the campaign, and yes, they finance the campaign . . . .
That makes good sense. We have obtained excellent results. In a campaign where
we have growers commit themselves and participate, we have achieved success.
To publicly communicate that the fruit-fly campaign was operated for and by
growers, CESAVESIN printed a message on their vehicles (Figure 8-3): “A Unidad
Adquirida con Recursos de Productores de la Region,” meaning “unit acquired with
resources of growers in the region.”
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Figure 8-3 CESAVESIN pickup truck with a note “Unit Acquired with Resources of
Growers of the Region” in El Rosario, Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)

Underlying these discourses stressing the growers’ commitment was the
recognition that where growers took initiative, the campaign worked effectively. Such a
call for growers’ self-responsibility and self-reliance prevailed under the neoliberal
climate toward diffusive governance over farming sectors in Mexico. A federal
government officer’s comment succinctly made this clear by attributing responsibility to
individuals: “Growers themselves are responsible for expenses for pest control in their
orchards.” In addition, the federal government was taking the responsibility to control the
pest in non-commercial farming areas, such as forests and urban residential areas. In this
respect, the division of responsibilities in the pest control program between growers and
the government was made clear in the official discourse.
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However, the ideology stressing growers’ self-responsibility did not guarantee
their commitment. The above CESAVESIN officer stressed that the most difficult
challenge for him had been to mobilize growers to commit to the campaign.
CESAVESIN as an organization of growers seemed very apt to fill the gap between this
ideological claim and the actual mobilization of growers. For more than several years, he
had had a hard time convincing “disorganized” growers of the region and raising their
consciousness about the significance of the campaign. However, though gradually and
slowly, they became more interested and attentive to PS conditions of their orchards.
The attempt to involve more growers in the campaign demanded ingenuity to
respond to their finicky demands. CESAVESIN had to offer a variety of services to draw
the attention of growers with less interest in the pest control program. Some growers who
had produced only mangos criollos (i.e., non-established local strains) tended to give less
care to their plants because they were not eligible for the export program. Their orchards
were prone to be spots of pest infestation, which would contaminate other groves and
make all CESAVESIN and other growers’ efforts in vain. To give such “disinterested”
growers an incentive to pay more attention to their plants, CESAVESIN encouraged them
to switch to a commercial variety, which would require more care yet sell at a better price
than the criollos. CESAVESIN offered growers a free service of grafting to renew their
orchards of criollos with a new variety. To facilitate the renewal of an orchard,
CESAVESIN was helping growers eliminate criollo plants—yet not completely
uprooting them but leaving their trunks to be utilized as rootstock—and then a contracted
technician would graft shoots of a commercial variety on them. Also, CESAVESIN was
providing assistance to resource-poor growers to clean up their orchards of criollos. I
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accompanied CESAVESIN’s field operaton as part of mechanical control program for a
mango grove. The grower had planted “Kent,” a major commercial variety, but because
of inadequate management, criollo rootstocks evetually overrode the variety.
CESAVESIN staff members chainsawed unnecessary criollo branches, leaving only
those of Kent. This helped the grower register the inadequately cared for orchard for
export, which otherwise could be a problematic infection spot. Such attentive services,
which might be hardly possible by a governmental agency, were conducted with the
intention of building a “close atmosphere” with growers, according to a CESAVESIN
senior officer. In an ideological climate after the 1990s impelling privatization and
participation, CESAVESIN increasingly exhibited its strength as an organization of
growers by providing services directly to its patrons.

Figure 8-4 CESAVESIN staff members cleaning an orchard in El Rosario, Sinaloa,
Mexico
They eliminated only branches from criollo rootstock, leaving branches of a
commercial variety. (Photo by author)
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8.1.2 CESAVESIN as a proxy of government agency or self-sustaining “negocio”
(business)?
In addition to its attribution as a “farmers organization,” CESAVESIN had
another significant character as a proxy of the government agency. As auxiliary of the
Agricultural Secretary, CESAVESIN’s personnel were engaged in inspecting cargo and
passenger’s baggage, and sampling, retaining, and testing (by destroying) products that
were subject to the quarantine regulation under NOM-075-FITO-1997, which controlled
transportation of fruit in the country (Figure 8-6). To my knowledge, it was quite unusual
for employees of a non-governmental entity to be engaged in actions to seize a private
property. In fact, the NOM-075-FITO-1997 as such had no clause to concede an official
authority to inspect, sample, seize, or destroy fruits to the CESAVE (but it did authorize
employees of the Secretary of Agriculture and Units of Verification of which I will
discuss later in this chapter). CESAVESIN’s de facto authority to seize fruits was based
on its status as an auxiliary organization, and perhaps tacitly expected voluntary
compliance of individual citizens to obey the regulation.
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Figure 8-5 Inspection of luggage of passengers by CESAEVSIN personnel at PVI
“Las Brisas,” Sinaloa, Mexico
(Photo by author)

Figure 8-6 A CESAVESIN officer seizing a bag of oranges, subject to regulations at
PVI, “Las Brisas,” Sinaloa, Mexico
Later, all the fruits were tested for fruit fly larva. (Photo by author)
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The status of CESAVESIN as a government’s proxy could be validated with the
fact that quite a few, if not most, employees of the organization were former
governmental agents. The aforementioned senior officer, for instance, started his career in
plant protection as a quarantine inspector of the Ministry of Agriculture at a federal
inspection station. An officer currently working for inspection of cargo and passenger
luggage at the checking point for the northern PFA in Sinaloa revealed that he had been
an employee of Compañia Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO, National
Company of Popular Subsistence). This former state-owned enterprise served to provide
peasants with farming supplies and credits and was dissolved in Mexico’s administrative
reform that privatized or liquidated many governmental agencies. This officer also
suggested that his colleagues of CONASUPO had gone through similar experiences,
although I missed the opportunity to confirm with him that they were rehired by
CESAVESIN or other CESAVEs. With its foundation in Mexico’s reform adapting the
nation to a global economy, CESAVESIN could be seen as a child of the age of
neoliberal political economy. Although CESAVESIN hired staff members with no
previous experience in a governmental agency as well, the presence of former
governmental employees engaged in regulatory activities might be taken as another sign
of its characteristics as the government’s proxy.
In fact, the recognition of CESAVESIN as a governmental agency was frankly,
yet sarcastically, reflected in a remark of a mango grower in southern Sinaloa:
“CESAVESIN is an organization of the government. If there is no fly, there is no negocio
[business] for them . . . . A governmental organization says what it wants. They charge
what they want [i.e., campaign fee].” This comment implied not only CESAVESIN’s
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functioning as a government agency, but also his perception that the organization had
become a self-sustaining “negocio,” which I translated as “business.” Indeed, the
recognition that CESAVESIN was engaged in a negocio was often heard among mango
growers I interviewed. At least four of the interviewed growers, who were leaders of
organizations of farmers in the region, explicitly used the term negocio to describe
CESAVESIN’s activities. For instance, a leader of a peasant group commented:
I think, they [CESAVESIN] release [sterile flies] to the extent that the fly should
still appear . . . drawing more money out. [Because] if the fly is gone, the negocio
is gone . . . . We already think that way. Why can’t they eradicate it? We now
think that that [CESAVESIN] is negocio.
This sarcastic remark reflected frustrations widespread among mango growers of
the region with CESAVESIN and the progress of its campaign against fruit flies. I could
identify a couple of interrelated causes of the frustrations, reflected in these farmers’
comments. First, though not shared by all the interviewed mango growers, there was a
sense of distrust in governmental organizations and works in general. As I will discuss in
more detail later (Chapter 10), until recently the Mexican political system had long been
ruled virtually by a single party, Partido Revolucionario Institutioinal (PRI; Institutional
Revolutionary Party). While the populist PRI ruling would deliver relatively generous
social programs for the poor, the number of governmental agencies and state-owned
companies and their expenditures had grown to the extent that led the nation to grave
fiscal crises. Those who were critical of these monopolized, inefficient, and
bureaucratized state enterprises might sense the same frustration with the operation of
CESAVESIN as the government’s proxy.
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The second reason for the growers’ frustration was that the progress in eradication
of fruit flies in southern Sinaloa seemed stagnant or bogged down after the northern and
central regions of the state were made free of the pest and the south was declared to be a
low prevalence area. The above peasant leader condemned CESAVESIN’s reiterated
preaching that the pest would be eliminated soon, although in fact many years had passed
with no—to his eyes—progress. He likened their situation to “being stuck in a sink” and
“never able to leave from there.”
The third reason, which was closely related to the situation as “in a sink,” was that
despite the sluggish progress in eradication, the fee for the campaign had continuously
risen. As noted earlier, growers were committed financially to the campaign. They had to
pay seventy pesos (approximately six dollars) per ton of harvested mangos to participate
in the campaign. In the year of my fieldwork (2009), CESAVESIN in the southern area
decided to raise the fee. Despite CESAVESIN’s effort to save operational costs (see
Chapter 7), expenses for field operations had constantly risen not least because of the
growing mango production in the area. The rise of the campaign fee escalated the
frustration of the participating growers, especially those small-scale peasant farmers. A
frustrated leader of a peasant group denounced the way CESAVESIN was using funding
resources: “Many growers, we, see CESAEVSIN, organization, you know, in the pickup
truck of the year, good salaries, many employees and secretaries, much extravagance of
resources, but . . . ask for more [money]. We also wonder . . . ‘where is our money gone?’”
And, his condemnation of CESAVESIN’s pickup truck ironically recalls the message on
the vehicle (Figure 8-3): “Unit acquired with resources of growers.”

242

More importantly, however, the frustration was exacerbated by stagnant prices of
mangos in the market. According to the interviewed mango growers and the
CESAVESIN officials, the falling price of the mango market was recognized as the
toughest challenge faced by them. According to a grower, when many farmers of the
region began introducing mango as a promising export-oriented crop in the 1980s, its
prices were about three pesos per kilogram, whereas currently prices were usually around
1.5 pesos, or sometimes even less than one peso, per kilo. As the number of farmers
planting mangos increased, the supply (i.e., production) was getting saturated. Even
worse, Sinaloa is the last to ship the fruit among the major mango producing states in
Mexico, which would further depress prices. When growers of Chiapas, the most
southern state, and followed by Oaxaca and Guerrero, begin harvesting fruits in January
through February, prices would be three pesos or so. As the harvest proceeds toward
northern states, including Michoacán, Colima, Jalisco, and Nayarit (right south of
Sinaloa), prices would keep falling, and when Sinaloa’s turn came in May or June, the
price would hit the bottom. The stagnantly depressed price of mangos was increasing the
sense of burden of the campaign fee for mango growers of Sinaloa. In the meantime,
CESAVESIN was neither supposed to nor capable of directly manipulating prices of
mangos, which is under the magical market mechanism. Under the swelling expenses for
the campaign and fee payments supporting it, no difficulty was needed to imagine the
desperation, frustration, or even rage, which led one of the interviewed growers to
demand an alternative to the operation by CESAVESIN: “I think that everyone should be
able to decide a private company that would do the job [of CESAVESIN]. Everyone
should be able to choose freely a company which is more convenient.”
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8.2

Entry of New Players into PS Regulations

8.2.1 PS professionals, third-party and private entities
To this grower’s eye, government agencies, including CESAVESIN as a proxy,
seemed to attempt to monopolize the negocio, prohibiting entries by other private
companies. However, the truth might be vice-versa. As noted, CESAVESIN itself had a
façade as a private non-governmental organization. Moreover, the real federal
government also was not only stressing the responsibility of individual farmers, but also
promoting new types of entities to enter some parts of the PS regulatory network, such as
Profesionales Fitosanitarios (PFs, Phytosanitary Professionals) and Terceros
Especialistas Fitosanitarios (TEFs, Third-party phytosanitary specialists) both of which
were accredited as authorized persons by the Secretary.
In PS regulations in Mexico, PFs serve as collaborators of the Secretary of
Agriculture in the application of PS measures (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad
Agropecuaria 1999; SAGARPA-DGSV 2008a). In a sense, PFs work to some extent as
“free agents.”29 In the case of PFs contracted with CESAVESIN, for six months of the
year (which constitute the mango harvest season), they were temporarily paid with the
growers’ campaign fees to dedicate time to check and verify commercial orchards; and
for the rest of the year, CESAVESIN hired them with the federal government’s budget to
work for control programs in non-commercial-farming areas, including urban residential
areas and forests. Employing “free-agent” PFs allowed CESAVESIN to allocate their

29

As of 2011, 191 PFs were registered in the country according to SAGARPASENASICA’s directory. While most of them belong to CESAVE or JLSV, some PFs
work independently.
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limited human and financial resources somewhat flexibly, depending on the source of
funding, types of tasks, and seasonal variations in tasks.
Meanwhile, TEFs are external independent organizations or individual persons
authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture as its collaborators especially in conducting
evaluation of conformity with PS regulations (SAGARPA-DGSV 2008a). In essence,
they are officially entitled to verify whether products or their production procedures meet
certain PS standards set by the government. As of 2008, 491 individual TEFs (out of
which 27 were in Sinaloa) were authorized to work in various PS regulatory activities,30
and four corporate TEFs were authorized in verification and certification of regulated
products such as mango (SAGARPA-DGSV 2008a).31 In the case of the mango export
program, they were working for inspection of harvested fruits in packinghouses and
certification of registered orchards.
In LFSV, namely, the Federal Law of Plant Health, moreover, the Secretary of
Agriculture can approve TEF as Organismos de Certificación (ODC, Organization of
Certification) and Unidad de Verificación (UDV, Unit of Verification). ODC and UDV
are decreed by Ley Federal sobre Metrología y Normalización (LFMN, Federal Law
about Metrology and Normalization) to be private bodies accredited as capable to certify
or verify conformity of products or procedures with regulations or standards. The PS
authority of the Ministry of Agriculture of Mexico intended that all PS-related
30

TEF’s activities were not only in the mango export program but also in venues of other
types of regulations and other commodities.
31

These corporate bodies were registered as Sociedad Civil (Civic Society) or Asociación
Civil (Civic Association), which are not established primarily for commercial, profitmaking purposes.
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certifications of products destined to domestic markets be handled exclusively by ODC
and UD in the future (SAGARPA-DGSV 2008a; 2008b).
8.2.2 Privatization and decentralization in new legal frameworks of PS
regulations
The entry of these new players in the PS regulations network was situated in the
political-economic reform of Mexico during the 1990s to adapt to a global market
economy. LFMN was enacted in 1992 with the objective to establish the fundamental
rules concerning metrology, normalization (standardization), certification, accreditation,
and verification systems in the nation toward “harmonization” with trade regulations
under GATT (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 2000; Urrea-Salazar 2004).
Under this law, all rulings, including PS regulations, affecting trade should be stipulated
as Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOM; Mexican Official Rules), which are based on
science to avoid unfair trade restrictions (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria
1999).
Along with LFMN, LFSV constituted the essential components of the
administrative reforms in the 1990s and afterward to adapt Mexico’s national economy to
a global free-trade regime (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 2000; UrreaSalazar 2004). The 1994 LFSV represented significant progress in streamlining and
deregulating the legal backbone of PS regulations (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad
Agropecuaria 2000). The national PS authority responsible for this law, Dirección
General de Sanidad Vegetal (DGSV, General Office of Plant Health) of SAGARPA,
explained the law’s intention (Comisión Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria 2000):

246

a profound reorientation of the state involvement in assisting and providing
services to the community, in a framework of shared responsibilities, based on the
concentration of mutual commitments, as well as in the decentralization and
deconcentration to transfer the functions and resources to the places where the
production takes place, without neglecting the state responsibility in the PS matter.
(16)
Accordingly, these new legal bases promoted decentralization and privatization of PS
regulatory services; roles of third-party and non-governmental bodies were significantly
increasing in the official PS regulatory scheme in Mexico. Thus, the introduction of the
concepts of TEF, ODC, and UDV to PS regulations should be comprehended as a process
of delegation and privatization of state authorities in the larger background of Mexico’s
political-economic restructuring to adapt to a global market economy.
The use of these private or third-party entities in the network of PS regulations
could be justified with various rationales. According to a federal government official, one
of the major administrative challenges for the federal PS authorities in the fruit fly control
program was the shortage of personnel to cover all production areas, which resulted in
the need to resort to private organizations. The same officer explained that third-party
entities were introduced to PS regulatory activities specifically in the inspection of
packinghouses with HWT and the certification of orchards to make the processes more
efficient.
In addition, the rigor and transparency with which third-party organizations
supposedly can work for regulatory activities would reinforce the justification of their
involvement. According to the coordinator of the mango PS certification program of a
third-party organization, a substantial increase in interceptions by the U.S. border
inspection of fruit fly larvae in Mexican mangos in 2000 triggered the introduction of
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third-parties. As mentioned above, certainly the demand for private entities was primarily
because of the dearth of government human resources. However, that was not the sole
reason. Third-parties were expected to execute more rigorous inspection services. The
coordinator emphasized, as the certifier’s raison-d’être, its credibility supported by
stringent implementations of regulations and standards. Even if one of his inspectors
knew a farmer’s hard work to grow mangos, the coordinator stressed, he or she would
never pass the products if a single larva was detected. Since the Work Plan of the
Mexican mango export program, elaborated by the Mexican and U.S. PS authorities,
details the inspection procedures of shipped mangos, there is no chance of cheating or
corruption. An inspector of the same certification body whom I met in a packinghouse in
Sinaloa told a similar story, and added that, because of the rigorous demands the staff of
the packinghouse had to meet, almost no one there liked him.
As with CESAVESIN’s employment of PFs, the use of third-party entities in PS
regulations seemed to postulate that it would make more flexible and optimal allocation
of human resources possible. The certification organization I interviewed dispatches its
45 inspectors (all of which are TEFs) to mango packers from Chiapas to Sinaloa during
the mango season. When less or no mangos are harvested, the inspectors work for other
regulated crops such as avocados for export to the United States and potatoes. The
government, operating under rigid budgetary and administrative constraints, would find it
difficult to allocate its personnel for inspection of different crops of which productions,
and thus demand for the inspection job, can vary among years. Of course, the personal
lives of third-party inspectors working in different places become trying. The inspector I
met in May in Sinaloa told me that he had taken no days off since January when he began
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working to inspect mangos in Chiapas. He had not seen his wife—he alluded that they
had recently gotten married—until the previous week when she visited him only for a
short time. Despite such grim stories, the PS regulation network engaging outside actors
seemed to be working quite effectively and efficiently on the surface.
8.3

Complications of Neoliberal Marketization Reform
Mexico’s neoliberal reform, which had resulted in apparently successful PS

regulatory operations by private bodies, had also engendered some complications. As the
reform had affected every aspect of administrations of Mexico, CESAVESIN was faced
with an unusual and difficult challenge, which came from outside of the farm sector.
As explained earlier, the northern five municipalities were already free of fruit fly pests.
On the highway running through the state, near the border of this PFA there was a PS
inspection point (in the Mexican PS terminology, Punto de Verificación Interna,
abbreviated as PVI, or in English, Internal Verification Point). All traffic entering the
PFA passing through this point is subject to inspection by CESAEVSIN officers, and a
regulated product must be abandoned, as shown earlier in this chapter. It is this inspection
activity that protects the PFA from introduction of the problematic pests coming with
traffic from other still “contaminated” areas. Furthermore, when I was conducting
fieldwork, CESAVESIN was faced with an outbreak of fruit flies in the central region,
which was recognized as pest-free by the Mexican government and was waiting for
recognition by the United States. A senior CESAVESIN officer explained that
complication in fact had been somewhat anticipated because, unlike the northern PFA,
the central PFA had no PVIs at the border with the southern low prevalence area where
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fruit flies were still detected. In the interview, he banged on his desk, perhaps expressing
his frustrations, and insisted that CESAVESIN had to establish new inspection points.
At the time, CESAVESIN was negotiating with Secretaría de Comunicaciones y
Transportes (SCT, Ministry of Communications and Transportations) to obtain
permission to install two new PVIs. However, a couple of factors complicated the process.
First, there were two major highways, including one toll road and one free (no-toll) road,
passing through the central PFA; in contrast, only one highway passes in the northern
PFA as the two roads from the south converge at the border at which the PVI Las Brisas
was constructed (Figure 8-7). CESAVESIN had to convince SCT that two PVIs were
necessary at the southern border of the central PFA to protect it. SCT would not be very
happy to install two PVIs on the highways, because of its own policies to ensure high
quality highway transportation, that is, convenience, comfort, security (safety), and time,
which could be compromised by CESAVESIN’s mandatory inspections.
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Figure 8-7 Pest prevalence status, locations of major highways and PVI in Sinaloa
Elaboration by author with a map image created by INEGI
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Second, more importantly, part of the toll road between Culiacán, the state capital,
and Mazatlán, the largest city in southern Sinaloa, was constructed with private
investment funds. In Mexico, private investors can participate in bidding for investing in
construction of certain sections of highways. This marketization of highway projects with
private investments started in 1985 by a government facing fiscal shortage and unable to
continue construction of roads on its own (Aguilar Quintero 2004).32 Under this scheme,
the government concedes to the bid-winning investor the right to finance construction and
maintenance of a toll road section, and to receive returns from toll money collected from
drivers. The involvement of private parties looking for financial returns arguably added
complications to CESAVESIN’s negotiations for the new PVIs, since SCT was under
more pressure to assure the quality of highways, such as time and convenience, in order
to retain drivers who as loyal customers were paying tolls, which were the basis for
financial returns for investors. Although two PVIs have been successfully constructed on
the two highways between Mazatlán and Culiacán by September 2011, this example
indicated that as Mexico’s neoliberal reform affected many aspects of lives of the nation,
its consequences brought the PS regulatory network an unexpected “side effect” as it
were.
8.4

Summary and Discussion
The previous three chapters (Chapter 6, 7, and 8) were intended to address the

first research question: How does the PS regulation network operate to draw distinctions
32

The Mexican government had a long history of engaging private constructers in
highway construction and maintenance. What was remarkable about the 1985 reform was
that it enabled full-fledged participation of private investments for return from collected
toll.
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between pest/non-pest, thereby enabling the export of Mexican mangos to the United
States? Who and what devices, practices, or knowledge are applied in the development
and enactment of PS regulations? Taken together, from the findings of the three chapters,
important insights can be elicited to better understand transforming agri-food regulatory
governance. Firstly, the network of PS regulations to allow the Mexican mango export
has been becoming more complex and spatially and institutionally diffusive. When the
Mexican mango export was possible solely with post-harvest treatment measures, such as
EDB fumigation and heat treatments, the network of PS regulations centered mostly on
the very process of the treatment. Although there were regulations applied to the outside
of the treatment facility, such as orchard registration and shipping procedures, the scope
of the regulations centered primarily on the very process to make the product free of the
pest. Accordingly, a dead fruit fly larva intercepted in a mango detected by the U.S.
border inspection was not problematic even if it indicated that the orchard or the area of
origin might be infested (note however, the newly approved irradiation treatment has
changed this, too). In the “post-harvest-centered” scheme since 1945, until recently when
third-party bodies took responsibility for inspecting harvested mango fruits in
packinghouses, relatively few types of actors, such as Mexican and U.S. PS authorities
and the packers and exporters association (EMEX) were engaged.
However, as the technical scheme of PS regulations shifted toward the “area-wide”
approach, more specifically, the Campaign against fruit flies, consisting of biological
control, sterile fly technique, establishment of quarantine cordones and PFAs, and
monitoring orchards and harvesting and shipping processes, the whole PS regulatory
network expands itself and creates more points of regulation. In addition, newer post253

harvest measures also have become diversified. Now, besides the conventional heat
treatments (i.e., VHT, HWT, and FHAT), irradiation can also be applied to mango fruits
and other fruits (e.g., guava). With insights from systems theory and ANT, it can be
argued that the whole regulatory network has become increasingly complex, and
materially heterogeneous, including (sub-)components, and become more diffusive in
that control points spread spatially and institutionally. These newer PS measures tend to
be increasingly reliant on non-human inscription devices and increasingly less reliant on
human direct perceptions. Engaged in the regulatory network are, for instance, traps, GPS,
irradiation dosimetry devices, and heat sensors and loggers (already used in HWT). Also,
although conventional human-sensory inscription devices, such as eye, nose, ears, and
hands, might still play significant roles, it seems the importance of monitoring,
documentation, and recordkeeping activities throughout the regulatory network has risen
to an unprecedented degree to secure traceability by compensating human direct
perceptions. In the diffusive regulatory network, the scope that each control point
regulates may be relatively limited. Just as Law and Mol (2008) highlighted in
conceptualizing material politics, the PS regulation network to draw distinctions between
pest and non-pest are enacted and sustained through very mundane, day-to-day practices;
and what enables the entire regulatory network to work is the incessant monitoring by
nested monitoring (i.e., monitoring of monitoring). The next chapter (Chapter 9) will
highlight how this nested monitoring as well as mundane practices beyond farming areas
engendered normative behaviors and moral and professional values, which served to
discipline humans, and in some cases non-humans, to act in accordance with global PS
regulations.
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Secondly, in line with the recent literature in agri-food studies, the diffusive
regulatory network involves not only the state national government but also new types of
organizations with the nature of a hybrid composed of private and state authority,
including CESAVESIN and private or third-party entities (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch
2005; Higgins and Lawrence 2005a). As this chapter has just explored, the roles of
CESAVESIN as an organization of growers and other private, third-party organizations
has risen in enacting the regulations to make possible the export of Mexican mangos to
the United States. Although Mexico has a long history of farmers’ organizational
involvement in official pest control since the 1920s, it was relatively recently, that is, in
the early 1990s, that CESAVESIN as a farmers’ organization fully started to mobilize
growers in the campaign against fruit flies. With its multifaceted or hybrid characteristics,
CESAVESIN has been aptly managing the pest control program operations in the middle
of Mexico’s neoliberal reform where discourses pushing privatization, decentralization,
civic participation, or self-responsibility have prevailed. On one hand, as an organization
of growers (i.e. as a private entity), CESAVESIN has been successful in mobilizing
mango growers in the region. Although there were dissatisfaction and discontent with its
performance among growers, CESAVESIN’s achievements seem to be buttressed by and
resonating with the prevailing neoliberal discourse that stresses self-help, selfresponsibility, and participation. On the other hand, with its façade as a governmental
proxy and staff members who had experience and skills in regulatory operations, this
organization has continued exercising substantial de facto authority and strict regulations
to protect the PFA and promote eradication of the pest.
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Although CESAVESIN has played vital roles in the regulation, other new entities
have become important in the PS regulation network. Engaging new actors such as PF
and TEF (and in the future, more active involvement of ODC and UDV) has enabled
more flexible and optimum allocations of budgetary and human resources as per work
needs. Also, these entities have been supposed to offer more rigorous and transparent
operations of regulations. Discourses to promote downsizing of governmental agencies
supported the introduction of these new entities into the PS regulation. The emergence of
CESAVESIN and these new entities indicate—regardless of however successful it has
been—Mexico’s struggles to adapt to the global, open-market economy since the 1980s.
Thirdly, as the PS regulatory network has spatially and institutionally extended, it
is very likely to encounter other institutions or social systems, just as demonstrated by the
above case of highway administration. With insights from systems theory and ANT, it
can be argued that different networks or systems should have distinctive interests and/or
operational programs. Extension of a network (e.g., PS regulations against fruit fly pests)
may be faced with complications or obstacles resulting from different interests and
programs of another network. A distinctive system (e.g., highway administration) can
respond to the other system (e.g., PS regulations) either if the former does successfully
incorporate (or translate, in ANT terminology) the interest of the latter, or if its program
is not disturbed by the latter. In the case I have demonstrated, SCT would agree to
construct the new inspection points only if it is convinced that its criteria, such as
convenience, comfort, security, and time, are not compromised.
In some cases, moreover, a system might not react to outside forces or
organizations at all, and thus two different systems or networks may have no chances for
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negotiation. The PS regulation network was not designed to control mango prices in
markets but to kill or eliminate fruit fly pests. Whereas falling prices of mangos was
lamented, the growers and CESAVESIN’s senior officers did not consider that PS
regulations as such would be able to intervene directly upon the mango market. On the
other hand, the market, as far as it is believed to operate based on the balance between
supply and demand, does not seem to be responding to PS regulations. Indeed, the very
source of the frustrations spreading among the growers was the fall of mango prices in
the market, which beyond CESAVESIN’s control. Indeed, high prices of mangos were—
whether tacitly or explicitly—underlying the justification for encouraging growers to
participate in the costly campaign against fruit flies. Better prices of the commodity were
supposed to compensate the investment by mango growers. The last finding chapter
(Chapter 10) will examine in detail whether or how this expectation will be fulfilled.
Finally, it seems to me ironic that while more and more stringent regulations have
been applied to enable the export of mangos, the neoliberal political-economic reform has
left prices of the products out of the regulations. Neoliberalism has been the subject of
heated debates in the social sciences, which have exposed its contradictory nature
(Harvey 2005). The irony between the tightened regulatory governance and the loosened
market can be comprehended as an indication of such contradictory nature. This ironic
consequence also resonates with another dimension of the irony of neoliberalism, that is,
the call for self-help, self-responsibility, and participation. Such discourses make it very
“natural” to assume that every farmer is responsible for his/her own farms. If my soil and
fertilization management was poor and my mango trees gave a poor harvest, I would be
responsible for my poor harvest. The consequence is mine. However, if my pest
257

management was poor and let fruit flies thrive in my field, the consequences would affect
other people as well. Pests in my orchards would expose my neighbor orchards to
dangers of contamination by flies from my field, and indeed if one of them was
contaminated, its fruits could not be shipped. Therefore, the call for self-responsibility,
attributing consequences to individuals, in fact tacitly demands a collective responsibility.
In essence, every individual grower of a global commodity under stringent regulations,
such as the mango, is collectively responsible for not only his/her farm but also the farms
of other growers. The next chapter will highlight how this hidden call for collective
responsibility, tacitly underlying the discourse of self-responsibility, engenders a sense of
morality among growers.
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Chapter 9
Emerging Norms and Smoldering Conflicts
The previous three chapters have delineated the actual operations of the PS
regulation network to enable the export of mango fruits (and potentially other host fruits).
In essence, what PS regulations accomplished was to draw the boundary between
pest/non-pest as to mango fruits, mango groves, floors in a packinghouse, or large
geographic areas, by engaging diverse agents, including humans and non-humans. The
regulatory system also established itself as a social network with its growing internal
complexity involving more and more components to secure control over every aspect of
the process to make mangos pest-free. This regulatory network consisted of mechanisms
for monitoring and re-monitoring, which functioned to discipline actors to conform to the
regulation. Once a boundary was established, it kept enacting itself through controlling
and disciplining acts of human and non-human. The regulatory network extended
spatially and institutionally its reach from the site of mango production (i.e., groves) and
processing (i.e., packinghouses) to things, geographic areas, and people that were not
directly involved in the production of the host fruits.
This chapter will turn attention to analyses of, first, how associated values,
normative expectations, and moral senses, as well as disorder and conflict as attendant
corollaries, emerged in the process through which the PS regulation network extended its
reach. The extending network was not merely making distinctions between pest/non-pest.
As presented earlier, the regulations entail a nested-network of monitoring, which serves
to self-discipline actors. Such self-disciplining mechanisms engender values, norms, or
moral commands that could guide or even bind acts of humans and non-humans. Yet,
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even if PS regulations successfully established certain guiding principles, they would by
no means guarantee that all actors act in the way the regulation commands. Rather, they
could be discontent and disobey the rulings, or even conflict with those who are deemed
to be making or enforcing the regulation. One may want to call a situation where
discontent, disobedience, and conflict prevails, “disorder,” in contrast to the orderings
which the regulation as material politics was designed to establish and maintain.
However, in my view, some of the essential concepts, such as values, norms, and moral
expectations, as well as (social) order, disorder, and conflict, need careful consideration
to be able to guide my analyses of socio-material orderings in contrast with disorder. In
what follows, therefore, I will provide clarifications of these key concepts, followed by
analyses of empirical cases guided by them.
9.1

Emerging norms

9.1.1 Interrelation of values, norms, and morals emerging from regulations
Regulations or standards endorsed by scientific knowledge have associated values,
normative expectations, and moral implications, although the scientific community may
pretend otherwise. Scholars of STS have been concerned with how science serves to
make and legitimate boundaries as classifications of things and people, and about the
social implications of classifications. As exemplified by such categories as diseases and
certain race/ethnicity groups, people categorized in a particular way can be subject to
exclusion from society (Bowker and Star 1999). In a similar vein, scholars in the
sociology of agriculture inspired by STS insights have revealed that commodity standards
as a means of classification, legitimated by science and technology, can not only
standardize products to facilitate market circulation of the products, but also classify
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people engaged in production into such categories as “good famer” and “bad distributor”
(Busch 2000; Tanaka and Busch 2003). While products that meet standards and
individuals producing them are allowed to sell in the marketplace, those that fail to meet
the standards are likely to be excluded and thereby lose opportunities to gain from the
market. Thus, for STS scholars, the control through allegedly neutral scientific
knowledge unquestionably raises sociologically pertinent consequences such as
associated values, norms, and morals.
To clarify analysis, however, I posit distinctions between values, norms, and
morals, which constitute three interrelated layers: first, values, which communicates
asymmetrical importance resulting from preciousness of things, acts, or humans; second,
norms, which communicates commanding acts pursuing a (positive) value; and third,
morals, which communicates esteem and disrespect to the whole personality of a human.
The PS regulations in the present study served to control and/or discipline acts of growers,
packers, and transporters or those involved in the production and/or export of mangos or
other host fruits. In doing so, the regulations not only draw lines between pest/non-pest,
but also generate value-laden distinctions between good (or, right, well) and bad (or,
wrong, poorly): if a grower does manage to control pests well, he/she is deemed a good
farmer. Values as corollaries of the regulations can further generate normative
expectations, which call for acts or thoughts in line with the “positive” side of the values
(good, right, or well): a farmer should complete right pest control practices. Furthermore,
the call for conforming to the positive values can, but not necessarily, result in a moral
judgment regarding a person: a grower who enacts right practices regarding pest control
is a good farmer, hence also a (morally) good person.
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Notably the first (i.e., values) and the second (i.e., normative expectations) can
apply to not only humans but also non-humans (e.g., “a McPhail trap is poor in capturing
wild fly populations correctly” and “a sterile insect should be capable of mating a wild
fly”). On the other hand, the third layer, the moral, seems to apply only to persons; and
more importantly, it tends to pertain to the esteem of the whole personality, rather than
specific aspects of a person (Kneer and Nassehi 1995). In other words, when we think
that a farmer is not simply a good farmer but morally good as well, it is likely that the
judgment implies that he or she has a good reputation in other, if not all, aspects of the
person. The above considerations will guide the following analysis of values, norms, and
moral judgments emerging from PS regulations.
9.1.2 Growers’ morality
As noted above, PS regulations not only stipulate explicit standards of practices to
carry out in an orchard, but also establish implicit standards on values of acts and the
personality of a grower. In field expeditions with personnel of the PS authorities (i.e.,
CESAVESIN and USDA-APHIS), oftentimes I heard their comments or evaluations on
conditions of mango groves we visited. In an orchard in the northern PFA, where ripe but
unharvested fruits scattered on the ground, an APHIS official told me that “this would be
really problematic if this was in the southern ALPP like Escuinapa” because growers in
southern Sinaloa would have to collect and dispose of unharvested fruits. Besides, in the
field trip for mechanical-cultural control, which I described in Chapter 8, a CESAEVSIN
technician grumbled about conditions of the orchard under poor management practices.
For example, to allude to the lack of adequate orchard management, the technician
explained about “witch’s broom” (a plant disease that causes abnormally dense shoots
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and eventually weakens the infested plant) being rampant in the orchard. Also poor
maintenance allowed shoots of the criollo rootstock to dominate branches of the Kent, the
grafted commercial variety. Although the disease and the overriding rootstock as such did
not necessarily indicate the lack of the required fruit fly control, it evidently demonstrated
lower-than-average quality of overall farming practices. Whether problematic or poor
orchard management, the comments implied value judgments regarding the practices of
the grove owners or even the personalities of the grove owners. And, the value standards
could lead to the emergence of normative senses that called for responsibilities of
growers not only at the individual but also at the collective level.
In the previous chapter, I discussed that while there was a call for individual
responsibility at an individual orchard, there was an underlying exigency for collectively
bound responsibilities. As per the provisions of the NOMs for the Campaign, every
mango grower to export the fruit had to practice required measures individually on
her/his grove, including burying fruits in the ground, eliminating weeds to prevent fruit
flies from hiding there, and cleaning up trees by pruning. However, as fruit fly pests are
highly mobile, a grove under inadequate pest control provides them with refuge and
becomes an infestation spot from which insects contaminate other groves, as made clear
in an interview with a leader of a JLSV in state other than Sinaloa:
I personally register my grove for export to obtain better prices. To carry out
control of the fruit fly, however, I am surrounded by burros (thickhead) growers
who do not do campaign [i.e., control practices], who have no interest, who
[nonetheless] sell their fruits in any ways. They don’t do campaign but affect me
enormously. I can’t control the fly in my own grove because I am surrounded by
burros . . . . And the same happens to all of us who have registered for the export
program. . . .
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Thus, the responsibility surpasses the individual matter but becomes a collectively
binding norm. Every individual farmer is responsible for his/her grove to collectively
prevent flies from spreading from to other groves. Yet, according to the same leader, this
collective norm was not underpinned as a mandatory practice by any legal statute; or
more accurately, although there was a NOM that stipulated rules to prevent infestation
spots from occurring, they were not effective nor applied sufficiently to impose
individual growers to adopt specific practices.33 In this specific context, the state
authority seemed very shy about intervening in individual practices for pest control,
perhaps to safeguard the belief in the individual freedom at his/her tract under liberalist
(including neoliberal) premises.
Accordingly, officials of the PS authority including the auxiliary body opted to
resort to normative senses that could collectively bind individual acts. Another officer of
the same JLSV explained:
SAGARPA told us, ‘You have to make the growers have consciousness and
conscience, and convince them.’ SAGARPA has the authority to register the
packers for national markets as well as for export because it issues the certificate
for transport of fruits. I make the grower conscious because there is no law to
obligate [rules].
The phrase “made the growers have consciousness and conscience” was my
translation of “concientizar al productor.” Unlike English, Spanish makes no distinction
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NOM-081-FITO-2001, Manejo y eliminación de focos de infestación de plagas,
mediante el establecimiento o reordenamiento de fechas de siembra, cosecha y
destrucción de residuos (Management and elimination of spots of pest infestation through
the establishment and rearrangement of dates, harvest, and destruction of residues), is the
decree that has statutes commanding actions for prevention of infestation spots. This
NOM was decreed independently of NOM-023-1994 and NOM-075-1997, which
primarily govern the Campaign.
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between consciousness and conscience in the term conciencia. Likewise, the verb
cocientizar means to make someone conscious and conscientious and hence already has a
normative connotation. Moreover, the fact that this officer’s anecdote resonated with the
senior officer of CESAVESIN, who struggled to raise consciousness (and conscience)
among the local growers, indicated that, to solve the paradoxical calls for the individual
responsibility and the simultaneous collective responsibility, the PS authorities took
recourse to raising normative senses among growers.
The call for consciousness and conscience, however, and of course, had not
resolved the problem of growers’ non-compliance to the rules. Then, such growers being
unwilling to abide by the regulation became subject to moral judgments, especially
condemnation by other growers who observed the rules. In the interview quoted above,
the leader of JLSV explicitly called his fellow growers who did not perform the required
practices “burros (thickhead).”34 The word burro was not simply meant to criticize some
attributes of a person, but rather directed to his/her inclusive personality. In other words,
such a morally condemned person would be deemed prone to commit other wrongdoings.
The above JLSV officers indeed alluded that those who were not practicing the required
measures were engaged in other delinquencies, such as cheating of certificates to
smuggle fruit through intermediaries especially to sell to national markets, which
required less rigorous controls. It was such loose, or even nearly unlawful, marketing
channels that fed a vicious circle: growers could sell fruits to buyers, even if their prices
were low because of poor management; buyers would buy fruits at lower costs even if
34

In addition to “thickhead,” burro means donkey, which perhaps provoked the former
connotation.
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fruits might have blemishes because of poor management. For those who were in this
cycle, the required PS measures against fruit flies would be of the least importance. The
above JLSV officer expressed quite explicitly his frustration with such a situation, which
he called “disorden (disorder).”
Meanwhile, understanding moral evaluations as attribution of esteem or disesteem
to the whole personality, I argue that a moral condemnation toward a whole personality
could conceal, behind the condemnation, varying circumstances, including local-level
political, financial, or cultural backdrops, in which each grower’s livelihood was
enmeshed, thereby, especially when there was a plausible reason for non-compliance,
making it more difficult to solve these problems. As I will discuss in the next chapter,
while the rationale for growers to participate in the Campaign (which requires expenses)
had resided in the prospect that prices of mangos would remain high, scrutiny would be
needed as to how farmers with varying financial and technical resources would perceive
such an optimistic prospect. If this prospect does not appear to be the case to a grower, he
or she would be plausibly unwilling to make a commitment to the Campaign.
Nonetheless, if a moral condemnation is directed to such a grower, it is likely to ascribe
the non-compliance to his/her personality while obscuring the plausible reason for noncompliance.
My point to conclude the present section is that recourse to morality to ensure or
encourage growers to participate in the PS program be taken prudently. On one hand, the
call for moral obligation serves to fulfill the lack of secure legal endorsement (with
sanction, for instance), which would urge growers to engage in necessary pest control
practices. In essence, it is a functional equivalent for the legal binding force. On the other
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hand, by ascribing problems to the whole personality, rather than plausible reasons
behind non-compliance, a moral call can make it difficult to solve the problem.
9.1.3 Emerging normative senses outside of mango production: “I wish
everyone were like that.”
As reiterated, the PS regulation network enabling mango export was extending its
reach out of the mango export industry. Once a boundary was established and maintained
through mundane practices, it became capable of controlling human and non-human acts
legitimately and more securely. PVIs installed throughout the country monitor traffic of
plant products. At the PVI on the border of the PFA in Sinaloa, everyone and all cargo
passing there had to be inspected. Fruits subject to the regulation, whether of commercial
cargo or of a bus passenger, if undocumented, or even some garden trees under the
control, would be spotted, confiscated, inspected, and destroyed. In this section, I will
illuminate how norms emerged among those who were not involved in mango production
through these extending regulatory activities.
As demonstrated in Chapter 7, CESAVESIN technicians worked in not only sites
of production of mangos and other host fruits, but also in places that are not directly
involved in production or export of the fruits. Their expeditions for the Campaign
operation included spraying of bait-insecticide mixture and elimination of noncommercial host fruits. The extended regulatory actions would logically entail
interactions with people who were not engaged in farming, let alone, production and/or
export of mangos. Such interactions, revolving around PS regulations, could provoke
senses of judgment as to if people, things, or their acts were in accordance with rightness
or wrongness provoked by the regulations. And a right or wrong distinction might further
267

be underpinned even with a legal basis. For example, carrying host fruits with no
certificate into a PFA could be illegal hence subject to sanctions. In the cases of
mechanical-cultural and chemical control in urban areas, a sense of rightness or
wrongness about an act would not immediately corroborate with the legal/illegal
distinction. This is because the NOMs that command the Campaign did not explicitly
warrant sanctions even if non-farming citizens do not let CESAVESIN spray or cut host
trees in their backyards. Even if a household owner refuses to cut down a host plant tree,
CESAVESIN could not punish or reproach him/her for the uncooperative attitude, and
instead it had to train its personnel to be polite in interactions with such non-farming
citizens to maximize voluntary cooperation. Still, in the fieldwork I witnessed scenes
where certain normative expectations were emerging as to how even non-farming people
were expected to act in accordance with the regulation.
In an expedition for spraying in a township, when a senior CESAVESIN
technician and I in the pickup cabin were waiting for another young technician to finish
cleaning up the equipment, a woman approached us and said that she had heard that
CESAVESIN would help to eliminate problematic plants. She had a couple of host trees
in her backyard, and wanted to eliminate them because they had grown too large to
handle. With no reason to refuse such an obliging offer, the technician discussed with her
to schedule a visit of a team of technicians to eliminate her trees. After she left the
vehicle, when the young technician completed his task behind the cabin, the senior
technician, pulling out the vehicle, said to me—or to no one—with a slight sigh, “Si todos
fueran asi” meaning, (I wish) “if everyone were like that” (cooperative).
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This anecdote bears striking significance as an example of the emergence of
normative expectations, which were not yet explicitly decreed as a legal statute or a
specific moral code, nonetheless involving actors in values in accordance with the global
regulations. The woman might just want to take advantage of the Campaign to eliminate
the annoying trees on her property and obviously did not have any obligation to
collaborate with the regulations or the mango sector. While one may think that where
there is a regulation it is natural to think that people should observe it or cooperate with it,
she did not have any reason to do so. Putting aside the question of whether such an
attitude is “natural,” what drew my attention was that I was witnessing a moment when a
normative expectation was emerging, creating social orderings at the local level, yet
conforming to the global regulations. That was a moment when the global began enacting
itself at the local. If the PS regulations network was to further extend its operations in
non-farming areas and therein apply more stringent control measures including legal
statutes,35 then stronger normative or even moral expectations might emerge. As
witnessed in the above case of the JLSV officers, a moral condemnation towards those
who do not observe rules is prone to be an attack on the personality, rather than specific
circumstances that cause the non-compliance, and hence tends to provoke otherwise
avoidable conflicts.

35

Many local governments of municipalities in Japan where Asian pears are grown have
ordinances that prohibit planting of juniper, a host for Gymnosporangium (a fungi),
which devastates pear fruits, within the municipal territories, whether in production sites
or backyards.
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9.2

Smoldering Conflicts
As demonstrated so far, while the PS regulation network was generating orderings

of humans and non-humans, it was also the case that behind the apparent orderings, as the
officers of JLSV lamented, “disorders” seemed to be prevailing among those who were
involved in the regulatory network. In this section, my analysis will center on disorders
surrounding PS regulations, and conflicts as its corollaries. As I posit that the PS
regulation network constitutes a field of (material) politics, and that politics is enacted by
actors competing for dominance in a field, it is realistic to expect “disorders,” including
discontent against, disobedience to, or conflicts with, the dominating PS regulations. In
the meantime, while the concepts of “order” (and its opposite, disorder) along with
“conflict” are frequently discussed themes in sociology, oftentimes I have had difficulty
grasping what they denote. In what follows, I will delve into these concepts, while
demonstrating empirical cases of disorderliness and conflicts I detected throughout the
fieldwork.
9.2.1 Order and conflicts
Before demonstrating my empirical observations from the fieldwork, first I will
provide theoretical considerations of disorderliness and conflicts. In sociology, order or
orderliness of society is often associated with solidarity based on consensus, conformity,
or obedience to norms or morality. Conflict theorists (e.g., Dahrendorf 1959) countered
such views that look to consensus as the basis of social orderliness. Then, in sociology,
the concepts of consensus-based order and conflict in society seem to be oppositely
juxtaposed (Nagaoka 2006). Indeed, more generally, disorder can be defined as (1) lack
of order, (2) breach of the peace or public order, and/or (3) abnormal state of body or
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mind (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary s.v. “Disorder”). These categories indicate the
layered interconnections between disorder (i.e., lack of order), conflict (i.e., breach of
peace), and disturbance to a “normal” status of human mind and body.
In the meantime, however, my study drawing on social systems perspective and
ANT (Castellani and Hafferty 2009; Law 1994; Luhmann 1995), which are indebted to
complexity theory, might provide a slightly different, though not incompatible,
perspective to understand order and conflict. According to these theoretical perspectives,
in which the order(ing) is understood in relation to the complexity, that is, selecting from
vast alternative possibilities, order is a status where particular patterns of selection are
more likely to occur than other possibilities; disorder then would be where particular
patterns of selection are less likely to be observed. This “order(ing)-as-selection”
perspective challenges the more commonly (yet implicitly) accepted, opposing
juxtaposition of order and conflict. The conflict as such is not an opposite of the order,
but rather a particular type of social order(ing), while order(ing) does not only mean
consensus nor conformity to norms or morals.
Rather, following Luhmann (1995), I define a conflict as mutual rejection of
claims by other parties. In essence, in a conflict situation, one acts to express “No” to a
previous act or communication. Being constituted as a chain of rejecting acts, therefore, a
conflict per se indicates orderliness in the sense that it is relatively stable, cohesive, and
predictable.36 However, I also should note that conflicts often occur with physical or

36

In a similar vein, “deviance” and “crime,” which are also oftentimes deemed as
antitheses to (social) order, can be deemed as a particular social order, that is,
continuously enacted acts against expected norms or morals.
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mental violence and disturbance. Perhaps that is a reason why the conflict concept is
oppositely juxtaposed with order. Still, I distinguish, from a conflict per se, physical and
social disorder such as destruction of economic property caused by a physically violent
conflict (e.g., a war), and deem them as (lamentable) corollaries of the conflict. Thus, to
avoid confusion of disorder with conflict, distinctions should be drawn between (1)
conditions that potentially provoke conflicts, (2) conflict as a coherent chain of acts
communicating rejection (Luhmann 1995), and (3) “negative” corollaries that a conflict
provokes, such as disturbance to other social networks and/or the human mind or body.
The PS regulations the present study examines were indeed rife with potentially
conflicting conditions. For example, as the principal scheme of PS regulations was
shifting from HWT to establishing PFA, some well-off mango growers and packers
might be more willing to adapt themselves to the new scheme, while others with less
capital might be unwilling. Then, it was anticipated that there would be conflicts or
discontents concerning PS regulations among the PS authority, growers, and packers. As
the economic prospect opened by PS regulations, and discontent with it, will be discussed
as the key theme in the next chapter, in what follows I will focus on cases where I heard
about confrontations between packers and personnel of the PS authority engaged in the
inspection of fruits prior to the HWT processing in a packinghouse.
9.2.2 Tensions and conflicts in packinghouse
The Work Plan, which details procedures and specifications of post-harvest
treatments, and NOM-075, which controls transportation of host fruits, demand that
personnel of authorized certification bodies and USDA officials be stationed in a
packinghouse for inspections of fruits harvested and brought from fields. Hence my field
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observation revealed that packinghouses were sites where different social (institutional
and organizational) networks with varying interests would confront one another; their
conditions were prone to potential conflicts. For instance, in one of the packinghouses I
visited in Sinaloa (southern ALPP), its personnel, especially their manager-level staff,
were under pressure to process (i.e., disinfect fruits by HWT), pack, and ship fruits as
soon as possible, because if they were to increase their sales, they cannot let fruits
purchased from growers perish, and they want to finish their work and go home early.
However, two officials, one hired by USDA-APHIS (a Mexican national) and the other
from an authorized third-party certifier body, were stationed there to inspect by dissecting
samples from every batch of harvested fruits prior to treatment. With their limited labor,
in peak days of harvest season, the inspection could be a bottleneck throughout the entire
packing process from entry to shipment at the packinghouse. What exacerbated the
managers’ frustrations was that, as explained in Chapter 6 (on the history of post-harvest
treatment), the work conditions of inspectors were rigidly determined by the Work Plan
so that extra-hour work must be compensated and daily maximum work hours were
capped. Accordingly, it was a real challenge for the managers to adjust processing
schedules to the availability of the inspectors. In addition, accommodation of the
inspectors, including meals and transportation from and to hotel and lunch, had to be
arranged and paid for by the packers. Given the demanding task of handling their
inspectors, a manager of a packinghouse was explicit in expressing his frustration with
them by calling the inspector “molesta (annoying).”
On the other hand, the inspectors also had a say. The USDA inspector emphasized
that although some packers would think of him, his job, and the authority associated with
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it as molesta, he was just doing his job to meet the conditions for export. He went on to
say to me that if I had spent enough time in Mexico, I would perceive the mentality of
some people who would not understand why such rulings were needed; and even worse,
particularly in northwestern states such as Sinaloa among many mango producing states
in Mexico, people were more antagonistic to the inspector. Another senior USDA officer
who had worked as an inspector had even a life-threatening experience with a
packinghouse manager who demanded the inspector overlook a minor error in HWT and
issue a certificate. Raging at the inspector’s refusal, the manager pulled out a handgun
and threatened to shoot him unless he would agree to give the certificate. The inspector
managed to calm the manager down somehow—the inspector said to me that the manager
raged for 20 minutes or so—and convinced him to withdraw the gun and to obey the rule.
Although such an escalated confrontation might be rare, minor frictions happen “siempre,
siempre, siempre (always, always, always)” in a packinghouse.
Indeed, during the tour of the packinghouse, smoldering tensions between the
packer’s employees and the inspectors were quite obvious. Almost no one among the
packer’s employees would greet or even give a glance to the inspector walking with me.
The two inspectors accorded in that they perceived that almost no one in the
packinghouse liked them, as presented in the previous chapter. Instead, one of the
inspectors was loudly talking to me about the problems and frictions he had with that
packer even in the presence of its employees as if he wanted to vent his frustrations. Such
a perception of antagonism marked a stark contrast with when I was walking alone and
received friendly greetings from many staff members.
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Some confrontations or tensions between the packer and inspectors became
sustained and explicit conflicts, and mentally disturbed those involved in the
confrontation. A manager of the packinghouse revealed to me that while many inspectors
were willing to be flexible to respond to her requests, some were not collaborative; when
the manager repeatedly asked one such unsympathetic inspector for collaboration, he
became openly antagonistic and even abusive. After she reported his abuses to his
supervisor, his antagonism escalated rather than being restrained. He would even threaten
to cancel the certified eligibility of the packer for the export program. She heard that he
was eventually fired because he had acted in abusive manners in other packinghouses.
However, in such a stressful occasion as when an inspector was not collaborative,
disturbed by the abusive inspector, she would give a yell (“Grito”) in her workplace.
Finally, what became clear in this context was that this manager faced “power,”
which could be defined, following Miyadai (1989), as an experience by an obeyer of
pressure to select specific options. Despite unreasonable requests and malicious attitudes
of some inspectors, the manager obeyed their orders, “como lo que digan (as what they
say),” in order to obtain certificates from them, because she felt as if she had no other
choice to do so and because she thought she would get in trouble if she got behind
schedule. The power in this context neither should be deemed as an attribute of the
inspectors nor even as merely exercised by the “powerful” U.S. government or any single
entity. Rather, it was an experience of the manager situated within complex
configurations entailing asymmetrically distributed resources (e.g., the inspector’s
authority to issue certificate), anticipations (e.g., that harvested fruits were accumulating
and perishing), or normative expectations (e.g., that she should not delay processing and
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shipping), which all together urged her to feel that there was no other choice but to obey
the inspectors, despite the fact that she could have acted differently.
9.3

Summary and Discussion
This chapter has illuminated some corollaries of the PS regulation network, such

as values, norms, and moral senses as well as order and conflicts. PS regulations, a
quintessential example of products of scientific knowledge, were not simply providing
apparently value-neutral distinctions between pest/non-pest, but engendering very valueladen corollaries, which provided people with normative guidance and moral-based
esteem or disdain as to the entire personality of a human. For example, certain practices
(or lack thereof) required for pest control, including disposal of unharvested fruits or
appropriate pruning of trees, could lead to value-laden evaluations of things or humans,
such as a poorly managed orchard or a good grower. Such value-laden evaluations in
accordance with what the regulation commands could serve to normatively guide how a
person was to act. Tacit infusion of norms into individuals embodies neoliberal ideology
that commands self-disciplining in the context of the governance shift.
Meanwhile, non-compliance to rules could be deemed as a breach of morality,
which leads to accusations against the personality of a non-complier. A problematic
consequence of such a moral accusation was that by attributing problems to the whole
personality, it could obscure varying circumstances that might in fact hinder the person
from observing the rules. Meanwhile, normative senses emerged not only among those
directly engaged in production or export of mangos, but also, as the regulatory network
extended its reach, among those who were not involved even in agriculture.
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In the meantime, behind the apparent ordering effects of the regulations was
disorderliness, including disobedience to and breach of the rules. Conflicting situations
could also result in disorderliness, including destruction of relatively “peaceful”
communication or disturbance to human mind or even body. Yet, I argued that a scrutiny
of the concept of conflict would be needed to avoid the problematic confusion of conflict
with disorderliness and to make distinctions between (1) conditions that potentially
provoke conflicts, (2) conflict as a coherent chain of acts communicating rejection, and
(3) “negative” corollaries provoked by a conflict. My analysis illuminated that the mango
packinghouses indeed were rife with potentially conflicting situations because the places
were where different interests confront each other competing for dominance, that is, a site
of politics. Hence, tensions between the official inspectors and the employees of the
packinghouses were quite obvious. In some rarer cases, even more explicit confrontations
involving threats with a firearm or with the authority to deprive the packer of the
certification took place. Whether implicitly smoldering tensions or explicit confrontations,
these acts communicated refusal of claims or demands of the competing parties, and
hence were conflicts between them. These conflict situations further provoked
disorderliness, including discomfort, breach of peaceful communication, mental
disturbance, and so forth.
A critically important finding was that the confrontations and conflicts I
witnessed indicated enactment of power, that is, an actor’s experience of being forced to
select from limited options, situated in asymmetrically distributed resources, anticipations,
and normative expectations. I do not deem the asymmetry to be the result of resource
distribution or the existent norms and morals, nor is power the determinant cause of
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actions, but it has certain influences on configurations of options that would be available
to every actor. As with ANT and systems theory, I do not treat power as the cause of
actors’ actions (Fuchs 2001; Latour 1986). Power would not be something possessed by a
single person or entity (e.g., a state, an organization), but deemed as a consequence of
collective movements of actors, as a result of which power is attributed to a specific,
whether individual or collective, actor (Fuchs 2001; Latour 1986).
In this sense, power is not a concept to explain something that happens in society.
Accordingly, simply using the term “power” in an analysis would have little significance
unless an empirical concern is placed upon what and how options would be made
available to an actor as a function of asymmetrical configurations of resources, and of
moralities or norms. In the next chapter, therefore, I will examine how “options” might
open up, and simultaneously come to bind, growers enrolled in the mango sector. More
specifically, while farmers in Sinaloa might be attracted to the mango production for new
options, including better commodity prices and new employment opportunities outside of
farming, enrolling in the sector regulated by PS regulations could mean constraint by not
only the collective morality as demonstrated in this chapter, but also other bindings such
as perpetual dependence on packers and fee payment for the Campaign.
To conclude this chapter, I will present a few important themes. First, global PS
regulations and their outcome, the globalization of agriculture, were not merely a
mechanism of expansion of trade of agricultural products. Rather than simply drawing
distinctions between pest/non-pest, thereby enabling trade of plant products, the
regulations engender multiple socio-material ordering effects, including values, norm,s
and morals as to things, places, or humans. Second, despite such apparent ordering
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effects, there was also disorderliness at the very local level where the regulation enacts
itself. Third, a tacit (hence barely asked) rationale underlying the expanding PS
regulations was globalization of agriculture and food production and consumption, which
would supposedly benefit those who were involved in the regulations. Nonetheless, as the
reach of the regulations extended to non-farming sectors and created disorderliness as
well, a question might be asked: what costs, including moral burdens and potential
conflicts, vis-à-vis supposed benefits, by the expanding regulations promoting
globalization of agriculture should or could be borne and tolerated in society? While the
part of the question as to the supposed benefits of the regulations will be scrutinized in
the next chapter, I believe that the whole question is to be addressed by everyone with
interest in a globalizing world.
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Chapter 10
Justifying the PS Regulation:
How will the Eradication Program in Southern Sinaloa Benefit Small-scale
Mango Growers?
In this chapter I will address the last research question: How are the PS
regulations in transition in Sinaloa changing economic prospects for mango growers and
packers to tap into global markets of mangos? As presented in the previous chapter, PS
regulations extend their disciplining effects, going beyond the mango production sector,
to non-farm populations, including urban dwellers or travelers crossing the PS regulatory
boundary (e.g. inspection points on domestic highways). Costs and burdens incurred by
the extended regulatory network, whether direct economic ones (e.g., the governmental
expenditure for the program operation) or more indirect non-economic ones (e.g., moral
duties and legal sanctions over acts that threaten the PS status), must be justified by
benefits brought by the regulations. For instance, prohibiting transporting fruits without
certification may be justified because breaking the regulation can jeopardize the export of
mango and other products, which is an important source of revenue for the entire nation.
Yet, this does not mean that those who comply with the rules equally benefit from doing
so. Rather, some may end up only paying costs.
However, determining what are benefits and costs of the regulations, and who is
benefitting or losing from it, who is paying the costs and in what forms, can be a
complicated task since such a question could elicit varying answers in a diffusive and
moving social network. Determining benefits as such becomes “politics” (in a broad
sense), as the concept of material politics (Law and Mol 2008) leading this research
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informs. Still, despite such complexity, if not impossibility, of determining benefits, my
observations will illuminate how claims for justification of compensational benefits are
constructed, whether through negotiation and contestations or more tacit and implicit
ways, and proliferate in and sustain the PS regulations network. One might imagine that
there are discourses that claim benefits, while perhaps concealing burdens and costs.
Therefore, in this chapter I intend to illuminate how accounts of supposed beneficiaries
and benefits from PS regulations were constructed and justified. This position resonates
with the constructivist “second-order observation” (Luhmann 1998),37 which means
“observation of observation” or analysis of how observation is made in specific contexts.
This perspective, paying attention to plural contextualization of observations, aims to
highlight and compare varying contexts in which specific benefits are constructed rather
than determining the beneficiary or the benefits of PS regulations as such. Thus, several
pertinent questions arise as to: What were rationales or justifications for PS regulations
and related programs? What benefits were the regulations supposed to bring? How likely
is it that such benefits would materialize and how might that happen? And, are there
going to be unanticipated externalities, such as “hidden” costs or risks?
The following sections will first focus on how accounts of benefits and/or
beneficiaries of the PS program, the eradication program, in particular, were made and
justified. Two sections that follow will examine prospects of demands for mango, and the
status of mango production in Sinaloa, which underlie the rationales for continuing PS
regulations, particularly the eradication program to establish a PFA. To examine the
37

This can be compared with the first-order observation, which means observation that
determines beneficiaries or benefits.
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accounts of prospects of benefits by the PS program, the following section will delineate
broader political-economic backdrops surroundings mango growers and packers,
especially small-scale farmers (peasants) in Mexico, and particularly in southern Sinaloa,
where the pest eradication program is in operation. My analysis will center on the
complexity with which the local famers (as the supposed beneficiaries of the PS program)
produce mangos under the regulatory controls. Based on the analyses of broader politicaleconomic conditions and local-specific relationships between small-scale mango growers
and packers/exporters, the chapter will conclude with an examination of whether and how
the prospected benefits of the program can be achieved.
10.1 Variations in Rationales for PS Regulations
An entomologist working in a governmental institute, in response to my question
asking who are the beneficiaries of his research on fruit flies, asked me, with a jokingly
(or perhaps seriously) sarcastic tone, “Why did you ask [such a question]?” Then,
although for him it might be something too obvious to ask, he gave me his answer:
“Agricultores” (farmers). Farmers would be able to expand their fruit production and tap
into more marketing opportunities, including export markets. As such, his accounts were
valid. Yet, as suggested earlier, a claim of benefits or beneficiaries of PS regulations or
research to improve PS programs should be interpreted as contingent actualization among
many other possible, contextually-varying accounts. For instance, accounts by those who
are importing fruits can differ from those of exporters. According to a U.S. entomologist,
for countries requiring PS treatment on Tephritidae, the major significance of PS
requirements for importing countries lies in its quarantine purpose. This means that the
research intends to prevent the pest from crossing a quarantine border in order to protect
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growers of crops within in it, rather than to develop control measures in production fields
(e.g.. field fumigation, mechanical-cultural practices – see Chapter 4 and 7).
Even if farmers of exporting countries are deemed as beneficiaries, one might
expect there to be considerable variations among them. Martin Aluja ([1994] 1993), a
renowned Mexican entomologist specializing in Tephritidae fruit flies, emphasizes the
importance of the research on the biology of fruit flies to help small-scale farmers,
especially those in developing countries, be able to market fruits in export markets. And
even among small-scale farmers in developing countries, there are variations. Another
Mexican researcher working in the same institute as the aforementioned entomologist
explained that some groups of guava growers in Mexico cannot expand their market
chances due to regulatory obstacles,38 which might be overcome by research. In fact,
according to him, research on Anastrepha striata (guava fruit fly), which prefers guava
(Psidium guajava) as a host, was given less priority, lagging behind the other major
Anastrepha species, such as A.ludens (Mexican fruit fly) and A. obliqua (West Indian fly).
The comparative lag in research on A. striata might be accounted for by the fact that
commercial usage of guava, especially fresh consumption in so-called developed
countries such as the United States, is very limited. Still, while it is obvious that its
consumption in the United States is limited and that research on guava fruit fly is also
limited, the relationship between these two facts is not straightforwardly obvious—while
the limited research might be attributed to the limited consumption, one could also
attribute the limited consumption to the limited import because of the lagging research on
38

The US banned its import until recently when irradiation was accepted as a viable
quarantine treatment in 2008.
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A. striata.39 Earlier students of STS demonstrated how the “social” affects the direction
or outcomes of scientific and technical research, by articulating the former (“social”) as a
causal-explanatory variable explaining the latter (science). However, their relationship
should be deemed as both conditioned by and simultaneously conditioning, in a
reciprocal dialectic fashion, rather than a unilaterally causal mechanism.
Meanwhile, a few informants also pointed out benefits of PS regulations, the
Campaign in particular, for consumers of Mexican mangos. An officer of the PS
regulatory authority pointed out general benefits that U.S. consumers would enjoy from
fresh, better quality, safe Mexican products. Today, concerns of U.S. consumers (or
concerns that retailers or buyers claim to relay from consumers) about product quality,
food safety, environmental friendliness, and even ethical production methods have been
heightened. Mexican farmers and food producers were becoming increasingly conscious
of the need to comply with standards and demands of the U.S. buyers, since doing so
would constitute and maintain their competitiveness. Thus, CESAVESIN (Phytosanitary
Committee of the State of Sinaloa) had held annual “Mega Conventions” on PS issues in
agricultural production since 2007, focusing on topics such as food safety and hygiene
issues and gathering many alarmed growers and food producers.40 In a few mango

39

There could be still other reasons for the limited consumption and research investments.
For instance, guava contains many small, hard seeds, which hinder fresh consumption of
the fruit. However, my point here is that as a sociological inquiry this study always seeks
possibilities of making alternative accounts.
40

The theme of the 2008 “Mega Convention” I attended in Mazatlán, a famous tourist
destination, was concerned specifically about food safety and hygiene issues in
agricultural production (but not livestock production). There had been a discovery in the
US of salmonella-contamination in salsas whose ingredients allegedly had been produced
in Mexico. This incident perhaps caused concerns among food producers and Mexican
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packinghouses in Sinaloa I visited, signboards commanding employees to follow hygiene
practices, such as washing hands, were conspicuously posted everywhere in the facilities
(Figure 10-1). In addition, a manager of one of the packinghouses showed me a contract
document concerning GAP, indicating the buyer’s concern about broader issues
throughout the production and packing processes. On one hand, in such a context where
the capacity to conform to standards, whether food safety, plant- and animal-sanitary, or
quality certification, directly leads to competitiveness in markets, compliance with the PS
regulation per se would constitute benefits of adding competitiveness to the entire
agriculture and food sector of the country. On the other hand, whether conspicuous or
tacit, continuous exigencies or pressures from buyers, retailers and consumers could
mean dragging growers and packers to, and keep running on, a “treadmill” of compliance
to norms and standards.

governmental officials as to whether and how the U.S. regulations would be altered or
tightened.
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Figure 10-1 Signboard posted in a mango packinghouse in Sinaloa

There were, of course, benefits specifically pertinent to the particular PS
eradication program. Whereas HWT can damage the taste and shelf life of mangos, fruits
grown in PFA have better fruit quality. A manager of a packinghouse energetically
emphasized better taste of non-HWT mangos, saying that it would be completely
different. According to him, although we called them “fresh” mangos, they were no
longer fresh because they were “cooked” with hot water. However, this benefit was not
well known among U.S. consumers, since the availability of non-HWT Mexican mangos
was still limited and there was no way (but the better taste per se) to know whether a fruit
was hot-water treated unless it was sold with an original box with a USDA stamp (proof
of HWT) shipped from a packer. In addition, from my observations of retailers in the
United States, there seemed to be no difference in prices or “premium” on Mexican
mangos grown in the PFA. This means that consumers incur no specific “cost” to
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establish PFAs in Mexico. The truth is that the Mexican government (hence, the nation),
as well as mango growers and packers, bear the costs for the additional, if any, benefits
for consumers by the eradication program. These circumstances would make the
consumer benefit less visible to the beneficiaries themselves.
While there were multiple accounts of benefits of PS regulations and related
programs and research, the most relevant was the eradication campaign against
Tephritidae (fruit fly) pests in southern Sinaloa, because it was expected to attract mango
growers to the area, including underprivileged peasants. In this specific context, the most
significant rationale for PS regulations was to establish the PFA, which would “liberate”
mango growers who were reliant on packers and intermediaries who had access to the
mandatory HWT and/or commercialization channels. Once the entire state of Sinaloa
becomes free of the pest, HWT as the requirement for export will no longer be needed.
Then, any grower can export mangos to the United States and Japan, two major importers
that require PS treatment, without relying on packers or intermediary buyers (or brokers)
for marketing. Moreover, if non-HWT fruits are recognized for better quality, “premium”
prices may become another reward for producers (although such has not happened so far).
This benefit would be particularly pertinent to those small-scale, peasant growers
of ejidos (pronounced “e-Hii-do”), who lack equipment for the mandatory HWT and thus
are in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis intermediaries or packers with access to HWT. To
understand situations surrounding ejidos, Mexican peasants, a brief historical outline will
be helpful. In Mexico, there are two different systems of entitlement for use of land,
including private ownership and the “ejido”. The latter, which was established in the
1917 Constitution in the era of the Mexican Revolution, means the communal right for
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farmland use (and a group of peasants entitled to the right). In the land reform carried out
throughout the Revolution, the federal government granted lands (confiscated from large
landlords) to groups of landless peasants. The granted lands themselves did not belong to
the group or an individual peasant. Each peasant member was granted only the right to
use a portion of the granted land. A group of peasants and their entitled lands are together
called an ejido and a member of an ejido is “ejidatario” (“e-hi-da-Ta-ri-o-s”) or
“ejidataria” (for woman). Since the historical root of the ejido can be traced back to the
poor landless peasantry, ejidos in general have tended to be underprivileged, lacking
financial and/or technical capitals, compared to private landowning farmers. In this study,
ejido farmers (ejidatarios) are called “peasants” to indicate their underprivileged status.
Although there had been strict regulations over concession or trade of the land use
entitlement of ejidos, an amendment to the Constitution in 1992 under neoliberal reforms
of the farming sectors drastically relaxed the restrictions, allowing non-peasant farmers
access to ejidos’ lands. While the ejido system constitutes the “revolutionary” national
identity of Mexico, its nature has been drastically altered in recent years when neoliberal
political discourses are dominant.
Given the relative weakness of the ejido sector, a few informants told me that
“brokers” or intermediaries (often called “coyotes,” perhaps reflecting their negative
image) from other regions treated local peasant growers in an abusive manner. However,
most peasants had to rely on packers or intermediaries to sell fruits. “Liberating” the
region from the pest could mean eliminating the cause of the reliance, thus also
“liberating” resource-poor, small-scale growers from the position subordinate to coyote
buyers or local “elite” producers/packers. Upon completion of a PFA in southern Sinaloa,
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many peasant mango farmers would be able to tap into the larger export market without
being bothered with others. So, while farmers, consumers, and peasants could be all
potential beneficiaries, in what follows I must investigate further in order to examine
validities of the “beneficiary discourses,” as well as the likelihood that the potential
benefits of PS regulations would really materialize.
10.2 Prospect of Mexican Mango Export Markets
One of the critically important premises to materialize the potential benefits,
especially for mango growers, is the steady growth of export markets of Mexican mangos.
What underlies the rationale for PS regulations, whether discussed explicitly or not, is
that there are optimistic prospects of the growing export market of mangos. Without a
persuasive projection of growth in major markets for mangos, a good prospect of one of
the most important potential benefits of PS regulations (i.e., better chances for Sinaloan
mangos) would not be persuasive. My interview with a representative of EMEX, an
organization of packers and exporters of mangos in Mexico, while validating this premise,
illuminated shifting and significant trends in the major markets for Mexican mangos for
export.
In recent years Mexico has been the largest supplier in the U.S. mango market.
After hurricanes, frosts, and urbanization caused Florida-based mango production to fade
away, Mexico has become the largest supplier in the U.S. mango market and its supply
has been expanding. The EMEX representative added that there would be a projected
change in the United States, not simply in the export quantity, but also in the pattern of
consumption in the near future. Currently, according to him, particular ethnic groups,
such as Hispanics and Asians (as opposed to European- and African-Americans), are
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major mango consumers in the United States. For many U.S. people, the mango is still an
“exotic” fruit compared to commonly consumed fruits such as apples, bananas, or
oranges. The representative hopes that as the supply of mangos from Mexico and the rest
of the world rises and its price decreases, the fruit will be less exotic and become closer
to those common commodities so that more people in the United States would be
attracted to this fruit. To push this trend further, mango packers and exporters in
exporting countries and traders in the United States are making collective efforts to
provide information on consumption of mangos, including recipes and nutritional values,
to raise publicity of the fruit in the United States.
In addition, Japan, which is the third largest importer of Mexican mangos
following the United States and Canada, is also a promising market. Although the
quantity of Mexican mangos shipped to Japan (less than two percent) is still minuscule
compared to that for the United States, the market growth during the past decades has
been much higher than the other major importing countries (Table 10-1). The average
unit value of Mexican mangos shipped to Japan (1.74 $US per kg) has been superior to
those for the other major importers, such as the United States. Thus, compared to the
export to the United States, where the total export values have not grown despite the
growth in volume, Japan has become a “premium” market for Mexican mangos.
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Table 10-1 Exports of Mexican mangos to major destination countries (1988-2008)
Volume (metric ton)
Country\Yea
1988
r
USA
13,530
Canada
327
Japan
60
Netherlands
222
France
171
Germany
0
Export Value ($US1000)
Country\Yea
1988
r
USA
3,825
Canada
89
Japan
116
Netherlands
85
France
59
Germany
0
Unit Value ($US/kg)
Country\Yea
1988
r
USA
0.28
Canada
0.27
Japan
1.93
Netherlands
0.38
France
0.35
Germany
0

Change (%; 1988 data = 100)
1998

2008

180,133
18,434
1,239
3,286
1,170
612

194,914
24,051
4,776
1,836
209
61

1988-2008

1998-2008

1,441
7,355
7,960
827
122
NA

108
130
385
56
18
10

Change (%; 1988 data = 100)
1998

2008

122,450
12,026
1,906
2,233
892
358

79,216
18,004
12,052
1,059
420
65

1988-2008

1998-2008

2,071
20,229
10,390
1,246
712
NA

65
150
632
47
47
18

Change (%; 1988 data = 100)
1998

2008

0.68
0.65
1.54
0.68
0.76
0.58

0.41
0.75
2.52
0.58
2.01
1.07

(Source: FAOSTATS http://faostat.fao.org/)
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1988-2008

1998-2008

144
275
131
151
582
NA

60
115
164
85
264
182

The EMEX representative’s account indicated that at least among the mango
packers/exporters, there existed an optimistic prospect of opportunities for Mexican
mangos to grow in the major markets, the United States, Japan, and Canada. Yet, access
to the two promising markets both in the United States and Japan requires clearance of
PS regulations on Tephritidae fruit flies. Maintaining and promoting the appropriate
operation of the required control measures, including HWT and on-site pest monitoring,
could thus be justified. Specifically, PFA as an alternative to HWT, which not only is
costly but also damages fruit quality, would be a legitimate measure to make Mexican
mangos a more competitive and attractive commodity in the markets of the two countries
mentioned above.
10.3 Rising Mango Production
10.3.1 Growers opting for mangos in southern Sinaloa
The prospect of a growing mango market represents an incentive for peasant
growers to switch from other conventional crops to mangos. My informants told me that
in southern Sinaloa, Escuinapa, and El Rosario, the two largest mango-producing
municipalities of the state in particular, farmers had been opting for growing mango as
one of the principal crops, instead of conventional products such as wheat, frijol (bean),
or livestock. In the interviews the informants reasoned that farmers, including peasants,
came to be attracted to mango principally because of its potential profitability, less labor,
and lower costs for production. In short, growing mangos appeared to give a better
economic prospect. A couple of farmers I interviewed told me that in recent years they
had switched from frijol, corn, and livestock production to mango because other crops
had become less profitable; whereas some other crops, especially vegetables for export
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markets such as chili and green peppers were also promising, they would require more
intensive labor and capital to produce. Also, as I will discuss later in this chapter, an
important backdrop of their accounts concerns changes by Mexico’s political-economic
reform towards liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. The Mexican government
ceased some of its supports to the peasants, including the procurement of staple crops
such as corn and frijol, in order to prompt the agricultural sector to adjust to an open
market economy. This has lessened the viability of the conventional crops as stable
income sources for resource-poor peasants who could not afford to make investments to
compete with cheaper products flooding the open market. Earlier literature in the
sociology of agriculture inspired by ANT (e.g., Busch and Juska 1997) could provide an
explanation of Sinaloan peasants’ adoption of mango as “enrollment” into a network of a
commodity chain. Following Busch and Juska’s account (1997), one may reason that,
when provided varying options to enter networks, an actor would calculate benefits,
negotiate with other actors, and enroll into a new network consisting of diverse actors
including humans and non-humans.
However, whether their opting for mango was based on a careful, “rational”
calculation of profit/cost (or labor) would need a cautious examination.41 For, in general,
as argued in works following “actor-oriented approach” (AOA) (Long 2001; Long and
Long 1992), motivations underlying peasants’ responses to macro socio-economic
changes vary. Rural people at the local level, faced with global economic changes, enact
41

Certainly, I could argue that the peasants’ opting for mango based on “non-economic”
calculation was in line with other dimensions of “rationality,” following sociology’s
tradition, such as substantial rationality (Max Weber), as examined with US family farms
in the US by Mooney (1985).
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diverse responses as livelihood strategies, including opportunities out of agri-food
commodity chains. For instance, mangos seemed not only profitable but also appeared to
demand less labor, which would allow them to use their time for other economic
activities, including performing contract farm labor and temporary work in fisheries
(shrimp, in particular, has been one successful income source as an alternative to
agriculture after 1990s when the state economy was stagnant (López Cervantes 2007)).
Their response is undergirded with varying cultural and value resources (or cultural
capital, following Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) that allow for different and
contingent interpretations of situations. Also certain sets of existing networks (as social
capital following Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)), including global and local
commodity chains and other institutions, such as political-administrative or legal
frameworks and local community relationships, allow them to (re)configure multiple
livelihood strategies, simultaneously transforming the existing networks and value or
cultural bases (de Haan and Long 1997; Echánove and Steffen 2005; Long 2001; Long
and Long 1992; van der Ploeg 1990; Zendejas and Vries 1995).
Thus, for my study, it is important not only to focus on how an actor successfully
is enrolled and actualized in a network of the specific commodity network (and how the
network may eventually fail—see narrative of how a network of scallop industry
developed and failed (Callon 1986)), but also to pay attention to what is not actualized,
not negotiated, but excluded and concealed from negotiations, to enroll in the network.
While a “rational” economic calculation (which may lead to enrollment in the network)
might be a plausible explanation for the shift of the crop, more “irrational” and
contingent factors opened up the possibility for peasants to jump on the bandwagon of
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mango-growing. According to a peasant in southern Sinaloa, for instance, farmers started
growing mangos because they had heard from friends or relatives about success and
prosperous potential of the new fruit. However, growers “jumping on the mango
bandwagon” may face a situation where their capacities are limited to negotiate for better
positioning within the mango commodity network, and eventually expose other
uncertainties or risks, if not at risk of failure. Accordingly, the following analysis will
examine the relationship between growers with packers, mediated through PS regulations,
intertwining with other broader, complex political-economic backdrops such as Mexico’s
neoliberal (and post-neoliberal “re-regulation” (Snyder 2001)) reform, as well as farmers’
livelihood strategies under the transition. In doing so, I will discuss that PS regulations,
which have been increasingly restrictive and comprehensive, seem to have much to do
with the sustained dependency relationship, which both allows and constrains the actors’
“entry” to the network of the mango market. To that end, first, I will delineate the
situation of southern Sinaloa where peasantry mango growers are concentrated.
Southern Sinaloa, a “low prevalence area” where the eradication program was in
operation, is where the state’s mango production was concentrated, particularly in
Escuinapa and El Rosario, the two largest mango-producing municipalities in the state
(Figure 10-2). Mango groves and growers registered for export to the United States were
also concentrated in the area, with more than 2600 groves and 2100 growers, compared to
less than 200 groves and growers in the northern area (Figure 10-3). However, their
productivity was less remarkable compared to areas already free of fruit flies. With the
greater number of growers and groves, average sizes of groves were smaller than almost
all the other mango producing municipalities (Figure 10-4). Average yields in the south
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tended to be lower than the north (Figure 10-5). As shown in Figure 10-6, more mango
groves in the southern region lacked irrigation. Availability of irrigation could be not
only an important factor for determining yield levels but also stable production of quality
fruits, which would directly affect their prices (Figure 10-6). The low productivity in
southern Sinaloa could be attributed to small-scale growers’ lack of technical and/or
financial capital for production. Their dearth of production capital will be discussed in
detail in what follows.

(ha)
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by US)
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(Low Prevalence Area)
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Non-irrigated

Figure 10-2 Areas of mango orchards in municipalities of Sinaloa, Mexico, by
availability of irrigation (2007)
Source: INEGI
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Figure 10-3 Number of mango groves and growers in municipalities of Sinaloa
(2007)
Source: INEGI
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Figure 10-4 Average sizes of mango orchards registered for export to the United
States (per grower) in municipalities of Sinaloa
Source: USDA
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Figure 10-5 Average yields of mangos produced in municipalities of Sinaloa (2007)
Source: INEGI
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Figure 10-6 Average yields and unit prices of mangos produced in Sinaloa by
availability of irrigation (2007)
Source: INEGI
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10.3.2 Small-scale mango growers lack production capital
Small-scale growers in southern Sinaloa were also prone to being excluded from
access to resources for production and/or commercialization. For instance, commercial
suppliers of materials, such as fertilizer and pesticides, were not willing to sell their
products to small-scale operators. During the fieldwork, I attended a business meeting of
an ejido. Salespersons of a few companies of farm material supplies were also invited to
introduce products available for the peasants. A few extension technicians, including one
with whom I had an appointment, were also invited to the meeting to give a workshop on
fruit crop production, including mango production. What drew my attention was that the
salespersons were emphasizing that they were there for business (comercio in Spanish)
and not to provide free service to the farmers, although they would be glad to help
through comercio. In a later interview I conducted with the technician who gave a lecture
in the ejido’s meeting, I asked about the salespersons’ comments. The technician
explained that many commercial suppliers would be unwilling to make transactions with
small-scale operators needing only small batches, especially when purchasing with
unreliable credit. Indeed, Marsh and Runsten (1998) identified such high transaction
costs as one of the challenges faced by Mexican peasant fruit and vegetable growers.
Also, I learned that the meeting I attended was something unusual for the ejido. In
another interview with representatives of the ejido, they revealed that the meeting
involving the technicians and the salesperson was a really novel experience for them. The
ejido, as a group facing limited technical and financial support, had never had such an
opportunity to learn technical suggestions about different fruit crops, soil and fertilization
management, and pest control. Indeed, at the end of the meeting, I witnessed a farmer
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express his appreciation to the salespersons and the technicians for their talks. With the
workshop being the first of the kind for this peasant, his unusually polite expression of
his gratitude demonstrated by his standing up among the audience mirrored the ejido’s
dearth of access to technical and production capital.
An anecdote of a packing facility of this ejido also epitomized their financial and
technical situations. According to the leaders, this ejido, using this facility, used to pack
and ship their mango fruits by themselves to both the domestic and export markets until
the mid-1980s when the use of EDB was banned by the U.S. EPA for its carcinogenic
potential (see Chapter 6). However, the ejidatarios could not finalize installment of HWT,
a mandatory alternative to the banned EDB fumigation to meet PS requirements for
export.42 Despite their attempt to equip themselves with HWT device, they had no option
but giving up exporting fruits by their own means (Figure 10-8). More than twenty years
after ceasing their packing operation, the anticipated eradication of the fruit fly pests
opened up the opportunity for the ejidatarios to resume commercializing mangos on their
own. When I visited the office, the ejido leaders were preparing a proposal to obtain
financial support to resume operation of the facility.43 In the interview, however,

42

I should note, however, that there were competing or conflicting narratives about this
packinghouse. Another peasant in the same region claimed that that particular packing
facility had never shipped mangos to the US, but only to Canada, which has not required
PS regulations against fruit flies. Still, the relevance to my research of the narratives of
this packinghouse lies not in whether the packinghouse was really shipping fruit for
export. Regardless of whether or not members of this ejido exported mangos to the US, it
was the case that they were currently struggling with securing capital to tap into
opportunities of the apparently prosperous mango exports.
43

Unfortunately, I had no opportunity to address a question to specify financial sources
they were looking for.
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notwithstanding the positive prospect of mango production, they emphasized how hard it
was for resource-poor ejidos, compared to private large-scale farmers, to obtain financial
and technical support for their commercialization.

Figure 10-7 Inside of the abandoned packing facility
Containers (“bathtubs”) were reminiscent of the uncompleted construction of HWT
equipment.
(Photo by author)

The serious paucity of production resources for Mexican peasants growing fruits
has been documented in many works (e.g., De Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997;
Marsh and Runsten 1998). Fruit and vegetable production was encouraged as alternative
income sources for peasants especially after the late 1980s and 1990s when the Mexican
government geared their economic policies towards liberalization. Mexican policymakers
reasoned that conventional grain production such as corn and frijol would no longer be a
viable choice for peasants, as the relatively generous support at the time, which the
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government offered through parastatal companies, such as price support and credits to the
conventional crops, were supposed to cease (for detailed accounts of governmental
support since t1970, see (Fox 1993); for the process of decline of the governmental
supports and consequences for peasants, (De Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997;
Echánove and Steffen 2005; Kurtz 2004; Myhre 1998)). However, while giving the push
to adopt fruits or vegetables, the government provided peasants with very limited, if any,
support for transition, since the existing service channels were demolished. The parastatal
institutions, which not only provided financial support but also technical assistance and
material supplies (e.g., fertilizers or other agro-chemicals, or in some cases, seedlings and
seeds), were dissolved or liquidated in the neoliberal policy reform following the late
1980s. Marsh and Runsten (1998) noted major constraints or challenges that peasant fruit
and vegetable growers would face, including lack of marketing channels and skills,
undercapitalization (e.g., lack of credit to obtain production supplies, of transportation
measures), poor technical and extension supports, and higher transaction costs due to
small batches (an important factor for financial institutions, material suppliers, and
buyers doing business with peasant products and creditors). These factors correspond
squarely to what I witnessed with the ejido struggling to tap into the apparently promising
market opportunity for Sinaloan mango producers.
Particularly pertinent to what I witnessed in the ejido’s meeting were the
availability and changing scheme for the provision of technical support and extension
service. To adopt more “value-added,” market-oriented commodities, especially for
export markets, initial technical support would be crucial for small-scale farmers who
lack previous experience since those new crops definitely would need substantial
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technical investments to meet more stringent quality demands. However, agricultural
research and development programs by governmental institutions, which could have
provided significant assistance to the peasant sector, had suffered severe budgetary and
human-resource cutbacks. Throughout the reform toward deregulation and liberalization,
the public extension service was discontinued and research programs on some crops by
INIFAP (National Institute of Forest, Agriculture and Livestock Research), the flagship
research institute of the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA), had substantially
decreased (Echánove and Steffen 2005; Marsh and Runsten 1998). When I visited one of
INIFAP’s research centers located in suburb Culiacán, the state capital, its falloff
compared to a few decades ago was clearly reflected in the facility, the almost-abandoned
library in particular. Although in fact the library stored precious research documents from
all over the world, it seemed the room had been converted into a junk shed—on its floor
dead cockroaches were scattered and even a mummified snake body was left. Also,
INIFAP-Culiacán was once active in selection of germ-plasm stocks of mango in an
experimental orchard in Aguaruto, suburb of Culiacán, which once had been the most
important genetic resource for the Mexican mango industry. However, the experimental
lot was transferred to another organization. When I visited there, it seemed to be under
fairly poor conditions perhaps due to limited budgets and human resources.
Instead, what emerged as significant players in agricultural research, development,
and extension, at least in Sinaloa, were non-governmental organizations, such as
Fundación Produce, an affiliate organization of CAADES, the umbrella organization at
the state level under which local-level organizations of private-landowning farmers were
associated. Thus, CAADES itself was not affiliated with the ejido sector. However,
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Fundación Produce was engaged in research, development, and extension to provide
support to both private farmers and peasants in the state. Indeed, the technicians who
gave the lecture in the aforementioned ejido’s meeting belonged to Fundación Produce.
Its technicians were obliged to visit at least one farmer per month from both the private
farmer and ejido sectors. Though the care did not seem sufficient, Fundación Produce
was the organization now responsible for the aforementioned INIFAP’s experimental lot
of mango cultivars and conducted research on sustainable mango production practices
through contract with a university researcher. If the political reform of Mexico after the
1990s pushing privatization was meant to allow for active and effective engagement of
non-governmental private sectors without being bound with rigid, bureaucratic,
organizational, institutional, or sectorial boundaries, and if I was to look for a sign of
expected outcomes of the reform, then the case of Fundación Produce might be one
example. In addition, the interviewed technician pointed out that, in recent years,
financial and technical support to peasants by the government was being improved
despite many claims otherwise. His opinion was that although it was the case that support
was not sufficient or effective yet, perhaps many peasants were still unaware of such
assistance resources available for them. Still, what mattered to my research centered on
perceptions of financial and technical conditions surrounding peasants, including the
changing PS regulations.
10.3.3 Cultural factors or (purported) peasant “mentality”?
The analysis by Marsh and Runsten (1998) also pointed out that there were
cultural factors affecting the willingness and ability of peasants to switch to fruit or
vegetable production in the Mexican liberalization reform in the 1980s to 1990s.
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Educational levels of growers and the historical paternalism and anti-peasant biases were
included in such cultural factors. In a similar vein, my informants explained about the
propensities or characteristics of mango growers in southern Sinaloa. According to their
accounts, as mentioned earlier, compared to the northern municipalities in the state, the
number of growers in the southern Sinaloan region was large. Among the mango growers,
especially those peasants predominating in southern Sinaloa, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve consensus. This limits their collective negotiation ability vis-à-vis
local packers and “coyotes” (intermediaries or brokers) from outside of the area.
Also, the extension agent I interviewed pointed out that peasants in the region
were prone to be risk-averse. However, he did not intend to disdain such “mentality” of
the peasants with those with whom he had worked. Rather, being from a southern state of
Mexico where he had grown up with more underprivileged indigenous peasants, he had
sympathy with the purported disposition to avoid risks of southern Sinaloan peasants.
Such an observation on peasants’ disposition also resonated with a remark by an
interviewed Mexican social scientist who had conducted research on peasants growing
non-traditional crops in the country. For many small-scale peasants, growing fruit
commodities, such as mango and avocado, would serve as “insurance.” Her commentary
went on to explain that, although production of export-oriented fruit commodities would
give even peasants a promising opportunity, institutionalized norms, including those on
quality and sanitary and PS regulations, had become increasingly burdensome for them to
conform to if they were to embark on the export or even domestic markets. When lacking
technical and financial resources to meet the regulations or requirements, prospects for
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small-scale growers to benefit from products whose standards were stringent would not
be comparable to those who could count on technical and political-economic resources.
Past research literature indeed has pointed out that in Mexico, while local elite
producers successfully collectively mobilized their political resources for negotiations
involving the national government to make regulations on fruit commodities such as
avocados and mangos more amenable to them, the underprivileged peasantry was not
enjoying the same benefits (Echánove 2005; Echánove and Steffen 2005; Stanford 2002).
The fruit production as “insurance” then meant that most unprivileged peasantry would
perceive it as a supplemental income source, which would ensure them a certain level of
income from the prosperous export market, as well as their access (entitlement) to the
land. These benefits were made possible by relying on stronger intermediaries, although
room for negotiation for peasants with buyers would be limited.
In the meantime, the growers in northern Sinaloa starkly contrasted in many
aspects with many southern counterparts. I met a few growers in Ahome, the major
mango producing municipality in the PFA, who owned groves and packinghouses. Being
much fewer in number, the growers have achieved consensus with relative ease. They
collaborate well with each other through providing or exchanging advice in technical
aspects or marketing. The northern mango growers, as the aforementioned extension
technician said, were more entrepreneurial (empresarial in Spanish), eager to explore
market chances, and blessed with technical and financial capital. For instance, I visited a
recently established, very-large-scale (500 ha or 2000 acres) mango plantation in Ahome,
which illuminated the “entrepreneurial” characteristics of growers in the region. The land
itself did not belong to a farmer in a strict sense. Having heard about the good prospect of
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mango, the landowner with little previous experience in farming, asked a technical
advisor to make the land a state-of-the-art mango plantation. The advisor, who grew and
brokered mangos by himself, and worked as a consultant for other mango growers (and
was one of my most important informants), adopted new techniques, including
sustainable practices using composts, micro nutrients, and tube-drip irrigation.
Throughout the field, even birdhouses were installed for raptors that hunt rats so that their
damage to the plants could be reduced without ratsbane. Of course, the entrepreneurial
propensity and well-equipped infrastructure of the northern growers never meant that
they would be immune to risks inherent to agriculture. Plantations of at least two of the
interviewed mango growers in Ahome were devastated by a hurricane that hit the region
during my fieldwork. I indeed witnessed their many mango trees torn down and
completely inundated. There are always uncertainties and risks in agricultural production.
Then, whether a farmer has capabilities to deal with risks, including the ability to obtain
needed technical and financial resources, becomes a critical issue.
Certainly, risk-taking entrepreneurial growers were also found in southern Sinaloa.
The first commercial production of mangos started by a few risk-taking growers in El
Rosario and Escuinapa, who introduced a few new commercial varieties, and to export
the fruit to the United States, overcame the PS norms by devising disinfection methods
using equipment for disinfection of citrus. A large-scale grower (who was a relative of
one of the first mango growers in Sinaloa) had recently begun, perhaps first in the region,
certified organic production of mangos. However, in the two major mango-producing
southern municipalities, growers who would make such active investments were
comparatively few given the dominance of small-scale holdings.
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In addition, even for such “entrepreneurial” mango growers and packers,
commercialization of mangos, especially for the export market, was a demanding task.
An informant in northern Sinaloa told me that one of his colleague mango farmers went
through a significant financial loss when his fruits shipped to the United States were
returned by a buyer because the products allegedly had not met quality standards. As far
as the marketing to retailers in the major mango markets such as the United States and
Japan were in the hands of importing traders, room for negotiation of commodities’
prices for packers/exporters, let alone growers, would be limited. A manager of a largescale mango grower/packer explained that the now deceased owner of the packinghouse,
being unhappy with the little room for price negotiations with U.S. importers, established
a subsidiary of his own in the United States to market mangos from his packinghouse to
U.S. retailers. However, notwithstanding this relative success, not all the growers and
packers could afford to take similar risks. It appeared to be quite a hassle for mango
packers and growers to develop and maintain marketing channels to export markets. In
addition, whether governmental or (semi-)private, standards on fruit quality or GAP,
along with PS and other sanitary requirements, would add more pressures on the packers
or traders of the commodity to spend more costs for compliance.
Thus, with few exceptions, including the ejido struggling to resume packing
operations, most small-scale mango-growers were unlikely to opt to embark on
commercialization on their own, whether because of the insufficient technical and
financial support or their risk-averse “mentality.” And, for purportedly “risk-averse”
peasants in southern Sinaloa, mango production virtually necessitated reliance on packers
for marketing their fruits. Indeed, critics have reported that marketing is the most critical
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factor for growers of non-traditional crops and what many peasants were decisively short
of (Marsh and Runsten 1998, Echánove and Steffen 2005). Mexican peasants who
adopted fruits or vegetables as alternatives to conventional grains would be far less
proficient in developing commercial channels than private landowning farmers.
10.4 Political-economic Backdrops Surrounding Mexican Peasants
The above observations of circumstances surrounding, and propensities of, smallscale mango growers in southern Sinaloa could be accounted for as consequences of past
Mexican rural policies that provided generous support to the peasantry, which has been
the revolutionary identity of the nation. From the 1970s through the early 1980s, the
Mexican government under virtual autocracy of Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI; Institutional Revolutionary Party) developed and reinforced strong patriarchal,
corporatist institutional connections with the poor, including the peasantry sector, in
order to sustain their monopoly of political domination. This was made possible, as
alluded to earlier, through state-controlled, “parastatal” companies that monopolized
distribution of resources, access, and subsidies to the poor, who in turn participated in
political campaigns sponsored by PRI (Holzner 2010; Kurtz 2004). In this patriarchal,
corporatist, political structure, Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC, National
Peasant Confederation), a corporatist organization of PRI, served to mediate the
relationship between political leaders and peasants by exchanging resources from the
former to the latter in exchange for voting support. The period of the 1970s and the early
1980s witnessed the government, through these organizational channels, expand support
to ejidos, including subsidies for supplies for production (e.g., fertilizers, seeds), finance
(credits and insurance, price supports including purchases of peasants’ products at
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guaranteed prices), information (extension and technical support), and distribution
(marketing, transportation, and storage) (Fox 1993; Kurtz 2004). Among different
parastatal entities, CONASUPO (National Company of Popular Subsistence) and Banco
de Desarrollo Rural (Banrural, Rural Development Bank) played key roles in these
services to ejidos. The former, CONASUPO in particular, did this by securing marketing
channels for ejidatarios in order to protect the peasantry from private distributors who
would take advantage of the weaker marketing ability of peasants by charging excessive
transportation or transaction fees.44 However, the Mexican government steered economic
policies towards withdrawal of governmental services, slashing the variety of support to
ejidos, privatizing parastatal companies, including CONASUPO (and some former
employees of CONASUPO were hired by CESAVESIN, as explained in Chapter 8).
While the broad institutional support somewhat successfully sustained the peasant
sector, which would not be competitive in the looming market-oriented globalization of
agriculture, they also might hinder peasants from developing capacities and skills for
marketing on their own. Peasants’ dearth of marketing capacities could have become
more problematic, since these cutbacks were accompanied with market liberalization, the
ratification of NAFTA being a prominent example. Then, resource-poor peasants were
left in a desperate situation where their products were exposed to sheer market
competition without the protection shield formerly provided by the government.
Although the government had programs to encourage the poorer producers to adopt nontraditional crops, they were by no means sufficient or effective. Whereas medium-scale
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CONASUPO also had control over staple food import by imposing import licenses.
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private farmers, who were expected to be principal players in the modernization of
Mexican agriculture, maintained access to subsidized credits from different financial
institutions, peasants were left only with limited finances by Banrural or some poverty
alleviation—rather than production enhancement—programs (Kurtz 2004; Myhre 1998).
Subsidies of such programs supposedly assisting peasant growers were in reality used to
obtain staple foods, rather than production materials (De Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet
1997; Marsh and Runsten 1998). Furthermore, after PRI lost the leading position at the
national-level political arena in the 1990s to the 2000s, the situation has worsened.
Peasants’ access to resources for production and survival, formerly mediated through
PRI-CNC connections, has diminished. Although, ironically, this encouraged more active,
“democratic,” political participation at the local levels, including burgeoning of nongovernmental organizations (Holzner 2010), peasants seemed to be locked in severe lack
of access to resources.
Another very important policy change happened in 1992 when the government
amended the article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution. Strict controls over transfer or
sales of ejidal lands stipulated by the article were relaxed, allowing non-ejidal members
to access ejidal lands for production. Whereas its intention was to make the ejido sector
more productive and competitive in the open market economy, critics argue that this
change led to dismantling of solidarity or social ties of ejido communities (de Haan and
Zoomers 2003). Certainly, scholars have noted changes in peasants’ farm-centered
livelihoods after this reform, showing certain signs of adaptation, with “entrepreneurial”
posture, to the open economy (e.g., De Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997). At an early
stage of the economic liberalization, the 1992 ejidal land reform in particular, De Janvry,
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Gordillo, and Sadoulet (1997) identified certain patterns of the peasant economy adapting
to the change. Though varying across households, ejidos, and regions, peasants adopted
autumn-winter mono-crop corn production, fruit and vegetable production, cattle raising
using common-property lands (all three patterns were characterized as “entrepreneurial”),
and migration-subsistence strategy. Stories I heard from peasants in Sinaloa, despite
considerable variations, seemed to match these patterns of adaptations to the economic
reform that was drastically changing as well as repressing the peasant sector.
In addition, one of my informants, who was a grower, consultant, and broker of
mangos, acquired access to ejidal lands and started growing mangos. As an expert, he
had highly sophisticated knowledge, skills, and resources in mango, from production
techniques to marketing channels. If other ejido members could learn his techniques or
utilize his commercial channels, his presence with an “entrepreneur-mind” would be of
great help for the ejido to be a modernized, independent, farming enterprise. Still, my
field observation caught little signal of substantial success of ejidos converting their
farming into independent agri-enterprises prospering in export sectors. As Kurtz (2004)
notes, one might expect uneven (positive and negative) consequences of ejidal land
privatization because of varying qualities of lands and other production factors. What my
fieldwork captured was the struggle and bewilderment of the peasants striving to find and
secure resources that would allow for independent enterprises tapping into exportoriented mango production. Perhaps, the question of whether Mexico’s politicaleconomic reforms towards liberalization would foster competitive, entrepreneurial, and
independent peasants still remains to be answered. And, as discussed below, PS
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regulations could provide a part of possible answers to the question of whether the
“independence” of peasant mango growers would be achieved.
10.5 Analyzing the Prospective Benefits: Continuing Dependency Relationship
Corollaries of Mexico’s neoliberal reforms since the late 1980s, as delineated
above, indicate that the analysis of whether and how PS regulations, specifically the
eradication program in southern Sinaloa, would benefit peasant mango growers, requires
careful attention to the complex intertwining of the political economic backdrop with the
specific local relationships between relevant actors, such as growers, packers/exporters,
intermediaries/brokers, and regulatory officials. Underlying the eradication program’s
expected benefits was a premise that the program would “liberate” mango growers,
including those resource-poor peasants, from the dependence on local packers or abusive
coyotes who had access to the mandatory HWT. Given this, prior to the entry to the field,
I had held a working hypothesis that the packers equipped with the treatment device
might see the pest eradication program as a threat to their business, because establishment
of PFA in southern Sinaloa means termination of the required HWT.
My probing questions asked of several key informants, including packers, elicited
mixed responses. A few representatives of the PS regulatory authorities supported my
view, pointing out that the packers were unhappy with the program. For those who had to
keep the PS regulation running, the account that the eradication program could benefit
(i.e., liberate) underprivileged growers, rather than privileged large-scale growers or
packers/exporters, would make the justification for the program more persuasive and
appealing to the broader public (e.g., tax payers, or non-farming populations affected by
the regulation). However, the rest of opinions of the interviewees, including those of
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packers, did not conform to the hypothesis. The packers/exporters, especially those who
were producing mangos on their own, seemed to rather welcome the PFA, because it
could reduce the production costs to operate HWT. In addition, given the increasing
demands for mango supply, the packers (especially “pure” packers who do not grow
mangos on their own) would continue to need stable supplies of good-quality fruits from
trusted growers, whether private landowning farmers or peasants. A manager of a
packinghouse with a sizeable grove in production mentioned that its production had been
in decline and he would need to increase supplies from outside. Among my interviewees,
a typical packer’s account, including that of this manager, was that to build and maintain
longstanding trust, the packers should treat growers in proper ways by providing good
returns. This was especially important because the local packers and processors were
competing with each other to secure quality fruits from outside growers. The competition
was harsh and tricky—although the packers would make an agreement on a general
purchase price prior to a harvest season, nonetheless, such “gentlemen’s agreements”
were often and easily ignored. From the packers’ standpoint, they also would have to
assume considerable risks and burdens to respond to cumbersome requirements or
standards on quality and other aspects of products from retailers and consumers in the
developed countries. These accounts indicated that there was a complicated
interdependent relationship between growers, packers, and buyers (Mexican
intermediaries and U.S. importers) all of whom had to conform to PS regulations,
although abilities for negotiations or to mobilize resources to obtain a variety of desirable
outcomes (e.g., better prices, access to capital, markets, etc.) were not equal among them.
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My observation indicated that the PS regulatory schemes in transition, which had
been tightening controls over many aspects of mango production, could rather sustain the
small-scale growers’ dependence on the packers. In addition to the burdens of marketing
and meeting quality requirements by importing buyers from the United States and Japan,
the mango export first and foremost required clearance of PS regulations. As presented in
the earlier chapters, the rules for production and transportation of mangos in and from
Sinaloa were increasingly extensive and complex. This was more the case for growers or
packers wishing to export fruits.
Under the current PS regulations, all mango growers must pre-register their
groves prior to a harvest season every year. For export to the U.S. market, data of
registered groves and growers must be sent to the USDA. Right before the harvest, all
mango plantations must go through inspection by inspectors of the PS regulatory
authorities, including CESAVESIN and third-party organizations. To have inspectors
check fruits, growers and packers buying mangos have to notify CESAVESIN to register
dates of their harvest and location of their plantations. At this registration, they have to
pay fees to be used to administer the eradication campaign. Harvest processes have to be
inspected by inspectors as well. No harvested fruits can be transported to a local packer
without a document issued by CESAVESIN upon fee payment, which certifies the origin
of the products because the packer cannot accept, process, or ship undocumented fruits.
The certification document, and an endorsement by PS officials of proper treatment
(HWT) at packinghouses, must be attached to every shipment of fruits destined to the
United States. Without the certificate, the consignments are not allowed to pass the
domestic quarantine inspection points (see Chapter 6) and, of course, the U.S. border
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inspection. Thus, the extensive network of regulatory procedures ensuring pest-free status
of the commodity maintains the strict control over the harvest and packing processes.
Also, some of the details of the regulations may be altered so that it becomes difficult for
small-scale growers to be well informed about all the required procedures. Although, as I
witnessed the representatives of the ejidos as well as the private landowning growers
attend meetings with CESAVESIN,45 it would not be easy for the peasant leaders to
disseminate information regarding modified regulations to more than a thousand of their
members.
The “pure” packers as well as the large-scale growers/packers were handling
these regulations systematically in processes they use to secure fruits for procurement
from local growers. To respond to the growing demands, they would need to procure
mango fruits from growers without HWT capability. The local packers in southern
Sinaloa employed field managers who would drive around the region to spot mango
groves in good conditions and estimate dates of harvest. Once identifying a grove and its
harvest date, the manager would contact the grower to negotiate for purchasing the fruits.
The relationships between the mango growers and the local packers might
demonstrate resemblance with what Echánove and Steffen (2005) identified in ejidatarios
growing mangos who sell their fruits to buyers (local packers or intermediaries) in the
state of Nayarit, another major mango-producing state. These patterns varied in several
aspects of procurement of fruits, including timing of offer to buy fruits, degree of “care”
by buying packers of fruits on orchards, and availability of harvest labor and
45

The representatives of the peasant and the private landowning-farmers organizations
participate in the board of CESAVESIN.
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transportation. In my brief field observation in Sinaloa, while I had a sense that there
were varying yet similar patterns of arrangement, unfortunately my limited time in the
field did not allow me to observe and distinguish details of arrangement between buyers
and growers for procurement and harvest of fruits.
No matter how patterns of purchase were built between the growers and packers,
a critical factor for both was the fact that due to the limited handling capacity of the
packing facilities, the harvest, transportation, and processing, along with the clearing of
PS regulations, must all be coordinated at the right moment. Although there were
medium- or large-scale, independent (private landowning) growers who did coordinate
all labor by themselves,46 the local packers purchasing mangos from small-scale growers
had to take care of all these harvest procedures. They organized harvesting teams to
dispatch to mango groves and coordinate transportation of harvested fruits (which is
provided by groups of workers specialized in transportation) to the packinghouse in a
proper timing. While a grower would be informed about a date of harvest, he or she did
not even have to go to the orchard. For small-scale peasants who lack sufficient family
labor, it would be more practical to have a packer’s harvest team pick fruits than
arranging workers or harvesting fruits by themselves. For instance, an employee of the
PS authority with whom I observed the on-site harvest inspection was growing mangos
on his own grove in an ejido he belonged to. Although I missed the opportunity to ask
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This included caring for harvest workers. Since many harvest workers were laborers
seasonally migrating from other states, the growers hiring them had to provide temporary
lodging and food, which could add costs. A grower told me that, while he provided good
care and decent accommodation to his workers, he knew that some of his colleagues were
giving their workers much poorer care.
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him how he would arrange harvest labor, I could reasonably infer that he also was relying
on a packer harvesting team, while he, himself, was moving around for the inspection in
the very harvest season.
A critically important factor was the timely clearance of PS regulations, without
which all the harvest procedures could not proceed. Because CESAVESIN could operate
only a few registration offices in the entire southern region, growers living in remote
areas would find it bothersome to visit the sites only to handle PS regulations. Instead,
going back and forth on pickup trucks between production areas and the CESAVESIN
offices, or communicating with each other by cell phones and walky-talkies, I witnessed
the field managers swiftly clear PS regulations to obtain the needed documentation and
deliver them to harvest sites. For the field managers and packers, handling the regulations
by him/herself in such a concentrated manner would be more secure, hence beneficial,
than letting growers do the red-tape clearance.
Meanwhile, small-scale growers wishing to market mangos for export were likely
to see some advantages in relying on the packers, including finding access to markets,
saving labor for harvest, and clearing PS regulatory red-tape. Of course, despite these
apparent benefits, in the context where the packers (buyers) were handling all harvest
procedures, small-scale growers were likely to have little room for price bargaining,
keeping them in a weaker position in the network of the mango commodity. During
fieldwork, I heard complaints from several informants about prices of mangos virtually
forced by the buyers. Although there seemed to be case-by-case variations, prices offered
by the packers were inclusive of the harvest and transportation labors and the PS
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regulation fee. In other words, these costs were already “deducted” from sales of mangos
that peasants earn.
Whether this price structure would be fair is another complicated question to
address. A peasant might be interested in producing mangos for different reasons
resulting from varying agro-ecological, technical, or financial conditions as well as
factors that were not related to farming as such, including availability of non-farm
employments. Whereas certain types of conventional agricultural productions—livestock
in particular—would demand constant labor inputs, the mango crop might be a good
option if the most labor-intensive harvest process could be “outsourced” to packers,
allowing a grower to work for additional income. This is in line with past literature that
has documented diversification of livelihood means through off-farm employments as
alternative income sources in developing countries including Mexico (de Haan and
Zoomers 2003; De Janvry and Sadoulet 2001; Echánove and Steffen 2005). For instance,
a peasant who had recently started producing mangos told me that he would look for
employment opportunities in other industries, including fisheries, another important
economic sector of the state.47 Also, conditions in which different ejidos sustain their
livelihood appeared to vary considerably even when they were located in proximity. A
peasant leader, who was also a regional cadre of CNC, taking me along on a visit to a few
ejido communities to mobilize peasant members for a PRI’s party-related political event,
suggested that whereas an ejido community seemed relatively better off, another
47

Indeed, the owner family of one of the largest mango grower/packer companies in the
region also owned a business in shrimp production. However, past excessive catches and
persistent poaching led to the depletion of shrimp and resulted in serious decline of the
industry.
319

community in the next village was suffering from insufficient income sources. From the
latter, many male community members migrated to the United States seeking
employment opportunities. As noted earlier, and as demonstrated by critics, these
livelihoods of ejidos under transition were the outcome of a series of political-economic
reforms in Mexico including deregulation of ejidal lands. Especially problematic was that
the series of reforms caused individualization of lives and dismantled communal ties
within peasant communities (de Haan and Zoomers 2003).
10.6 Conclusion: Prospects of Benefits in Uncertainties
As mentioned earlier, literature in development sociology, especially that by AOA,
has shown that peasants in developing countries adopt diverse measures for livelihood
even under apparently similar condition caused by macro-scale social changes such as
economic globalization (Long 2001; Long and Long 1992). Against theories that
emphasize macro political-economic factors as structural determinants of actions of
individual actors, AOA emphasizes actors’ varying perceptions and active constructions
of realities surrounding them, and their resilience. This perspective implies that an
analysis to understand farmers’ responses to agricultural globalization should consider
possible alternative venues of livelihood, including non-farming activities, rather than
examining a single commodity network or chain (in the present study, mango).
Discourses justifying the prospects of economic benefits from the changing PS
regulations and mango production should also be analyzed in this light.
On one hand, the current PS regulations, tightening the control over the
production and transportation processes, may intensify or serve to sustain the growers’
dependency relationship with the packers, forcing the supplying farmers to reconcile with
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their weak negotiation power. Even when the PFA in southern Sinaloa is established, the
increasingly stringent PS regulations controlling many aspects of mango production can
quite possibly make many growers opt to let the packers handle the red-tape, including
payment of the mandatory fee to operate the eradication program. Risks and burdens
pertinent to marketing the commodity to the export markets have been, to a large extent
so far, borne by the packers, rather than growers. Most growers who cannot afford to
invest resources for marketing are likely reluctant to embark on commercialization on
their own. On the other hand, it is true that the fruit fly eradication campaign can “liberate”
peasants from dependence on buyers and packers and open up the possibility for them to
commercialize their products with better prices.
However, there seemed to be many uncertain factors surrounding the mango
sector. For instance, the promising prospect of increasing demand for mangos has to be
examined carefully. In southern Sinaloa, mango production seemed to be booming. Some
farmers began planting mangos even in hilly remote plots (Figure 10-10). Although this
might be an example of a good use of unexploited lands, access to the remote plots could
hinder proper care of the trees, which would add fruits of poorer quality to the already
saturated market. Furthermore, if the grower’s decision to produce mangos was not based
on a strategic and precise cost-benefit calculation but rather the “jumping-on-bandwagon”
motivation, then, in the near future supplies of mangos in this region were more likely to
saturate, resulting in further decline in prices of the product. And if overproduction
reduces the profitability of the mango production, then, the underlying rationale to
continue the eradication program can be questioned. Meanwhile, if mango consumption
in the United States, as accounted by the EMEX representative, shifts towards a more
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generic consumer type, the expected profitability of Mexican mangos can be questioned
as well. The fact that the U.S. mango market has recently witnessed new suppliers, such
as India, Pakistan, or Thailand, leading to harsher competition in the market, urges
scrutiny of the projected profitability.
Furthermore, the resilience of the fruit fly pest adds uncertainty. Although the
central region of Sinaloa had been already recognized by the Mexican government as
pest-free, CESAVESIN was busy with an emergency action against reoccurrence of the
pest when I was conducting fieldwork. Fruit flies are resilient. Even in the northern PFA
recognized by the United States, the uncertainty of the pest did not completely disappear.
A mango grower/packer showed me old HWT equipment left in his packing facility. As it
had been a while since the area became pest-free, he could have scrapped the equipment.
Nonetheless, he kept it because fruit flies might return—no one knows what will happen.
And his statement “no one knows what will happen” became very convincing after I
learned that, as mentioned earlier, his mango grove was badly damaged by a hurricane.
Risks persist in any aspect of agricultural production.
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Figure 10-8 New mango orchards on a remote hillside in Escuinapa, Sinaloa,
Mexico
(Photo by author)

In the southern region, meanwhile, there was growing frustration among the
growers and packers about stagnant progress in eradication and the mandatory program
fee, which had continuously increased, despite their long term commitments. As the
uncertainty of the pest eradication program (and continuous efforts and costs to maintain
the pest free status) persists, a judgment over whether prospective benefits of the PS
program will materialize remains difficult.
Given the intricate relationship between growers and packers and the intertwining
political-economic backdrops surrounding the peasantry, along with intrinsic
uncertainties in production of mangos and the pest’s behavior, accordingly, it seems to be
inadequate to reach a quick and definite judgment about whether PS regulations will
“liberate” the small-scale mango growers from their dependence on the packers. Neither
is it a simple task to evaluate the complicated relationships of interdependence between
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the small-scale growers and the packers. The economic prospects PS regulations are
expected to bring should be discussed, not solely in terms of the relationship between the
packers and the growers in the region, but by first, deliberating how to support, if
necessary, livelihoods of peasant growers faced with opportunities and/or hardships
brought by the global economy, and second, more broadly, situating the question in
different contexts in which regulating the global agro-economy are calculated, justified,
and observed in order to keep raising questions regarding its benefits and costs. Now that
all the finding chapters have been completed, the next chapter, Conclusion, will address
the research questions in detail based on the analyses of the findings.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
This dissertation research aimed to elucidate the workings of PS regulations
enabling the export of Mexican mangos to the United States. PS regulations as material
politics engage diverse and heterogeneous entities, and draw distinctions between
pest/non-pest, simultaneously engendering a variety of socio-material orderings as their
corollaries. In this concluding chapter, firstly, I will summarize the findings and analyses
discussed in the previous chapters, along with responses to the research questions, which
are:
[Question 1] How does the PS regulation network operate to draw distinctions
between pest/non-pest, thereby enabling the export of Mexican mangos to the United
States? Who and what devices, practices, or knowledge are applied in the development
and enactment of PS regulations?
[Question 2] What values are associated with the PS regulation network, and
what are the normative, moral, or ethical implications of the regulations?
[Question 3] How are the PS regulations in transition in Sinaloa changing
economic prospects for mango growers and packers to tap into global markets of
mangos?
Then, I will discuss the sociological significance of the present study, followed by a
concluding reflection on the limitations of this research and suggestions for further
research in the future.
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11.1 Theoretical Framework and Review of Literature
Throughout this research I have intended to illuminate PS regulations for the
export of Mexican mangos as material politics. The concept of material politics (Law and
Mol 2008) draws attention to globalization as involving “material” processes. For
instance, boiling pigswill to make hog feed, constitutes what Law and Mol call a
“political technique” that draws distinctions between clean and not clean material and
simultaneously links different places, thereby engendering multiple socio-material
orderings on a global scale. Law and Mol postulate that there are two distinctive notions
of politics: the first kind as political discussion or debate (following Hannah Arendt’s
political philosophy), and the second, a political process instantiated by more rigid
material beings, such as sleeping policeman (following Latourian STS/ANT); neither
single one suffices to embody material politics, but material politics is the “one that
simultaneously foregrounds the relevance of materialities, whilst making it possible to
explore differences and alternative modes of being” (Law and Mol 2008:135). Moreover,
material politics extends its reach globally, beyond the boundaries of nation states, and is
therefore bound by its technical capability of maneuvering objects, including humans or
non-humans (Barry 2001).
Law and Mol’s argument led me to posit that PS regulations for the export of
Mexican mangos constitute a material politics, which engages human and non-human
entities, with varying degrees of rigidity and flexibility (or immutability and mutability).
PS regulations are enacted through and as very mundane practices, not necessarily in the
form of disputes or contestations, and generates socio-material orderings among both
human and non-human beings, including devices and places. Such ordering effects entail
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a variety of contingent distinctions (e.g., pest/non-pest fruits, clean/infested areas,
appropriate/inappropriate pest control management), while simultaneously establishing
links between distant places (e.g., a mango grove in Mexico and a supermarket’s shelf
where Mexican mangos are sold in the United States). Furthermore, these corollaries of
the regulations would result in not only values, morals, or norms, but also asymmetrical
consequences in economic opportunities, such as differing chances for mango growers or
packers to have access to foreign or better market opportunities.
In the meantime, my study on PS regulations could be situated in several strands
of literature, including works on neoliberal governance, systems theory, STS on scientific
governance, and the sociology of agriculture and food production and consumption. The
literature indicated that the neoliberal governance scheme for regulating agriculture and
food provisions, in which the nation-state government is the principal regulator in society,
are changing. This governance shift reflects differentiated social systems, such as law and
science, which provide expert and technical knowledge bases to heterogeneous agents,
including non-governmental entities. My theoretical foundation drawing on ANT was to
grasp processes of assembling such heterogeneous agents, including non-human material
beings. to enable PS regulations; yet, with the systems theory, it was anticipated that the
assemblage of materially heterogeneous agents would not happen “smoothly,” because of
varying degrees of compatibility with each other resulting from differences in their
operations.
11.2 Methodology
Methodologically, my study relied on the case study approach with qualitative
data collected through ethnographic fieldwork in Mexico (July to November 2008 and
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January to May 2009, nine months in total), combined with analyses of documents, such
as statutes and scientific articles. Most of the data collection activities, besides the
research of documentary data conducted in the United States, took place in Mexico,
principally in the state of Sinaloa, supplemented with some extra travel in Mexico. The
data collection activities entailed semi-structured formal as well as informal interviews,
participant observations, and archival searches at libraries. The analysis of the collected
data drew on both through—or, more accurately, dialectically combining—the “bottomup” approach (i.e., by finding patterns among relevant anecdotes) and the “top-down”
approach (i.e., by applying anticipated categories based on the theoretical framework).
The writing proceeded by connecting the threads among the relevant anecdotes by tracing
the historical and spatial network through which PS regulations have been developed.
11.3 Major Findings and Responses to Research Questions
Following detailed descriptions of the major actors, such as fruit flies and mangos,
and the research site, Sinaloa, chapters 5 through 10 presented major findings and
analyses. The first findings chapter (Chapter 5) elucidated how a certain fruit fly species
was judged and determined to be a pest vis-à-vis particular fruit crops. I demonstrated
two cases in which host statuses of Mexican Hass avocado and manzano hot pepper in
relation to some Anastrepha fruit flies were debated and settled. The processes to
“scientifically” determine pest-host relationships entailed somewhat controversial
communications, revolving around uncertainties in the behaviors of Tephritidae fruit fly
species; yet facts or knowledge about particular pests were taken for granted and kept
concealed until uncertainties reemerged. The findings indicated that whereas science
might rationally and meticulously calculate the potentials of specific pests as risks,
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science itself can shy away from being directly involved in making a legal or
administrative decision; and rather it delegates the decision to other networks (systems).
Scientific knowledge of host-status was translated into other social domains, such as law
and administration. This translation was to build the network of control drawing the
distinction between actors who control and those subject to control, entailing enactment
of power. In the meantime, the remaining and concealed uncertainties about the pest
would appear as controllable risks to those actors engaged in the rational calculation of
hazardous events, whereas the same hazards could appear as uncontrollable dangers to
those who are (deemed) excluded from calculation. I argued that sociological inquiries
should keep elucidating in what contexts, by and for whom, a decision is made, and who
will be affected by it, thereby shedding light on the decisive difference between those
who are decision makers and those who are not.
The next three chapters (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) focused on processes through
which PS regulations “materially” enacted themselves, engaging humans and nonhumans, drawing the boundary between pest/non-pest, and enabling the export of
Mexican mangos to the United States. Hence, the findings from these chapters, along
with those of Chapter 5, lead to responses to the first research question, indicating that
the PS regulation network has developed, not solely as the construction of legal statutes
and administrative organizations, but also as a “material” embodiment, which a
constellation of non-human beings, including devices, and biological agents constitute.
More specifically, the export of Mexican mangos was first enabled by the post-harvest
treatment technique using vapor heat, then fumigation with EDB replaced it, and finally,
the currently most popular HWT followed in the 1980s. While the central idea of these
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post-harvest treatment techniques was relatively simple, that is, to kill immature insects
in fruits, the legal and administrative procedures surrounding the treatment as such
became increasingly complex, incorporating heterogeneous components and commands
throughout the treatment procedures. Notably, this extending regulatory network for postharvest treatments came to employ, not only statutes or verbal commands, but also
coercive physical settings, such as the double screen doors to control movements of
humans and non-humans.
PS regulations further developed and extended outside of packinghouses. Even
while post-harvest treatments steadily enabled the export of mangos, efforts in research
and development to control the fruit fly pests in the field continued so that eventually the
national Campaign against fruit flies was established. The Campaign engaged a
constellation of actors, including biological agents (e.g., natural enemies, sterile insects),
physical constructions (e.g., roadside inspection points), and legal statutes. Thus, this
regulatory network increased in internal complexity and extended its reach from farming
areas to non-farming sites, involving both growers and packers and entities not related to
mango production or exportation. In this extending regulatory network, nongovernmental entities, including quasi-governmental organizations of growers and thirdparty certifiers, played critical roles, fitting squarely in a neoliberal politico-economic
climate in Mexico. These organizations possessed a hybrid nature, combining
characteristics of both government authorities and private sectors, with (supposedly
robust) scientific technical expertise and a unique legal underpinning. I argued that this
hybrid nature made these non-governmental agencies apt to connect and transcend
different networks with different logics, enabling control over the vast PS regulatory
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network, especially in the case of Sinaloa, where the intensive pest suppression was
under operation.
In response to the second research question, furthermore, as suggested by the
material politics concept, the enactment of PS regulations did not concern solely the
distinction between pest/non-pest, but also engendered a variety of ordering corollaries,
including values, normative expectations, and senses of morality, which, combined with
the use of more or less coercive physical constructs as mentioned above, served to
dominate and discipline all those “touched” by the regulation to act in accordance with its
globally valid commands to keep drawing distinctions between pest/non-pest.
Importantly, therefore, even if the observed ordering effects were appearing and observed
at very local and/or personal levels, they should be grasped as an enactment of the global
regulations. In essence, the global regulations as material politics was embodied not
merely as texts or verbal commands, but rather as a mobilization of heterogeneous
material beings that communicate a normatively expected dominant pattern for humans’
and non-humans’ acts in an otherwise messy world.
Yet, this observation by no means indicates that the dominant disciplining effect
was without conflicts. Although I insisted that the conflict communication as such should
not be conceptually confused with non-order or disorder, the field of PS regulations—this
“field” draws from Bourdieu’s concepts (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) as well—was
rife with incompatible interests and hence prone to provoke explicit, often prolonged,
conflicts, as presented in Chapter 9. Such conflicts seemed inclined toward morally
imbued communication, especially when supposed normative expectations were not
fulfilled. For instance, some mango growers who, whether deliberately or for other
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plausible reasons, did not practice required pest control measures, were morally accused
with quite harsh words such as “thickhead.” This indicated, firstly, that although the logic
behind the Campaign called for the responsibility of each individual grower at her or his
grove, that imperative as such already assumed, though tacitly, collective responsibility
held by all growers. Secondly, moral communication, while serving to complement the
regulations’ disciplining effect, tended to problematize the whole personality, rather than
specific features, of a person, and thus could obscure complex backgrounds that might
hinder the person from observing commands of the regulation. Finally, and
understandably, the frustration with those who were ignoring the rules, at least to some
extent, reflected the slower-than-expected progress of the eradication program.
Indeed, as Chapter 10 detailed, discontent smoldered among Sinaloan mango
growers as to the sluggish advancement of the eradication, which, when considering the
pest’s resilience and other challenging factors, might be inevitable. And, the discussion
developed in Chapter 10 provided a response to the final research question related to
economic prospects the PS regulations might alter.
One of the working hypotheses I developed was that while mango growers in
non-PFA areas in Sinaloa might welcome the expansion of PFA since they would be able
to export fruits without relying on packers who had HWT equipment, packers might see
the PFA as threat to their business. In particular, local small-scale growers, being
dependent on the packers, might hope for “independence” from the packers upon
completion of the pest eradication program. However, the relationship between the
packers and growers, and the socio-economic contexts in which their relationships were
embedded, were much more complex than my anticipation. The pest eradication program,
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a core activity of the Campaign, the costs (i.e., the campaign fee) of which each
participating grower incurred, was launched with a rationale that the invested costs would
eventually be compensated for by higher prices of mangos compared to those of other
crops. Certainly, there was a good prospect of increase in the demand for Mexican
mangos in the United States, their major export market. However, particularly in southern
Sinaloa, such a high prospect ironically seemed to have led to an oversupply situation,
which might depreciate prices of the fruit.
Another ironic fact was that while its northernmost geographical and agroecological conditions of Sinaloa were favorable for the eradication program, the same
conditions were a disadvantage because when a mango-harvest season begins in the state
last among the major mango-growing states, fruits from the competitors saturated
markets and further suppressed their prices. The suppressed price of mangos was
problematic for mango growers, especially small-scale farmers in southern Sinaloa, socalled peasants (ejidatarios) included, who tended to lack technical and financial capital,
and nonetheless might have jumped on the bandwagon of mango production, given the
prospect of better prices of the fruit. The increase in the fee to participate in the
Campaign exacerbated this situation, despite the sluggish—as it appeared to growers who
had to pay the cost—progress in eradication. The stagnant prices of mangos along with
the increased fee could have made some growers unwilling to observe the regulations.
Unfortunately, the logic of free-market’s “supply and demand” by which the prices of
mangos would be determined, and on which the hope for better market opportunities for
Mexican mangos hinged, was beyond the control of CESAVESIN and third-party
certifiers, which aptly maneuvered the field operations of PS regulations.
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Despite the murky outlook for prices and the slow progress in eradication,
apparently, mango production still attracted growers in southern Sinaloa. Growing
mangos required much less labor than other conventional crops and livestock production.
In particular, harvest, the most labor-intensive process, as well as some of PS regulatory
“red-tape,” such as the campaign fee payment, could be taken care of by the local packers.
While some ejidatarios were embarking on independently marketing their mangos
despite technical and financial challenges, many growers seemed to continue working
with the packers and find other employment opportunities.
Given the above observations of the complex socio-economic contexts in which
the livelihoods of growers were situated, I argue, while PS regulations, the Campaign
program in particular, could definitely improve market chances for even small-scale
growers, substantial challenges, including their dependence on packers, still remained,
and had to be dealt with if such an economic prospect was to materialize as expected.
Rather, I argue that the question as to whether and how PS regulations would alter the
prospect of economic opportunities for those involved in mango production to tap into
global markets requires a careful scrutiny into varying and complex realities surrounding
the livelihoods of the small-scale growers, such as financial capital, access to technical
assistance, or supplemental outside employment opportunities.
11.4 Sociological Significance of the Present Research
11.4.1 What insights did my research add to sociology?
What contributions, or new insights, could this research add to sociology,
especially literature related to agri-food studies, globalization, and development studies
and theories, including science and technology studies and systems theory? One
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contribution that I claim this study makes is that my inquiry has shed light on PS
regulations as the principal theme, with a relatively unusual approach combining insights
from both STS and a social systems theoretical framework. Although the globalization of
agriculture and food production and consumption and the organizational and institutional
changes enabling it, including global regulations and standards, have been keenly
investigated in social sciences and in the sociology of agriculture in particular (Bonanno
et al. 1994; Goodman and Watts 1997; Higgins and Lawrence 2005a; Lowe, Marsden,
and Whatmore 1994b; McMichael 1994b), relatively few works have dealt with PS
regulations as the main focus of study (Alvarez 2001; 2006; Knight 2005; Stanford 2002).
In this regard, the detailed and comprehensive delineations of the operations and
historical development of PS regulations have added, I believe, new insights to the
literature of sociology of agriculture and globalization.
More specifically, however, my study has raised several sociologically significant
implications: (1) there has been a shift toward the diffusion of control of agri-food
networks from control by a nation-state government to a governance scheme involving
more heterogeneous entities/actors; (2) expected specific roles of science and
technologies in materializing the regulatory network have increased, leading them to
acquire a major control ability, or what is termed “scientific governance”; (3) control
abilities are not only unequally distributed among actors involved in a regulatory network,
but also in qualitatively different manners in society (i.e., different components have
different functions), which reflects their particular characteristics, that is, control is
dispersed within functionally differentiated social systems.
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Firstly, the recent literature in sociology of agriculture and food production and
consumption and critical assessments of political-economy and political processes has
incorporated increasing concerns about the shift toward governance from (nation-state)
government (Dean 1994; 2010; Higgins and Lawrence 2005a; Jessop 1995; 1998; 1999).
According to the governance concept of which central argument is to grasp, not a single
controlling entity, but rather a multiplicity of practices and technologies, controls
individual’s conduct, including self-disciplining mechanisms drawing on ethical calls, as
encapsulated as the term “governmentality” (Foucault 1978). The recognition of such a
shift of the controlling mode was captured by sociological works in the 1980s through
1990s, which argued that global integration driven by multinational corporations under
the capitalist agricultural development had undermined the national basis in regulating
agriculture and rural spaces (Lowe, Marsden, and Whatmore 1994a). Interestingly,
however, my study of PS regulations as a global regulatory institution elucidated
significant roles that nation-state governments still maintain in its enactment. Meanwhile,
my findings indicated that national PS regulations were enmeshed within the
“hierarchically” as well as “horizontally” arranged organizational and legal framework
extending from the international to local scales, and that the quasi-governmental bodies
came to play significant roles in PS regulations in Mexico. These observations fit
squarely with recent literature observing governance that has illuminated increasing roles
of new regulatory bodies, including international organizations and non-governmental
“third-party” certifiers, towards which centers of control over the agri-food provision
network has been shifting (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 2005). Furthermore, in the
literature of sociology of agriculture and food production and consumption, there has
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been a “consumption turn” arguing that consumers, and the retail sector as a mediator and
materializer of their interests, became an influential determinant in shaping and steering
the ways agro-commodities would be produced, and how they were consumed (Busch
and Bain 2004; Goodman 2002). Nonetheless, in my case of PS regulations, direct
influence on the very regulation’s operation from retailers or consumers did not seem
substantial. Although the Campaign against the fruit fly rhetorically mobilized
consumers’ interests and benefits as its justification, the principal discourse to justify it
was that Mexican growers bound by trade limitation were its beneficiaries, thus,
contrasting with the above literature.
What does the compatibility of my findings with some, and incompatibility with
other, trends of agri-food globalization, especially the governance shift discussed in the
literature, indicate? I argue that sources of and demands for legitimacy of global agrifood regulations have become diversified, hence, different regulatory networks are
constituted and composed in varying and heterogeneous ways, contingently depending on
types of object dealt with and interests of involved actors. For example, whereas food
safety concerns provoked by occurrences of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
Japan were supposed to be handled by scientists convened under a national government
agency (Tanaka 2008), other cases of establishing regulations, such as product
development, quality standards, or certifications of organic agricultural products in the
United States, were undertaken by retailers or third-parties (Busch and Bain 2004; Flynn,
Marsden, and Ward 1994; Freidberg 2004; Guthman 2004). As elucidated through my
research, regulations, such as PS regulations, can comprise a constellation of robust
monitoring schemes, which span varying scales/spaces (Mutersbaugh 2005) and serve to
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self-discipline conduct of individuals. Yet, the monitoring activities were embedded and
enmeshed within the locally specific socio-economic conditions, such as the
interdependence relationship between mango packers and growers, and extrinsic
biological factors such as the resilience of the fruit fly pests. Thus, contingent and
locally-specific arrangements and/or distributions of resources, interests, and agriecological factors would make up an internally heterogeneous and complex composition
of a specific regulatory network, which could differ substantially from one another.
Finally, the local embeddedness of the regulation suggested, as mentioned above, that
careful examination is needed as to how likely and plausible discourses claiming benefits
and beneficiaries, as well as cost and risk distribution, are, since locally specific
conditions can hinder the supposed benefits from materializing.
Secondly, in close relation with the first theme regarding governance, STS
proposes the concept of scientific governance (Irwin 2007) to critically examine the
relationship between political/legal/administrative decision-making and science as a
truthful and trustful knowledge base for the former, especially to deal with risks or
hazards. My study of the material politics of PS regulations has illuminated a couple of
themes that resonate with this line of inquiry drawing on scientific governance. For
example, the regulatory network developed as an assemblage of heterogeneous actors,
mobilized through a constellation of practices, including discursive commands,
technologies, and physical constructions. The regulatory network as a techno-scientific
assemblage, thus, served to discipline all those involved in it through, on one hand
relatively coercive physical settings, and on the other hand, supposedly objective
scientific knowledge that serves as authoritative legitimacy by which individuals develop
338

self-disciplining normative and ethical senses conforming to global science-based
regulations.
Another important finding related to “boundary work,” which demarcates science
and non-science (Gieryn 1983; 1999; Jasanoff 1987). As the principal legitimate source
of objective knowledge of “natural” worlds that steers political/administrative decisionmakings, science attempts to draw a boundary with other domains of society. For
instance, some entomologists perceived politico-economic interests permeating into the
making of a scientific judgment as distorting objectivity. Yet, boundary works are not
premised on a static and pre-established boundary, but rather presume a continuous
enactment of demarcation, which may be murky and shaky. Thus constructed scientific
knowledge may be based on suspended assumptions in the phenomenological sense
(Berger and Luckmann 1966), as witnessed with the cases of tacitly assumed “immunity”
of manzano hot pepper to fruit flies (Chapter 5), and of Probit 9 mortality, which has long
been applied without scrutiny as a tacitly accepted risk tolerance level of pests (Chapter
6). Such implicit infusion of suspended assumptions into the making of scientific
knowledge would call for critical assessment of the claim that scientific knowledge
serves as a value-neutral basis for risk governance.
Thirdly, as indicated by literature in STS and scientific governance as well as
works in sociology of agriculture and food drawing from STS, there is always asymmetry
between those who are involved and those not involved in making (risk-related) political
decisions (Irwin 2007). The asymmetry in scientific decision making often reflects the
division between scientific experts and non-experts, lay or “engaged citizens.”
Historically, STS scholars have been critical of certain types of discourses revolving
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around relationships between scientific experts and non-experts, such as the “deficit
model of public understanding of science,” which disdains “lay” people’s capability of
understanding scientific knowledge (Massimiano and Neresini 2007). As science has
come to affect every aspect of the modern technologized life with potential hazards,
whether environmental impact, food safety, or other technologically induced disasters
(e.g., nuclear accidents), its “public” nature drew massive attention, resulting in attempts,
such as consensus conferences, to engage the public in techno-science-related political
decisions (Fujigaki 2002; Kobayashi 2002). These efforts meant to mitigate the concern,
if not completely abolish it, about the asymmetric relationship between those in
influential positions in risk-related policy making, such as scientific experts and
technocrats, and those who are not, and thereby build more “democratic” ways to
construct scientific knowledge and political decision making informed by it.
However, different actors’ asymmetrical degrees of engagement in risk-related
science and political decision making, which juxtapose scientific/technical experts and
non-scientific “lay” people, might also indicate differentiated expectations for different
actors in the decision making. For example, the Risk Analysis scheme, which has become
a standard model in risk-related governance (Yamada 2004) consists of scientific risk
assessment, political/administrative risk management, and risk communication,
presuming varying roles and responsibilities of different actors. Further, when we
consider that even scientists dispute a scientific “fact” (e.g., whether prion was the
pathogenic agent of BSE was contested), it could be insufficient to frame only the
asymmetry between “scientific experts” and “lay people.” Rather, I would argue, based
on the systems theoretical perspective, it is more appropriate to grasp these apparently
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asymmetrical engagements in making science-based risks-related decisions as corollaries
of different networks (systems or fields) that differ in their programs and simultaneously
have their limitations. For instance, my examination of the risk management decision
making regarding importation of Mexican Hass avocados to the United States also
indicated that science was shy about making the administrative decision over relaxing
quarantine restrictions on the commodity.
Following Luhmannian systems theory, I would argue that the above observation
is an indication of a functionally differentiated society, which is, according to Luhmann,
the hallmark of modernity. The concept of functional divisions, or functionalism,
originating from the division of labor of society by Durkheim and inherited from
Parsonsian structural functionalism, would remind many sociologists of the analogy with
a living organism that posited “basic functions” as a causal mechanism to fulfill the needs
in order to sustain the integrity of the organism’s body (Collins and Makowsky 2005).
Luhmann and his followers departed from this model and formulated it as a scheme with
which to find alternative solutions that fulfill a certain condition (Nagaoka 2006). For
instance, science as a subsystem of society would be posited to fulfill communications
that distinguish truth/not-truth. Modern society is characterized with a constellation of
differentiated functional systems (networks or fields) that operate in different conditions
that each system has to fulfill. A system may serve to feed solutions into other systems,48

48

Collins and Makowsky (2005) explain the basic functionalist premise as follows: “The
various parts of a society . . . all serve functions for the other institutions, and they
exchange these contributions for mutual support” (190, emphasis added). This
understanding of functions, typical among Angrophone sociologists, is apparently similar
with yet decisively different from Luhmann’s in that in the former all functions are
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thus creating inter-reliance among systems. For instance, scientific knowledge may be
used as a legitimate basis for legal or administrative decision making.
Also, drawing on evolution theories, Luhmannian systems theory postulates the
possibility (not necessity) of further differentiation within a system, that is, subsystems,
which increase internal complexities. Although in sociology since the nineteenth century,
evolution has often been equated with pre-determined “progress,” contemporary systems
theory has abandoned this perspective and grasps it as a contingent process consisting of
variation, selection, and (re)stabilization (Luhmann 2009a). In this scheme of evolution,
within a system, small variations (i.e., distinctions) selected more or less by chance
eventually engender a relatively stable subsystem (subcomponent).
The empirical question or interest of this functionalism, however, resides not
simply in explaining how well a depiction of social phenomena fits this model of interreliance between systems (thereby implicitly justifying status quo), but in elucidating
what is concealed or ignored, whether conflicting interests of some people or
uncertainties of the “natural” world, in the apparently “harmonious” connections among
different systems. And, this interest in concealment and ignorance is encapsulated as a
simple but vital question continuously asked in sociology from its outset: “what’s behind
all this?” (Luhmann 1998:77). Given this conceptualization of differentiation, I make the
case that PS regulations intersect with different systems and are supplied with
foundations of their legitimacy, such as “objective” scientific knowledge, legal
underpinning, and calculation of economic benefits, and so forth. Following Callon’s
presumed to serve to sustain the whole society, whereas in the latter whether and how a
functional system serves others is contingent.
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terminology (Callon 1986), this process is one through which “feeds” from different
systems are assembled though “problematization, interessment, enrollment, and
mobilization” involving non-human beings, including physical constructs.
However, the hybrid characteristic of PS regulations comprising internally
differentiated subcomponents, constituted as an assemblage of different institutional
bases with the technical capability of enacting itself physically, which materializes itself
as “power” disciplining everything involved, is an outcome of concealment and
simplification of uncertainties of the workings of “nature” and perhaps conflicting
interests. PS regulations might be based on scientific knowledge established by halting
further contemplation of uncertainties of the pest’s behaviors; the regulation might also
have overridden interests of resource-poor peasants who were unwilling to pay further
costs, and the meticulous protocols might create conflicts between packers and regulatory
inspectors.
All these considerations relate to a diagnosis of how risks are dealt with in society.
One challenge faced by governance in modern society, especially in its relationship with
the natural world, lies in handling of risks, which have extended the range of people
affected by potential hazards beyond boundaries of nation states and political-economic
statuses, or social classes (Beck 1992). According to Beck, risk in modernity results from
growing technical capability to maneuver material around the world and make it
predictable, which has ironically resulted in technologically induced unpredictable
disasters. Yet, furthermore, governance of late modern society was meant exactly to solve
this problem by calculating forcibly—as it were—this apparently incalculable
unpredictability, thereby formulating it as a calculated risk (Dean 2010). Thus, the risk
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concept always resides with active calculation of hazardous events (Komatsu 2003;
Luhmann 1993). And, in modern society, this rational calculation seems to be undertaken
largely if not solely by science, rather than other social systems such as religion or art.
This almost exclusive reliance on science as the calculator of risks, based on its expected
capability to establish objective knowledge about nature, might be a reflection of the
historical development of modernity. Latour (1993) posited that there was a “Great
Divide” preceding modernity, which marked the epistemological division between
“nature” and (human) “society.” This led science to differentiate itself from religion to
take over the latter’s exclusive privilege of interpreting the “natural” world and building
knowledge about it, which other differentiated systems, such as law and political systems,
eventually came to incorporate in their operations (Köpping 2002). A problematic
consequence of this differentiation of modern society is that, as each system can react to
what would happen in “nature” only according to its own program, their capacity is prone
to be overwhelmed by uncertainties (Hijikata 2002), which could eventually reemerge, as
specifically demonstrated in Chapter 5. Risks, in this sense, are handled in a very
paradoxical way in modern society—while handled as if they are calculable, in fact that
apparent handleability is only on the basis of the limited capability of each system.
11.4.2 Limitations and directions of future research
My discussions above thus have shown that the sociological significance of this
research is situated in various contexts of literature including sociology of agriculture and
food production and consumption, development and globalization, and STS and diagnosis
of modernity based on the systems theoretical perspective. All the findings and analyses
were intended to elucidate, on one hand, some stories of what enables mangos imported
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from Mexico, commonly found in a supermarket in the United States, and, on the other
hand, sociological implications of PS regulations. Meanwhile, obviously, there are
limitations or weakness in the way I conducted this research and elicited the conclusions,
as suggested in Chapter 3 (Methodologies).
To begin with, the case study approach is not intended to provide findings that
can be generalizable across different cases. In this regard, it is essential for future
research endeavors on global regulations, such as PS regulations, to expand geographical
as well as thematic scopes of inquiry (e.g., regulations over other products, other pests),
in order to examine variability as well as commonality across cases, to deepen
understanding of processes associated with the globalization of agriculture and food
production and consumption.
Also, my qualitative research methods did not provide accurate quantitative
assessments of the impact of PS regulations. The recruitment of the informants relied on
a convenient and snowball sampling strategy, because of which the obtained data were
likely to be biased, especially toward “elite” perspectives. Thus, my study had virtually
no information to estimate how many farmers would benefit from participating in the PS
program or how much costs and benefit the regulation would generate. Since such
information and analysis can be particularly pertinent to more “practical” contributions
by sociological inquiries to policy-making, it will be beneficial and necessary to conduct
systematic survey research for obtaining better quantitative estimates of perceptions,
opinions, or concerns that stakeholders, such as mango growers and packers, embrace
about PS regulations in Sinaloa and Mexico.
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The last methodological limitation was that despite my claim that the ordering
effect of PS regulations should be grasped as an incomplete status, this study can only
capture it as a static writing. Nonetheless, I argue that the concept of ordering has an
important theoretical implication that my observations and delineations of PS regulations
continue to be subject to (re)interpretation, and thereby remain “incomplete.” I hope that
future readers will add fresh insights from this study to the literature of sociology.
Meanwhile, one may ask if this specific research could provide “practical” or socalled policy suggestions. To that question I would respond, for example, by insisting that
the research illuminating the frustrations and struggles of some mango growers to meet
the regulatory requirements should be alleviated by providing technical or financial
support. Or, I might also suggest that publicity of the PS program, especially activities in
urban residential areas, be more extended to inform people living there. While I believe
that these suggestions are important, sociologically informed “practical” suggestions of
this research based on the abstract argument on the consequences of modernity is to
remind us that society has still limitations in its handling of risks. No matter how
technically sophisticated it has become, society can handle uncertainties of the “natural”
world only by assembling, reducing, and concealing its uncertainties, which may remerge.
Nonetheless, the same modern society tends to pretend to be able to appropriately handle
these uncertainties, yet in doing so, whether implicitly or explicitly, attributes and
distributes responsibilities, costs, and moral/ethical duties to different actors or entities.
To conclude this dissertation, sociological inquiries can and should keep attending
to who or what are supposed to bear burdens and costs in order to make possible the
global-scale provision of foods and agricultural products, including “exotic” ones, such
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as mango. I believe that research endeavors to shed light on mechanisms behind the
globalization of agriculture and foods, which entail mundane material practices and
engender orderings of the world while concealing domination, conflicts, and costs, will
remind us that the plethora of foods we enjoy cannot be taken for granted and is in fact
unlikely to happen. Indeed, a Japanese word to express appreciation, Arigatai, signifies
that the world that allows us to live is a very unlikely occurrence. I appreciate, or feel
Arigatai about, the fact that mangos are produced and delivered from Mexico, and made
available on a shelf of a supermarket in the United States.
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Appendix 1: Organizations contacted and visited for the study

Name of organization*

Type of activity

Location
(State) **

Interview

Participant
observation

Archival
search

Remarks

Governmental agency
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Direction General Plant Health,
National Service of Agro Alimentary
Health, Safety, and Quality
(SENASICA), Ministry of
Agriculture, Livestock, Rural
Development, Fisheries and Food of
Mexico (SAGARPA)

Regulatory
administration

Mexico City
(Federal
District)

Yes

Headquarters of fruit fly
control program in Mexico

SAGARPA Regional Delegation office
in state of Sinaloa

Regulatory
administration

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Yes

Fruit fly mass-rearing plant (Moscafrut)

Regulatory
administration/
Research

Tapachula
(Chiapas)

Yes

Yes

Sanitary Regulation, State Government
of Sinaloa

Regulatory
administration

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

State government's agency in
charge of health and safety
administration

International Service (IS), Mexico Area
III, Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), US
Department of Agriculture (USDA)

Regulatory
administration

ZapopanGuadalajara
(Jalisco)

Yes

USDA-APHIS regional
delegation in central Mexico
in charge of certification of
export packing houses

State Library of Sinaloa

(Archive)

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Regional office in Sinaloa of
Ministry of Agriculture of
Mexico
Yes

Yes

Plant for mass-rearing of
sterlile fruit flies and
biological control agents
(parasitoides); engaged in
research as well

Name of organization*

Type of activity

Location
(State) **

Interview

Participant
observation

Archival
search

Remarks

Para- / Non-governmental
organization
Regulatory
administration

Culiacán, El
Rosario, Los
Mochis
(Sinaloa)

Food and Development Resaerch
Center (CIAD)

Research

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Governmental research and
education institute

National Institute of Forestry,
Agriculture and Livestock Research
(INIFAP)

Research

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Governmental research
institute

Foundation Produce

Research/
Technical
validation/
Extension

Culiacán, El
Rosario
(Sinaloa)

Yes

NORMEX

Regulatory
administration

Uruapan
(Michoacán)

Yes

"Third-party" entity for
certification

State Committee of Plant Health of
Chiapas (CESAVE CHIAPAS)

Regulatory
administration

Mapastepec
(Chiapas)

Yes

"Auxiliary" (paragovernmental) organization
in charge of phytosanitary
field activities in Sinaloa
state

Local Phytosanitary Board of Fruit
Growers of Soconusco (JLSVFS)

Regulatory
administration

Tapachula
(Chiapas)

Yes

Growers group responsible
for local level phytosanitary
regulatory activities
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State Committee of Plant Health of
Sinaloa (CESAVESIN)

Yes

"Auxiliary" (paragovernmental) organization
in charge of phytosanitary
field activities in Sinaloa
state

Yes

Non-governmental
oraganization engaged in
agricultural technical
development and extension

Name of organization*

Type of activity

Location
(State) **

Interview

Participant
observation

Archival
search

Remarks

Packer/exporter organization
Mango Packers and Exporters
Asociation (EMEX)

Regulatory
administration

ZapopanGuadalajara
(Jalisco)

Yes

Exporters association (the
only organization officially
recognized by US as
representing Mexican mango
exporters)

Mango packer/exporter/grower 1

Packing /
Export /
Production

Northern
Sinaloa

Yes

Yes

Mango packer/exporter with
production

Mango packer/exporter/grower 2

Packing /
Export /
Production

Northern
Sinaloa

Yes

Yes

Mango packer/exporter with
production

Mango packer/exporter/grower 3

Packing /
Export /
Production

Northern
Sinaloa

Yes

Yes

Mango packer/exporter with
production

Mango packer/exporter/grower 4

Packing /
Export /
Production

Southern
Sinaloa

Yes

Mango packer/exporter with
production

Mango packer/exporter 1

Packing /
Export

Central
Sinaloa

Yes

Mango packer/exporter

Mango packer/exporter 2

Packing /
Export

Southern
Sinaloa

Yes

Packer/exporter
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Yes

Mango packer/exporter

Name of organization*

Type of activity

Location
(State) **

Interview

Participant
observation

Archival
search

Remarks

Farmer organization
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Confederation of Agricultural
Association of State of Sinaloa
(CAADES)

Production /
Regulatory
administration /
Research /
Extension

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Agricultural Association in southern
Sinaloa 1

Production

Southern
Sinaloa

Yes

Local-level organization of
private land-owning farmers

Agricultural Association in southern
Sinaloa 2

Production

Southern
Sinaloa

Yes

Local-level organization of
private land-owning farmers

Fruit growers association in Chiapas

Production

(Chiapas)

Yes

Communal land user group in southern
Sinaloa

Production

Southern
Sinaloa

Yes

Group of "ejidatarios"
(members of communal land
"ejido")

Regional office in southern Sinaloa of
National Commission of Peasants
(ejidos)

Production

Escuinapa
(Sinaloa)

Yes

"Umbrella" organizations of
ejidos

Communal land user group en Chiapas

Production

Tapachula
(Chiapas)

Yes

Group of "ejidatarios"
(members of communal land
"ejido")

Labor Union of Farm Wage Workers

Regulatory
administration
(labor union)

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Regional Peasant Commission (farm
wage worker union)

Regulatory
administration
(labor union)

El Rosario
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Worker organization

State-level "umbrella"
organization of private landowning farmers

Name of organization*

Type of activity

Location
(State) **

Interview

Participant
observation

Archival
search

Universities
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Faculty of Agronomy, Autonomous
University of Sinaloa

Research

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Yes

Central Library, Autonomous
University of Sinaloa

Research

Culiacan
(Sinaloa)

Bioscience Center, Autonomous
University of Chiapas

Research

Tapachula
(Chiapas)

Yes

Southern Frontier College, Tapachula
Campus

Research

Tapachula
(Chiapas)

Yes

Central Library, Autonomous
University of Chapingo

Research

Chapingo
(México)

Institute of Geography, Autonomous
University of Mexico

Research

Mexico City
(Federal
District)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Remarks

Appendix 2: Interview guide
Form M
Interview Guide (English)
[Introduction (common to all informants)]
Ø Explanation of the research objectives and
procedures including the precautionary
measures for protection of human subjects’
privacy and confidentiality
Ø Explanation of the anticipated interview time
(about 45 to 90 minutes)
Ø Explanation of the consent to participate in the
research

Guía de la Entrevista (español)
[Introducción (común para todos informantes)]
Ø Explicación del objetivo y los procedimientos
del estudio, incluyendo las maneras preventivas
para la protección de la privacidad y
confidencialidad de participantes en el estudio
Ø Explicación del tiempo anticipado de la
entrevista (aproximadamente 45 a 90 minutos)
Ø Explicación del consentimiento para participar
en el estudio

[Questions about informant’s information
(common to all informants)]

[Preguntas sobre la información de los
informantes (común para todos
Ø Questions regarding informant’s basic data such informantes)]
as:
§ Age, gender
§ Contact address
§ Organization he/she is or was affiliated
with, roles or position, years of affiliation
§ Educational achievement, other career
experiences

Ø Preguntas sobre datos básicos sobre el/la
informante tales como:
§ Edad , Género
§ Dirección del contacto
§ Organización con la que el/la informante
esté afiliado, posición y papeles, la
duración de la afiliación
§ Logros educativos y otras experiencias
profesionales

(Continued to the next page)
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[Questions for researchers engaged in
development of PS technologies]

[Preguntas para los investigadores quienes
se han involucrado en el desarrollo de las
tecnologías fitosanitarias]

Ø ¿Qué son/fueron sus papeles en el desarrollo de
la tecnología?
Ø ¿Cómo usted se ha involucrado en la
investigación del desarrollo técnico?
Ø ¿Cuáles fueron razones oficiales para ejecutar
el estudio?
§ ¿Qué demandas sociales/económicas/
culturales sostenían el estudio?
Ø ¿Cuáles fueron sus opiniones personales sobre
las razones oficiales del estudio?
Ø ¿Cuáles obstáculos técnicos o sociales (p.ej.
legal, financiero) o controversias se han
encontrados en el estudio?
Ø ¿Cómo usted trató de solucionar los obstáculos
encontrados?
§ ¿Qué herramientas, conocimientos o teorías
§ What technical tools, scientific theories, or
científicos, o razones legales o financieros
legal or financial rationale did you (try to)
usted propuso o trató de proponer?
come up with?
Ø ¿Qué beneficios y/o problemas posibles usted
piensa/pensaba las tecnologías las que usted ha
Ø What benefits and/or potential problems do/did
trabajado generarían? Por favor provea los
you think the technology you developed would
cuentos “oficiales” tanto como sus opiniones
bring about? Please provide both “official”
acerca de los impactos de la tecnología sobre
accounts of and your personal thoughts about
los siguientes grupos de gente:
impacts of the technology to following groups
§ Usted
of people:
§ La población entera nacional, productores,
§ Yourself
empacadores/exportadores, y sus
§ The entire Mexican nation; farmers;
trabajadores de México
distributors (packers and exporters); their
§ La población entera nacional, productores;
workers
distribuidores, consumidores de EEUU
§ US nation, farmers, distributors, consumers
§ Cualquier otro grupo de gente sobre cual la
tecnología haya tenido impactos
§ Any other group of people the technique
might impact on

Ø What are/were your roles in the development of
the technology?
Ø How did you come to be involved in the
research to develop the technology?
Ø What were official rationales for carrying out
the research?
§ What social/economic/cultural demands
were underlying the research?
Ø What were your personal opinions about those
rationales for the research?
Ø What technical and other social (e.g. legal,
financial) challenges and/or controversies did
you encounter in the research?
Ø How did you address those challenges?

(Continued to the next page)
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[Common Questions for PS officials,
Growers, Packers/Exporters, Packers’
association, and Workers]

[Preguntas comunes para los oficiales
fitosanitarios, productores,
empacadoras/exportadoras, asociación de
empacadoras, y trabajadores]

Ø ¿Cuáles son/fueron razones para usted de su
Ø What are/were rationales to carry out your
cumplir su trabajo?
work?
Ø ¿Qué “oficiales” demandas
§ What “official” social/economic/cultural
sociales/económicas/ culturales sabe usted
demands do you know are underlying your
sostienen el trabajo?
work?
Ø What tools, devices, material (e.g. pesticide) do Ø ¿Cuáles herramientas, aparatos, materiales (p.ej.
pesticida), usa en el sitio (campo) de su trabajo?
you use in the work place (field)?
Ø What technical and social (e.g. legal, financial) Ø ¿Cuáles obstáculos técnicos o sociales (p.ej.
legal, financiero) o controversias ha encontrado
challenges do/did you encounter in your work?
en su trabajo?
§ ¿Cómo trató de solucionar los obstáculos?
§ How do/did you address those challenges?
§ ¿Sus soluciones funcionan bien?
§ Do the measures work effectively?
§ ¿Hay cualquier problema en torno al costo
§ Any problems in terms of operation cost,
operativo o condiciones labores para
labor condition to tackle the challenge?
solucionar los obstáculos?
Ø ¿Qué cambios en el sitio del trabajo usted
Ø What changes in your work place resulting
percibe que resulte de la tecnología
from the PS technology do you perceive?
fitosanitaria?
§ Por favor cuénteme unas experiencias
§ Please tell me a couple of your memorable
memorables acerca del trabajo relacionado
experiences concerning working with the
a la tecnología fitosanitaria.
PS technologies.
§ ¿Cualquier cambio en normas o valores
§ Any changes in norms or values such as
tales como el ético del trabajo o reglas
work ethic or unspoken rules?
tácitas?
Ø ¿Qué beneficios y/o problemas posibles usted
Ø What benefits and/or potential problems do/did
piensa/pensaba las tecnologías las que usted ha
you think the PS technologies would bring
trabajado generarían? Por favor provea los
about? Please provide both “official” accounts
cuentos “oficiales” tanto como sus opiniones
and your personal thoughts on impacts to
acerca de los impactos de la tecnología sobre
following groups of people (same as above).
los siguientes grupos de gente (igual que arriba).
Ø ¿Cuál es su opinión general sobre la norma y
Ø What is your overall opinion about the PS
las tecnologías fitosanitarias?
regulation and technologies?

(Continued to the next page)
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[Questions for PS officials]

[Preguntas para los oficiales fitosanitarios]

Ø What is/was your work regarding the PS
Ø ¿Qué es/fue su trabajo relacionado a las
technologies (HWT and/or PFA)?
tecnologías fitosanitarias (HWT and/or PFA)?
§ Please describe briefly the nature of your
§ Por favor describa brevemente el carácter
work.
de su trabajo.
Ø How did you come to be involved in this work? Ø ¿Cómo usted se puso a dedicar a este trabajo?
§ Any qualification requirement to do this
§ ¿Cualquier calificación requerida para
job?
dedicarse a este trabajo?
Ø What are impacts of the expansion of the PFA Ø ¿Cuáles son impactos de la expansión de las
in Sinaloa?
áreas libres de plagas en Sinaloa?

[Questions for Growers, Packers/Exporters,
Packers’ association]

[Preguntas para los productores,
empacadoras/exportadoras, y asociación de
empacadoras]

Ø Please describe briefly your business operation. Ø Por favor describa brevemente la operación de
su negocio.
§ Tamaño del negocio (rendimiento,
§ Size of your business (yield, treatment
capacidad del tratamiento, venta, empleo)
capacity, sales, employment)
§ Historia del negocio
§ History of your business
§ Otras actividades comerciales (producción
§ Other commercial activities (production or
o procesamiento de otros cultivos, etc.)
processing of other crops, etc)
Ø ¿Qué sabe usted sobre el área libre de plagas?
Ø What do you know about PFA?
§ ¿Es eso afectando su negocio? ¿En qué
§ Is PFA affecting your business? In what
manera?
way?

[Questions for workers]

[Preguntas para los trabajadores]

Ø Please describe briefly your work.
§ Nature of your work and size of your work
place
Ø How did you come to work here?
§ Any qualification requirement to do this
job?
Ø What tools, devices, material (e.g. pesticide) do
you use in the work place?
Ø What do you know about PFA?
§ Is PFA affecting your work? In what way?

Ø Por favor describa brevemente su trabajo.
§ El carácter de su trabajo y tamaño del sitio
de su trabajo
Ø ¿Cómo usted se puso a trabajar aquí?
§ ¿Cualquier calificación requerida para
dedicarse a este trabajo?
Ø ¿Cuáles herramientas, aparatos, materiales (p.ej.
pesticida), usa en el sitio (campo) de su trabajo?
Ø ¿Qué sabe usted sobre el área libre de plagas?
§ ¿Es eso afectando su negocio? ¿En qué
manera
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Appendix 3-1 Outline of NOM-023-FITO-1995
Components

Contents
v To establish PS regulations against major Anastrepha pests to recognize and protect PFA and ALPP*1
Ø Subjects of control: 47 fruit plant species that are hosts for four Anastrepha species and Apple maggot fly (R. pomonella) ,
“host fruits” hereafter

Areas of application

v Commercial orchards of host fruits
v Marginal areas (non-commercial orchards, backyards, national parks, ecological reserve and wilderness areas) with host fruits

Specification of
regulatory activities

v Registration and certification of orchards of host fruits
Ø Orchard owners or users register their acreage with host fruits and have verification
v Organization
Ø Campaign participants belong to a growers-organization*2 that coordinates the Campaign including finance
Ø Federal government funds activities in marginal areas

Technical specifics

v
v
v
v

Trapping for pest monitoring , sampling of fruits in fields for pest monitoring, and identification of the pests
Mechanical-cultural control (collection of unharvested fruits, clean-up of orchards, etc) and chemical control (bait-pesticide spray)
Release of sterile fly and parasitoid (natural enemy for biological control)
Determination of pest-prevalence status of orchards
Ø (Individual orchard level) Categories of status (pest-free, low, and high) based on detected “flies per trap per day” (FTD)
Ø (Individual orchard level) Record (“IPM card”) of pest status
Ø (Regional level) Categories of status (PFA, ALPP and “Area under PS control”) based on FTD
v Measures to maintain and protect PFA and ALPP
Ø Monitoring of the pest by trap
Ø Regulation of transport of host fruits from outside
Ø Emergency plan of intensive actions to contain pests occurring in PFA

Technical
appendices

v
v
v
v
v
v
v
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Main objectives

Organization and Administration
Field operation
Identification of fruit flies
Automated information system for field operation
Quality control of trapping
Emergency plan for PFA
Supervision and evaluation of the Campaign

*1 NOM-023 also intends to establish “temporally pest-free orchard.” But, to make the explanation simple, I will omit its description
*2 Organization called “auxiliary body” including Comité Estatal de Sanidad Vegetal (State Committee of Plant Health) (to be discussed in Chapter 8)

Appendix 3-2 Outline of NOM-075-FITO-1997
Components

Contents
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Main objectives

v To establish regulations for transport of fresh host fruits to prevent spreading to PFAs and ALPP

Areas of application

v
v
v
v
v

Pest-prevalence
status and zones

v PFA, ALPP and “Area under PS control” (see NOM-023)

Pests subjects to
control

v Four Anastrepha species, Apple maggot (R. pomonella) and Mediterranean fruit fly (C. capitata)

Host fruits subject to
control

v “Fruits of absolute quarantine”: highly susceptible host fruits for which no PS treatment exists hence under strict control
Ø 20 plant species
v “Fruits of partial quarantine”: host fruits for which a PS treatment is available
Ø 26 plant species

PS activities

v Sampling of fruits
v Post-harvest treatments to transport fruits into PFA or ALPP from outside
Ø HWT, fumigation (methyl dibromide for mangos)
v Inspection at PVIs by PS authority (or approved) personnel
v Issuance of PS certificate (based on IPM card to accompany transported products
v Disinfection treatments of products at origin or PVI
v Regulations of transport of fruits of partial quarantine
Ø (Transport of fruits of absolute quarantine to PFA or ALPP is prohibited)
Ø Requisites vary depending on origin and destination (whether from or to area under PS control, ALPP or PFA, or destined for
export), but in most cases PS certificate or IPM card is required.

Commercial orchards, urban acreages, ecological reserve and wilderness areas where host fruits grow
Facilities of packers, processors, intermediaries, distributors and PS treatment companies handling host fruits, etc
General cargo and passenger transports, and automobiles
Accumulation and marketing centers
Luggage, bags or packages at Puntos de Verificación Interna (PVIs, Domestic Inspection Points), railway terminals, sea ports,
airports, and border points
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